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ABSTRACT 
 
Market abuse practices have clearly harmed the integrity of financial markets and 
damaged investors‘ confidence. Market abuse takes two forms: insider dealing and 
market manipulation. These cover a variety of illegal practices, such as misusing inside 
information, pursuing courses of conduct which lead to artificial transactions, giving 
false or misleading information, and distorting the market in other ways. This thesis 
aims to examine the two forms of market abuse (insider dealing and market 
manipulation) under the UAE legal system. Particular attention is given to Federal Law 
No. 4 of 2000, known as the Emirates Securities & Commodities Authority Law (ESCA 
Law 2000). Other regulations which affect the market place are also covered.  The core 
question addressed in this thesis is to what extent ESCA Law 2000, and other 
regulations promulgated pursuant thereto, are efficient in combating market abuse 
practices and how they have been applied to protect market integrity and the market 
participants.   The thesis investigates the deficiencies of the existing law through a legal 
comparative study of the jurisdictions of the UK and the Dubai International Financial 
Centre. This is followed by an applied study which consists of a questionnaire and 
interviews.  The applied study, conducted in the UAE, aims to investigate the 
perspectives of legal experts, other specialists and investors towards the regulation of 
the securities markets in the UAE. Applied study and comparison eventually provide the 
basis for recommendations for the improvement of the UAE legal system, with respect 
to market abuse practices. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Market abuse has been one of the main issues of concern in financial markets 
throughout the world. Market abuse badly harms market integrity, stability and 
efficiency as well as public confidence. Accordingly, the topic of market abuse is the 
main problem examined in this thesis. The UAE government realised that it is important 
to create a legislative environment defining rules of law regarding the securities 
markets. On these grounds, Federal Law No. 4 of 2000 concerning the Emirates 
Securities & Commodities Authority (ESCA Law 2000) was enacted in the year 2000 
for the regulation of securities markets.  Even though it came into law quite late, it was 
at a convenient time and is of importance. The UAE needed to pay great attention to this 
field because of its rapidly developing economy. The fundamental tendency in 
regulating the marketplace has been increasingly in the direction of codification at the 
Federal level
1
 rather than by each state of the Emirates. 
 
Importance of the study  
 
There are dimensions of importance to this study. The first is the fact that the UAE is an 
emerging market that was only 10 years old when it enacted the first law (ESCA Law 
2000) concerning the securities markets. Any law must be carefully drafted in order to 
secure investors from any misleading action and maintain their confidence by creating a 
suitable legislative environment in the securities markets. Market abuse practices that 
occur in securities markets raise legal problems which are worthy to study in order to 
find appropriate solutions and complete the lack of legislation by issuing 
recommendations. While the ESCA law 2000 drafted provisions against practices of 
                                                 
1
 The United Arab Emirates as a federation was formally established in December 1971, and is comprised 
of seven States (emirates): Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ajman, Umm al-Qaiwain, Ras al-Khaimah and 
Fujairah. 
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market abuse, it has not yet found its way into enough practice in cases of law. There 
are countless cases which illustrate its shortcomings and its weaknesses. Therefore, it is 
important that the ESCA law 2000 be examined.   
Second, this topic (specifically with regard to the UAE) has not been dealt with 
analytically in either Arabic or Western Literature. Hence there is a gap in the academic 
law library in this regard and this research aims at filling that gap. Even though there 
was a study focused just on insider dealing regulation
2
 related to the UAE it did not 
cover market abuse practices overall. This study concentrates on market abuse; both 
insider dealing and market manipulation as a whole.   
 
Third, recent experience of the securities market of the UAE and the dramatic 
involvement of the locals in the securities market calls particular attention to the need to 
study the current regime and see whether this is efficient for combating practices of 
market abuse in the UAE financial markets.  
 
Research purpose  
 
The purpose of the research is to investigate the legal provisions of market abuse 
practices under the ESCA Law 2000. It looks at how the UAE jurisdictions combat 
deceptive trading.  The study critically analyses the experience of the UAE proper (i.e. 
at federal level and as observed in the cases of the Abu Dhabi and Dubai stock markets) 
through a comparison with the jurisdictions of the UK and DIFC laws in how they deal 
with such practices of market abuse: insider dealing and market manipulation.  These 
two practices will be analysed and their definitions in legal and economics perspectives 
will be looked at, as will the arguments for their reform. The DIFC, in other words, is 
                                                 
2
 Albelooshi, Abdulsalam , The Regulation of Insider Dealing: An Applied and Comparative Legal Study 
Towards Reform in the UAE, (unpublished PhD dissertation.  (Exeter, UK: University of Exeter, 2008). 
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seen here as an ‗external‘ case, even though physically located within the emirate of 
Dubai, from which lessons can be drawn, just as they can from the case of the UK. 
 
The current legal framework of the UAE needs to be examined with the following 
questions: To what extent is the ESCA law 2000 efficient for combating market abuse?  
How has it been used to protect market integrity and market participants in the market 
place? The thesis provides reasonable recommendations for enhancing the UAE 
regulatory regime through reforming the market abuse regime and remedying its 
deficiencies in order to protect investors and maintain market integrity.  
 
There are various aspects of market abuse regulation which are of major interest and are 
significant for this thesis. The objectives of this thesis are related to them and are as 
follows:  
 Exploring the historical legislation development of the securities markets in the 
UAE.  
 Identifying the reasons for the summer crisis in 1998.  
 Analysing the UAE legal issues referring to market abuse: insider dealing and 
market manipulation behaviours.   
 Defining who can be caught by the market abuse laws and to whom they can be 
liable.  
 Identifying the forms of market abuse that ESCA law 2000 has stated by 
comparing them with the UK and DIFC jurisdictions in order to judge the 
adequacy of criminal provisions and highlight the deficiencies  
 Examining the legal protection of investors in the UAE financial markets.   
 Investigating the operational problems in the UAE financial markets. 
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 Improving the UAE the judicial system and investors‘ legal protection by 
suggesting: 
- To establish a specialist court and criminal reconciliation in the UAE 
financial markets. 
- To criticise criminal punishments under ESCA law 2000 in order to be deter 
more market abuse.    
 Highlighting recommendations in order to reform the current legal framework.   
 
Research methodology 
 
This thesis relies on the comparative analytical method and applied social study. The 
comparative law study will be approached by studying the UK and DIFC legislations. 
The key purpose of this is to look at the problems and shortcomings of market abuse 
regulations under ESCA Law 2000 and how both laws (the UK and DIFC) in question 
deal with such illegal practices. This has required an analysis of the law in question to 
show how it has developed in regard to judicial reasoning and legislative enactment. 
This will be followed by gathering data from articles and textbooks which have been 
written on the same subject.   
 
The applied social study, using qualitative and quantitative methods, will be employed 
in this thesis. In fact, this is unusual in the legal field. Legal study often focuses on 
comparative law methodology alongside the reading of legislation digests, legal cases, 
journal articles, textbooks and other commentaries. However, this study will combine 
social study with legal methodology. This will assist the researcher to identify legal 
problems in regulation of the financial markets, and to build an integrated study.   
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The structure of the study 
 
 
This research begins with an introduction to the UAE securities markets, looking at the 
background of the securities legal development. It also will cover the legislative and 
administrative regulation of the capital markets: the Abu Dhabi Securities Exchange 
(ADX) and the Dubai Financial Market (DFM) as well as the Dubai International 
Financial Centre (DIFC). This will be in the first chapter because it is important to 
understand their regimes and the legal framework of the UAE. It is followed by Chapter 
Two which will discuss the regulation of market abuse in the UAE by making a 
comparison between the UK and DIFC laws. This chapter will define market abuse 
under UAE, UK and DIFC laws, so it should be read in conjunction with Chapters 
Three and Four. Chapters Three and Four will discuss insider dealing and market 
manipulation regulation in the UK and UAE. These two forms will be identified and 
examined with UAE, UK and DIFC jurisdictions. Chapter Five will use a social study to 
investigate operational problems and legal protection in the market place by means of 
investors‘ attitude and legal experts‘ perspectives towards law and regulation applied in 
the markets. The last chapter will consist of a conclusion of the thesis and 
recommendations for reforms needed to enhance the markets regulations. Thus, the 
remainder of this thesis will be organised as follows: 
 
 Chapter two: regulation of market abuse: overview 
 Chapter three: the regulation of insider dealing. 
 Chapter four: regulation of market manipulation. 
 Chapter five: applied study: market abuse from the perspectives of legal experts, other 
specialists and investors towards legal regulation of securities markets in the UAE. 
 Chapter six:  conclusion and recommendation. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION TO THE UAE SECURITIES MARKETS 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
The focus of this thesis is the United Arab Emirates (UAE) financial market. This initial 
chapter has two aims. The first is to provide a brief, historical outline of establishment 
of the securities markets in the UAE by tracking its development since its foundation on 
December 2, 1971 until 2000. There are two primary dimensions to the securities 
market‘s background in the UAE.  The first dimension concerns historical elements of 
the financial market and the informal and unregulated securities market, which 
functioned in the absence of a regulated market. The second dimension concerns 
attempts to launch a formal securities market. Thus, this chapter explores how trading is 
achieved through an informal and unregulated over-the-counter (OTC) market as well 
as the UAE government‘s response to the financial problems faced  in that regime until 
the new law established a formal securities market authority in 2000.  
 
The secondary aim of this chapter is to provide information on the legislative and 
administrative regulation of the capital market, including the Dubai International 
Financial Centre (DIFC).  
 
The chapter is divided into four main topics. The first two sections cover the historical 
establishment of the securities market and the launch of the Securities and Commodities 
Authority (SCA). The last two sections present the structure of the DIFC and discuss the 
stock market dealers as well as the types of securities that traded in the country‘s stock 
market.  
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1.2 Historical Establishment of the UAE’s Securities Markets 
The UAE securities markets have a complicated history, having undergone significant 
changes. Since its inception on December 2, 1971
3, the UAE‘s national economies 
witnessed unprecedented growth, manifest in a significant transformation from an 
economy based on traditional resources to one based on oil.
4
 The oil sector now 
dominates the economy, accounting for most export revenue and providing significant 
opportunities for investment, thus underscoring a remarkable emergence of the UAE on 
the global economic stage.
5
 However, the government‘s dependency on oil to provide 
public revenue makes the national treasury both vulnerable and subject to typical oil 
market disturbances and fluctuations, which lead to the necessity of adopting an 
economic diversification strategy.
6
  
 
                                                 
3
 The United Arab Emirates (UAE) is a federal country that comprises seven Emirates, namely: Abu 
Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ajman, Umm al-Qaywayn, Ras al-Khaymah and al-Fujayrah.  Each UAE state is 
ruled by a hereditary sovereign with authority over local issues in his emirate. In terms of geography, the 
UAE is on the eastern side of the Arabian Peninsula on the Arabian Gulf. The country is a total of about 
32,000 square miles. The largest of its states is Abu Dhabi, which boasts an area of 28,000 square miles, 
followed by Dubai, its second largest state, with 1,500 square miles, followed by Sharjah 1000 square 
miles, Ra's al-Khaymah at 650 square miles, al-Fujayrah at 450 square miles, Umm al-Qaywayn at 300 
square miles and Ajman at 150 square miles. The country‘s neighbors include Saudi Arabia to the west 
and south, Qatar to the northwest, and Oman to the southeast and northeast.  For more details, see: 
http://gulf-law.com/uae_profile.html , accessed on 23/09/2010 
4
 Najeeb Al-Shamisi, The Investment Environment in the United Arab of Emirates : Fundamentals, 
Challenges and Opportunities. (Arabic) 1
st
ed. (Almasar  Publication: UAE; Ras Al-kheimah 2001), p 1.  
جذذتًنا حٍتشعنا خاسايلأا ًف يساًثتعلأا راًُنا ،ًغياشنا للهاذثع ةٍجَ : صشفناو خاٌذذتناو خايىقًنا ( حًٍخنا طأس : ساغًنا
 ،خاعاسذهن2001)  
5
 The oil sector represents 66.8% of the UAE‘s GDP in 1975, the surplus reaches 6287 million dirham, 
rising annually by about 20.8%, i.e., reaching 16211 million dirham by 1980. The chief reason behind the 
nation‘s increasing dependence on oil is a dramatic increase in oil prices and revenues, which affords the 
government solid ground for various promising investment projects. See Yusuf Khalifa Al-Yusuf, 
‗Economic Development in UAE from 1975 to 1990‘, (September 1992, UAE University press) 8 
Economic and Administrative Sciences, pp. 25-37. 
 For more details, see also: Adel Alkadamani, ‗Facts and Prospects of Economic Development in UAE; 
Statistical Study‘(Arabic) (1997)  18 Horizons Economic 70, pp. 40–90. 
 ، لداع، ًَاًضقنا 'ود ًف يداصتقلأا سىطتنا قافآو عقاو جذذتًنا حٍتشعنا خاسايلأا حن : حٍئاصدإ حعاسد ‘ حٌداصتقا قافآ ، ( ذهجًنا18 
 دذعنا70 حُغنا ، :1997)  
6
 Jamal Suweidi, Society of United Arab Emirates: Future Vision (Arabic) (Abu Dhabi: Emirates Centre 
for Studies and Strategic Researches Press; 2003), p. 23. 
يذٌىع، ذُع لاًج .  جذذتًنا حٍتشعنا خاسايلإا حنود عًتجي : حٍهثقتغي جشظَ( ًثظىتأ : ،حٍجٍتاشتعلاا ثىذثنا و خاعاسذهن خاسايلاا ضكشي
2003)  
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The 1971 to 1975 period comprises key years that see significant development of the 
Emirates into a united and amalgamated political organization. The United Arab 
Emirates was founded on December 2, 1971. In order for the new country to develop 
and grow, new institutional structures, both economic and social, were required. The 
necessity of developing a new infrastructure was in particular due to the UAE‘s 
increased wealth that resulted from oil industry revenue.
7
 The creation of a modern 
infrastructure led to success and growth in all areas of life in the country. 
  
In fact, the economic policies adopted by the government, alongside radical changes 
that affect the country‘s economic structure, combined with considerable economic 
achievements, led to a capital surplus. However, this surplus required the appropriate 
investment channels. As a result, there were numerous calls for financial markets 
transformation so that the national economy could absorb a large portion of the 
country‘s oil revenues and facilitate investment in the local markets.8 
 
The UAE financial markets began with various forms of investments. However, 
institutional investments (some with government participation) were soon greater than 
those by private individual investors. Both types, though, including joint-stock 
companies and public companies, contributed to the development of the national 
economy.
9
 
 
                                                 
7
 Fida Darwiche, The Gulf Stock Exchange Crash; the Rise and Fall of the Souq  Al-Manakh (Bristol, 
England; 1986), p 77. 
8
 S. A. Asisi  Arab and International Securities and Establishment of the UAE Stock Market, 1
st
 ed. 
(Arabic) (Beirut, Lebanon: Alwessam Publishing House, 1998),p. 73. (Hereinafter Asisi, Arab and 
International Securities and establishment of the UAE Stock Market)   
حٍناًنا قاسولأن خاسايلإا قىع ظٍعأت و حٍنوذنا و حٍتشعنا حٍناًنا قاسولأا خاصسىت  ،ًغٍغنا ٍغد ٌٍذنا حلاص ( . ٌاُثن ،خوشٍت : ساد
 ششُنا و حعاثطهن واعىنا1998 )  
9
 Al Shamisi, The Investment Environment in the United Arab of Emirates, p. 9.  
 
 24 
 
From 1975 to 1982, great awareness occurred over the importance of investment, which 
led to the creation of public, joint-stock companies to deal with the surplus capital. This 
ushered in a significant move toward subscription of the new releases of companies, 
which developed dramatically. At this time, several banks were established by local 
governments, individuals and families. However, securities were limited and there was 
no financial brokerage activity. The majority of company shares were closed, meaning 
they were not made available for public subscription, but only for private purchase 
among the company‘s owners.10 This occurred prior to establishment of the Federal 
Company Law No. 8 of 1984 (FC law 1984).
11
 Thus, one of the negative phenomena 
that accompanied this period was a deficiency in the distinction between legal forms of 
commercial companies, which led to non-discrimination between the duties of each 
company according to its legal form.   
 
Moreover, it is worth noting that the government did not deal in other securities, such as 
treasury bills or bonds, which are generally issued by governments, because these bills 
were not yet available at the time. However, from the mid-1970s to the early 1980s, 
share-dealing transactions witnessed a dramatic increase in the number of credit 
facilities offered by banks and other financial institutions. In this sense, it is interesting 
to note that the overwhelming majority of investor savings made their way to the 
secondary markets. These dealings also include companies that were only recently 
founded, but which had not yet engaged in any real activity.
 12
  
                                                 
10
 I. A. Aljali, A study on the possibility for Establishing Securities Market in the United Arab Emirates 
(Abu Dhabi: The Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Abu Dhabi; Department of Studies and 
Economic Research; 1991), p.42. (Hereinafter Aljali, A Study on the Possibility for Establishing 
Securities Market in the United Arab Emirates). 
   ، جذذتًنا حٍتشعنا خاسايلإا حنود ًف حٍناًنا قاسولأن قىع ءاشَإ حٍَاكيا لىد حعاسد  ،ًهعجنا ًهع ىٍهاشتا( ًثظىتأ : جساجت حفشغ
 ، حٌداصتقلاا ثىذثناو خاعاسذنا جسادإ ؛ ًثظىتأ حعاُصو1991 .)  
11
  The Federal Company Law No. 8 of 1984 was issued in the UAE Official Gazette on April, 1, 1984 
and comes into force three months starting from the date of its publication. See the Federal Company Law 
No. 8 of 1984  Article 329. 
12
 Aljali, A study on the Possibility for Establishing Securities Market in the United Arab Emirates,p.42.   
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1.2.1 The Absence of a Formal and Regulated Securities Market  
 
Markets regulation in the UAE was supposed to be shared by the federal and Emirate 
levels. Nevertheless, federal legislative authority regarding market behavior was not 
exercised until 1979. Prior to 1979, market regulation was achieved separately and 
rather liberally by each ruler of the seven Emirates and their administrations. Most of 
these rules and regulations were not based on codified law and thus are informal and 
optional.
13
 As a result, many drawbacks came to the fore and some companies found it 
easy to exploit shareholder money through manipulation. One might justifiably 
conclude that, of all the drawbacks and deficiencies that taint this period, the lack of 
distinction between companies‘ various obligations and the lack of effective laws are 
the most noticeable.
 14
   
In addition to the above-mentioned problems in the establishment of financial markets, 
there were various other obstacles, such as lack of organization, unregulated markets 
and informal trading as well as the overall absence of public company integrity. 
Moreover, lack of transparency concerning periodic economic and financial reports 
undoubtedly underscored this negativity.
15
 Only with the establishment of certain 
regulations and laws could the nation‘s capital market develop and prosper.16 
Since 1979, the legal situation in the UAE has undergone a process of regulation.  
Federal and Emirate law has moved toward facilitating the entry of foreign businesses 
                                                 
13
 Nicholas B. Angell, ‗Regulation of Business under the Developing Legal System of the United Arab 
Emirates‘, (1986) 1 Arab Law Quarterly 2. p. 125. ( hereinafter Angell, Regulation of Business under the 
Developing Legal System of the United Arab Emirates). 
14
 Aljali, A Study on the possibility for Establishing Securities Market in the United Arab Emirates, p.42.  
   
15
 Asisi, Arab and International Securities and Establishment of the UAE Stock Market, p74   
16
 M.S. Al-Nabulsi,(1993).  Arab legislations Capacity to Assimilate the Changes and to Develop Stock 
Market Capital.  A Working Paper: An Introduction for a Symposium on the Role of Arab Banks in 
Privatization and Securities Markets Development, organized by the Union of Arab Banks, p.264.  
مًع حقسو،ذٍعع ذًذي ،ًغهتاُنا : سود جوذُن حيذقًنا،لاًنا طأس قاىعأ شٌىطتو خاشٍغتًنا باعٍتعا ىهع حٍتشعنا خاعٌششتنا جسذق
 يزنا ، حٍناًنا قاىعلأا شٌىطتو حٍصٍصختنا ًف حٍتشعنا فساصًنا حٍتشعنا فساصًنا داذتا حًظَ1993 .  
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into the market, which significantly affects business sector in the UAE. The 
fundamental tendency in market regulation has increasingly been moving toward 
codification, extra regulation at the federal level, rather than solely by each Emirate.
 17
  
Though there was no official, organized market for securities negotiation in the United 
Arab Emirates,
18
 the Central Bank held an important position in licensing and regulating 
securities and commodities brokers and dealers. In addition, the issue and transactions 
involved in the securities of publicly-held companies, to some extent, have been 
regulated by the Federal Company Law No. 8 of 1984 (FC law 1984).
19
 
In March 1984, the FC law 1984 was established, with a view to being put into effect on 
July 1, 1984. However, this July date was delayed by six months. The FC law 1984 
gave companies a one-year period to meet its requirements. By 1985, the Federal 
Ministry of Economy and Commerce, was in charge of overseeing that the original 
intent of the law would be carried out. The Ministry issued many executive regulations 
regarding the application and re-examination methods for new companies, the processes 
of registration for older companies and the need of public companies to have standard 
corporate documentation.  After the Council of Ministers promulgated a decree to 
suspend the law for one year, it finally became effective on 1 January 1987.
20
  
 
In retrospect, the delay establishing a proper financial market may seem surprising, but 
in fact there was a good reason for it.  Establishing a financial market was a goal of the 
                                                 
17
 Angell, Regulation of Business Under the Developing Legal System of the United Arab Emirates, p125. 
18
  Imad Salah Sallam , Handling the Crises in the Financial and International Securities, the Ongoing 
Development, 1
st
 ed (Abu Dhabi :2002), p.218. (Hereinafter Sallam, Handling the Crises in the Financial 
and International Securities) 
 حهصاىتًنا حًٍُتناو حًٍناعناو حٍتشعنا حٍناًنا قاسولأا حصسىت ًف خايصلأا جسادإ ،ولاع  حلاص داًع (ًثظىتا :2002  ) ص218  
19
 Angell, Regulation of Business under the Developing Legal System of the United Arab Emirates, p. 
126. 
20
 Gary R. Feulner, ‗The UAE Commercial Companies Law: Recalled to Life‘ (1989) 4 Arab Law 
Quarterly 3, pp.216-217. 
 27 
 
Government in order to encourage local and foreign investors, but efforts to establish it 
in the early 1980s were destroyed by the Kuwait financial market Al-Manakh crisis. The 
financial market in Kuwait had a strong influence on the UAE economy, as there has 
been investment from the UAE in Kuwait, which had opened the first financial market 
in the Gulf region.  Additionally, Kuwait and the UAE as countries share similar socio-
economic backgrounds, features and characteristics. 
 
In the early 1990s, the plan to establish a financial market was revived, providing for 
the country's flourishing economy at that time. However, uncertainty and hesitation 
meant more delays. Following that, the Second Gulf War took place, which negatively 
affected the plan. In the late 1990s, the Asian economic crisis provided another excuse 
for the delay in taking the decision. 
 
By the end of 1998, the UAE stock market became one of the major markets in the 
region, compared to the rest of the Arab world. In terms of total market value, it was 
ranked second after the Saudi Arabian stock market and considered one of the largest 
markets in proportion to the size of the state economy, as the percentage of market value 
reached 56% of the general national income.
21
 This prosperity encouraged the 
government to attempt to establish a formal securities market. However, this attempt 
was stopped as can be seen in the subsection below.  
1.2.2 Attempts at Launching a Formal Securities Market  
 
Officials in the United Arab Emirates realised the necessity of establishing a securities 
market.
22
 Therefore, in 1982, the Chamber of Commerce and Industry attempted to 
                                                 
21
 Sallam, Handling the Crises in the Financial and International Securities,  p.218 
22
 Asisi, Arab and International Securities and Establishment of the UAE Stock Market, p. 73.  
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found such an exchange.
23
 The International Finance Institution (IFI) was also 
commissioned by the UAE Central Bank to undertake a study on the possibility of 
instituting a stock market and hiring experts in the field of securities in the Emirates.
24
 
In light of this step, a group of experts visited the United Arab Emirates in 1982, met 
with a number of officials in various fields and then prepared a report on the prospect of 
establishing a securities market in the United Arab Emirates.
 25
 The IFI then discussed 
the report with experts from the International Monetary Fund, who agreed.  The 
recommendations of international experts were interesting as they suggested that 
conditions were ripe for the establishment of a formal securities exchange in the 
country. The Council of Ministers forwarded the report to the Supreme Committee 
(1983). Following discussion of the report, the Supreme Committee recommended 
taking appropriate action for the establishment of a stock exchange. Consequently, the 
Supreme Committee adopted a draft bill for establishment of a stock market. However, 
the Council of Ministers did not take any action at that time.
 26
   
These attempts were challenged for various reasons, the most important of which is the 
crisis (Al-Manakh) of the neighboring Kuwait financial market. This collapse affected 
companies and investors in the UAE. Moreover, the oil boom had ended and the UAE 
experienced economic deflation. Despite the introduction of the Federal Company Law 
No 8 of 1984, it took another three years for the law to become effective. Owing to 
                                                 
23
 Yet, these attempts are stopped because they coincide with an investment environment crisis in Kuwait 
alongside the ensuing negative impact on investors in the United Arab Emirates. Further, the soaring rise 
of oil and the national recession that continues until 1988 usher in total deferral of the market‘s 
development and promotion. See Sallam,, Handling the Crises in the Financial and International 
Securities, p 216. See also regarding crisis of Kuwait; R.M. Salameh, The Stock Market and Economic 
Stability in a Developing Surplus Economy, Case Study: Kuwait, (Dissertation presented to University of 
Denver, March 1986), p.96. 
24
Sallam, Handling the Crises in the Financial and International Securities,p.216. 
25
 Asisi, Arab and International Securities and Establishment of the UAE Stock Market, p.73.  
26
 Aljali, A Study on the Possibility for Establishing Securities Market in the United Arab Emirates, 
pp.61-26.     
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shareholders needs for liquidity and economic deflation. In the same era, three financial 
brokerages were founded, one in Sharjah and two in Abu Dhabi.
27
   
1.2.3 The Importance of an Open Securities Market 
 
Securities markets undeniably play an important role in driving a country‘s economy.28 
This has resulted in the growing importance of securities markets around the world, 
which in turn has led to more research on the relationship between financial 
development and economic growth.  This research has made it possible to identify 
securities market growth predicators, which explain at least part of the difference in 
increased rates across countries.
29
 The interest in the foundation and development of 
securities markets has increased in many Arab States as part of the implementation of 
privatization programs and has become an important factor in promoting and directing 
savings towards various investment channels.
30
 The UAE has played a large role as a 
financial and banking center of the Gulf Region, which emphasised the importance 
inaugurating a formally regulated securities market.  
 
Securities markets afford individuals and institutions a way to construct wealth or 
reduce the risk of financial failure.
31
 Some of the most important benefits of founding 
securities markets
32
 are as follows: 
1. Securities markets contribute to the development of financial services 
and enable the establishment of more limited companies. 
2. Such markets gather a portion of the funds invested abroad and re-
inject them into the national economy. 
                                                 
27
 Sallam, Handling the Crises in the Financial and International Securities, p.217. 
 
28
 Mahmoud Mohieldin and Maged Shawky, ‗Institution Aspects, Distributional Characteristics and 
Efficiency of the Egyptian Securities Market‘ (Working paper presented in a workshop organised by the 
Arab Planning Institute-Kuwait in March 1999), p 1. 
29
 Philip Arestis, Panicos O. Demetriades, Kul B. Luintel, ‘Financial Development and Economic 
Growth: The Role of Stock Markets‘ (Feb. 2001) 33 Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 1, p 16. 
30
 A.H. Al Isra, A.H. ‗The Arab Unified Stock Exchange and Arab Financial Integration‘(Arabic) (June 
17, 2006) Arab Economic Unity magazine,33, p.13. 
31
 Rik W. Hafer and Scott E. Hein, The Stock Market,(Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 2007), p.1. 
32
 Asisi, Arab and International Securities and Establishment of the UAE Stock Market, p. 80.  
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3. Securities markets can advise the financial community about options 
for dealing in publicly-traded shares as well as creating confidence 
among dealers. 
4. Securities markets capitalize on higher prices and diversity of 
investment portfolios for analysts and investors.
33
 
5. Securities markets reassure investors about the safety of their 
investments as well as their ability to reacquire the value of their shares 
from public companies easily and quickly, if necessary. 
6. Such markets improve the quality of investments and increases 
investment awareness, demanding better performance from companies 
and likewise improving available economic management for both 
individuals and institutions. 
 
It is assumed that stock markets facilitate the kind of price equilibrium on which 
economic theories are centred. They similarly perform two basic functions:  providing 
large-scale financing directly to productive units within the economy while 
simultaneously creating a market for company shares. Thus, they assist shareholders in 
achieving liquidity, while allowing them to acquire shares without great risk. These two 
functions are interrelated.
34
  
  
1.3 The Evolution of the Securities Market Establishment in the UAE  
 
In the sphere of consolidation, the distinguished role of the United Arab Emirates as a 
major banking and financial center in the Arab Gulf region and the evolution of a 
systematic securities market of company shares became increasingly important, as one 
of the basic fundamentals and focal points of the economic policies and plans for the 
region.
35
 In any country, the importance of commencing a formal and regulated market 
is shown in the presence of company shares being evaluated at more than their real 
market value without financial or economic justification.  
 
                                                 
33
 The term ―investor‖ is planned to comprise customers or other consumers of financial services. 
34
 Tony Naughton, ‗The Role of Stock Markets in the Asian-Pacific Region‘, (1999) 13 Asian-Pacific 
Economic Literature 1, p. 22. xxx 
35
 Symposium on Trends Development in Global Financial Market (March 1998) Implications for an 
Organized Stock Exchange in the UAE,p.1. 
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In its Financial System Stability Assessment report in 2003, the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF)
 36
 indicated that the ‗absence of effective regulation and reliable and 
accurate market information, combined with the closely held nature of many of the 
publicly held companies, [has] created a perception that the market was susceptible to 
abuse by insiders as well as other forms of market malpractice.‘ The report adds, 
‗during 1997 and 1998, the UAE securities markets are characterized by extreme price 
volatility. It is believed that market manipulation and insider dealing contributed to this 
condition‘.37 This report based its findings on a crisis in the summer of 1998, which was 
an unforeseen event and a reflection of the frenzied activities in unregulated securities 
markets.  
  
1.3.1 Summer of 1998 Crisis 
 
 The summer of 1998 saw a destructive crisis in the market. This crisis created 
unreliable and unpredictable stock market activity in which stocks fluctuated greatly as 
prices rose to incredible heights. Investors and trading companies lost assurance in the 
market. In addition, after the crisis, there was a quiet period and then one of extended 
decline. All of these problems caused the stock market to seem lackluster and had a 
dramatic effect on investor confidence, who began to worry that a similar crisis would 
recur. Lack of attraction to the market, as it was not considered profitable meant local 
investment ceased to be drawn to it, thus making it difficult to create the requisite 
financial liquidity.
38
  
 
                                                 
36
International Monetary Fund, United Arab Emirates: Financial System Stability Assessment, including 
reports on the Observation of Standards and Codes on the following topics: Monetary and Financial 
Policy Transparency, Banking Supervision and Payment Systems. (Washington, D.C.: International 
Monetary Fund, 2003).  
37
 Emirates Industrial Bank, (October 1998) p.19 Footnote 10. 
38
 http://www.adcci.gov.ae:90/public/media/magazines/sept99/analysis.htm  accessed (14/9/2010) 
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One important factor in the 1998 crisis, exacerbating the effect of the oil price slump on 
confidence in banks, was the absence of a formally regulated securities market. Major 
investors exploited the situation, perpetuating it by becoming involved in market abuse, 
such as through the spreading of false rumors.
39
 It is clearly shown that the delay in 
establishing a regulated market was the reason for the crisis. Capital markets could 
never exist or develop unless legislation for their organization would be established.
40
 
Consequently, the government issued regulatory laws to govern
41
 market activities and 
also rules governing the issuance and process of securities in conformity with 
international standards in order to avoid negativity and potential operational obstacles of 
an unorganised market. 
 
Officials considered the crisis to be the result of a stock market that lacked a central 
authority and legal regulation, considering it necessary to create such an authority and 
rule of law as quickly as possible in order to solve the market‘s problems.  Authorities 
in Dubai and Abu Dhabi moved rapidly to bring about changes and establish 
committees to learn what was necessary in order to establish a functioning market in the 
country. Later, the UAE Cabinet approved a draft law on the creation of an official 
stock market and authority.
42
 It was this crisis of the summer of 1998 which finally 
caused the government to reconsider the organization of the financial market and 
                                                 
39
 Al-Shamisi, The Investment Atmosphere in the UAE (Arabic) p.126. 
40
 Nabulsi. p.264.  
41
 The most important legislation relevant to the securities market before its formal foundation is the Law 
of Companies, which is issued under Federal Law No. 8 of 1984, concerning commercial companies; this 
is amended under Federal Law No. 13 of 1988 and the Federal Law No. 25 of 2001, which determine the 
conditions for founding various types of companies, including the shareholding companies that represent 
the backbone of the market. In the UAE, the Law of Companies plays an essential role in the protection of 
shareholders other than civil and federal laws regarding organized accounting and auditing standards. For 
more details, see  Uday Qasior, Protection of the Rights of Individual Shareholders in the Securities 
Markets of Abu Dhabi, 1st edition (The Emirates Centre for Strategic Studies and Research Press, Series  
No. 108, 2005) p. 38.  
42
 http://www.adcci.gov.ae:90/public/media/magazines/sept99/analysis.htm  (14/9/2010). 
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pushed them to decide to establish an effective regulatory regime that would improve 
market mechanisms and protect the markets integrity.
43
 
 
1.3.2 Launching the Securities and Commodities Authority (SCA) 
 
On January 29, 2000, Federal Law No. 4 of 2000 was issued concerning the Emirates 
Securities and Commodities Authority and Market (ESCA law 2000). Under the terms 
of this law, a public body was created called the ‗Securities and Commodities 
Authority‘ (SCA) in Abu Dhabi. This was given a  juristic, financial and administrative 
profile, with the independence and the supervisory and executive powers required for 
practicing and achieving its tasks.  The latter were  to serve the objectives of the general 
economic policy of the country and to support economic stability. In addition, the body 
had the right to establish other branches or offices to carry out its supervisory and 
control functions over the markets. The law prohibited the body from trading, having a 
particular benefit in any project, or from possessing or issuing any securities.
44
   
 
The Government identified three goals
45
 that it saw as essential to achieving the national 
economic interest; first it must provide an opportunity for investment funds and savings 
in securities and commodities. This means the Regulating Authority must ensure the 
safety and accuracy of transactions and ensure the interaction of supply and demand 
factors for determining prices while protecting investors by consolidating the 
foundation of proper handling between various investors. Second, it exists to develop 
investment awareness through studies as well as to present recommendations. Its last 
directive is to work to ensure the country‘s financial and economic stability. 
                                                 
43
 International Monetary Fund,  United Arab Emirates: Financial System Stability Assessment, including 
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Monetary Fund, 2003). 
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The Regulating Authority engages in a legislative and supervisory role in the securities 
and commodities markets of the country, where it is authorized to regulate the 
protection of investor rights, such as instituting an effective disclosure and transparency 
system as well as a system for the arbitration of disputes that arise from the securities 
market. Further, it has the right to propose regulations related to the stock market issued 
by a decision of the Ministers‘ Council. It can put into place certain regulations 
immediately after consultation and in coordination with the licensed markets of the 
country, while also overseeing the execution of laws and regulations by all parties, such 
as financial markets, intermediaries, listed companies and investors.
46
 
The ESCA Law 2000 was approved, producing two markets, namely, the Abu Dhabi 
Securities Exchange (ADX) and the Dubai Financial Market (DFM). These markets are 
connected electronically, allowing them to be viewed as one combined market, to some 
extent as Emirates Securities.
47
   
 
1.3.3 The Abu Dhabi Securities Exchange 
 
The Abu Dhabi Securities Exchange market was founded under Law No. 3 of 2000 
issued by the Executive Council of Abu Dhabi on May 13, 2000.  The market was 
officially opened on November 15, 2000 when the shares of twelve shareholding 
companies were listed; the market value of shares was approximately 13 billion 
dirhams. The number of listed companies increased from 12 to 59
48
 companies by the 
end of September 2006 and the market value of those company shares reached 
                                                 
46
 Article 4 of the ESCA law 2000.  
47
 Article 21 of the Resolution of the Authority‘s Board No. 3 of 2000 Regulation as to Disclosure and 
Transparency. See also: Oxford Business Group, ‗High-octane Growth‘, (January 2006) Issue:1  
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approximately 345,188.1 million dirhams ($93,979 million).
49
 Under Law No. 3, the 
market was defined as a government institution and so enjoyed individuality, financial 
and administrative independence and the powers of control and implementation 
necessary to execute its tasks. The market was also afforded the right to establish other 
branches outside the borders of Abu Dhabi. 
 
Financial experts and economists were agreed that the establishment of the Abu Dhabi 
securities market caused radical changes in the existing method of dealing with shares, 
giving them greater depth through correlation with other Gulf markets. Also, it actively 
contributed to the development of financial services and the establishment of more 
shareholding companies, which offered a positive reflection on the economic growth 
prospects of the country.
50
 
 
1.3.4 The Dubai Financial Markets 
 
On March 26, 2000 the Dubai Securities Market was founded pursuant to Decree No. 
14 of 2000 issued by the ruler of Dubai on May 29, 2000, which stated that the Dubai 
Securities Market was an independent public institution, enjoying individuality as a 
secondary market to the securities exchange. These securities are issued by deeds and 
bonds of the federal government, shareholding companies, local governments, public 
authorities, investment funds and all other financial mechanisms, both international and 
domestic, which are acceptable to the market.
51
 Mohammed Al Abar
52
 highlights the 
view that ‗[t]he goal for the foundation of the market [has been] to play a vital role in 
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 Arab Monetary Fund, a database cite securities Arab, (third quarter 2006) Quarterly Bulletin, p.62. 
50
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June 2000), p.16. 
51
 http://www.dfm.ae/dfm/arabic/main/main.htm  (23/01/2007). 
52
 Mohammed Ali Rashid Al Abbar. Al Abbar served as the Director-General of Dubai's Department of 
Economic Development, and Chairman of Emaar, one of the world's largest real estate companies. Al 
Abbar is also a member of the Dubai Executive Council. Available at 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mohammed_bin_Ali_Al_Abbar  Accessed (23/09/2010). 
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utilizing local savings through the creation of equal opportunities, for individuals and 
institutions to invest in local shares and to eliminate the overstepping and passiveness 
that dominated the unofficial stock market in the past years.‘ He adds that the ‗Dubai 
market is a part of a project of the UAE market for securities and commodities. The 
market mechanism will be governed by the provisions of the Federal Law No. 4 of 
2000‘.53 
The number of listed companies in the Dubai market at the end of September 2006 
reached 40 companies; the market value of its shares reached 352,358.8 million dirhams 
($95,932 million) with 47,839.3 million dirhams trading ($13,024 million).
54
 
On December 27, 2005, a significant development for the Dubai Financial Market 
(DFM) followed from a decision of the Executive Council Decree. The DFM became a 
public joint stock Company with 8 billion dirham capital paid for 8 billion shares - 1 
dirham for each share. Twenty percent of the shares were offered to public shareholders. 
This offering was the first of its kind in the UAE. These shares were overly subscribed 
and over 201 billion dirham is gained. On March 7, 2007 trading of DFM shares finally 
began.
55
 
1.4 Legislative and Administrative Regulation of the Capital Market 
 
To ensure effectiveness and efficiency of a capital market and to guarantee its mandated 
role in the country‘s economy, legislation is adopted governing its operation and 
configuration in terms of both substantive and administrative control. Legislation varies 
from one country to another as to the degree with which the law involves itself in the 
                                                 
53
 The Economy Magazine, (April 2000) 154, p. 18. 
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 The Arab Monetary Fund, a database of Arab Securities Markets, third quarter 2006 of term period, p. 
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55
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market.
56
 The UAE capital markets are regulated by both the Federal Commercial 
Company Law No. 8 of 1984 and the Federal Law No. 4 of 2000 concerning the 
Emirates Securities and Commodities Market (ESCA Law 2000). The former applies to 
and regulates a group of legal processes for all commercial companies that either are 
established in the UAE or that have the foundation of their branch agencies in foreign 
countries. The latter regulates secondary market and securities trading conduct. These 
legal frameworks regulate both foreign and domestic commercial and investment 
activity.  
 
Three resolutions were issued by the UAE Federal Cabinet in order to implement 
Federal Law No. 4 of 2000 with regard to the securities and commodities markets. The 
policy for licensing and supervising securities markets is determined by these three 
cabinet resolutions. This policy regulates securities listing on the markets as well as the 
actions of the Securities and Commodities Authority.
57
 With the approval of the 
legislation, the two stock exchanges come into being: the Abu Dhabi Securities 
Exchange (ADX) and the Dubai Financial Market (DFM). These markets are considered 
one entity, as Emirates Securities, since they are connected electronically.
58
   
  
On the other hand, the Dubai International Financial Centre (DIFC) was created by the 
enactment of Federal Law No. 8 of 2004 concerning the Financial Free Zones in the 
United Arab Emirates and of Federal Law No. 9 of 2004 with regard to the DIFC. This 
is the process by which a new law and financial regime are formed in the region of 
                                                 
56
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Dubai. The Federal Law alters the Constitution to give the DIFC extensive legislative, 
judicial and executive powers as a financial "free zone" within Dubai.
59
 
 
The DIFC cannot rise to become an integral part of Dubai‘s future unless it is able to 
attract worldwide investors; therefore, it offers a dollar-denominated environment in 
which 100% overseas possession is permitted with no tax on returns or profits and no 
limits on foreign exchange or capital/profit repatriation.
60
 
 
Based on this, the legislative regulation and managerial restructuring of the capital 
market and superintendence are presented and the rules and legislative laws clarified to 
the extent necessary, such that they are within the bounds of the DIFC‘s influence.  
 
1.4.1 Management Structure of the Market 
 
In the United Arab Emirates, the supervisory and regulatory role is played by the 
Securities and Commodities Authority (SCA).
61
 This Authority consists of a Board of 
Directors responsible for running its affairs, setting up general policy that is consistent 
with the regulations issued 
 62
 and acting in the interests of the national economy. It is 
not confined to that role, but also issues the necessary decisions to protect investors 
through consolidating proper handling bases that ensure the interaction of supply and 
demand and the development of investment awareness as well as financial and 
economic stability.
63
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The Board of Directors comprises the Minister of Economy and Commerce as the 
Chairman, five experienced and competent members nominated by the minister, and a 
Chief Executive Officer of the Board, all appointed by  decision of the Ministers‘ 
Council.
 64
A board term is for four years, with renewal for only one term, with the 
exception of the Chief Executive Officer.
 65
 The Chairman or his deputy is the head of 
the board and its representative in the judiciary as well as to third parties.
 66
  
 
Board resolutions are decided by majority vote and in the case of equal votes the 
chairman‘s vote carries greater weight. Council meetings are considered valid when  the 
majority of members are present so long as this includes the attendance of the chairman 
or his deputy.
 67
 
 
To achieve transparency and prevent insider dealing, the legislation obliges Board 
Members to declare, in writing, to the Authority  their own securities and any owned by 
their wives or minor children; also, Board Members are required to declare, in writing, 
any changes that occur within a week of the member becoming aware of that change.
 68
 
Moreover, the Board is considered the controlling authority for the conduct of its affairs 
in accordance with its regulations.
 69
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66
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 1.4.2 Speciality missions of the Securities and Commodities Authority (SCA) 
 
The UAE legislation charges the SCA with several missions, the most important of 
which are to:  
 Propose laws and regulations to practice its missions and roles and to issue 
authorization for securities markets and its trading and circulation system
70
 where 
practice of any of the actions related to the capital market law is not permitted until 
authorization from the SCA is obtained.
 71
   
 
 Conduct the necessary investigations, inspection and follow-up checks  72 to ensure 
application of the law, regulations and the availability of transparency and 
disclosure.
 73 Inspection teams have the right to enter the market and intermediaries‘ 
offices during working hours and to examine records and documents. They also 
have the right to request they any document or information they deem necessary for 
executing their tasks.
 74
Through the process of investigation and inspection, the 
inspection team can order anyone under investigation not to take any action related 
to his own securities and can prevent him from withdrawing any funds or securities 
deposited with another party.
 75
The paperwork that results from these investigations 
and inspections are considered confidential documents that should not be published 
for the general public.
 76
 It is worth noting that the law does not grant inspection 
teams the judicial authority to prove that crimes have happened in contravention of 
the provisions of the Securities Market Law and its pursuance decisions. 
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 Consider  complaints submitted with possible sanctions including a warning and a 
financial penalty that does not exceed 100,000 dirham issued by the Board of 
Directors.
77
  
 
1.4.3 Mission of the SCA‘s Board of Directors 
 
In addition to administering the Authority‘s affairs, the Board is charged with many 
specific  tasks, such as to:  
 Oblige any person, whether natural or legal 78 connected to securities, to disclose 
any information related to his activities in public or in private. For this, the Board 
has the right to ask that an investigation be conducted according to the provisions of 
the law, or to request that executive decisions be made thereon. 
 79
  
 Receive reports and complaints related to market activity or their intermediaries and 
make appropriate decisions.
80
 
 Temporarily stop transactions in the securities market or in the shares of any 
company, or dealing in any securities in the case of exceptional circumstances or 
due to any threat to the market system and its workflow functioning. 
 81
  
 Freeze, suspend, or enforce any regulation, or any system of the market or its 
operations.
 82
  
 Conduct periodic inspections of market members, or make a significant request for 
an investigation regarding compliance with execution of the law, and compliance 
with the law as well as with regulations.
 83
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1.4.4 Legislative Regulation of the Securities Market 
 
The economic situation of any country is the basis on which legislative policy is formed 
regarding the organization of capital markets, as the law emerges from the needs of 
society.
 84
Legislators plan general principles for incrimination and penalties applicable 
when offenses are committed and leave identifying the elements of acting to the 
competent authority 
85
 entrusted by law to manage its regulations, such as the Emirates 
securities market. 
86
  In economic penal law, especially, it can be hard to identify 
elements of criminality and identify the acts of each crime. Therefore, is often more 
appropriate for legislators to determine the general rules of criminality and the sanctions 
to be applied when committing the offense, leaving the job of identifying the elements 
of a crime to the executive authority.
 87
  
Accordingly, the legislative policy of the financial markets grants the administrative 
agencies concerned with the implementation of the law the authority to issue the 
appropriate regulations as well as to propose the solutions necessary to address any 
shortfall.
88
 These agencies display a high level of technical expertise through their 
practical experience and are able to identify the gaps resulting from practical 
experience.  Some market behavior demonstrates a high degree of innovation means and 
techniques, requiring extensive expertise to understand their nature.
 89
  
The Emirati Legislature adopted several policies that govern capital markets legislation. 
The first is a policy of determining which crimes happen exclusively in securities, such 
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as in Articles No. 40, 41 and 42. Further, it grants legislative authorization, as in Article 
4 of ESCA Law 2000, which decides that the SCA has the right to suggest regulations 
and set the requisite legislations to achieve its goals. Also, SCA Regulations are set out 
in Article 43 of the aforementioned law, which states that: 
Without prejudice to the penalties prescribed in this Law or in any other 
law, any person who contravenes any other provision of this Law and the 
regulations issued pursuant thereto shall be liable to imprisonment and a 
fine or to either of these penalties.
90
  
 
The SCA Board made a decision on article 16, which states: 
The Board may compel any person having a connection with activities in 
securities, whether a natural or a juristic person, to make public or private 
disclosure and to submit any information related to its activity.
91
 
 
Administrative penalties are a kind of legislative permission given so that the SCA is 
empowered to issue the appropriate regulations to deter crimes. According to this 
authorization, the SCA is concerned with setting up strict penalties, in order to deter 
violators of the capital market resolutions and regulations. Fines may not exceed 
100,000 dirhams.  
1.5 The Dubai International Financial Centre (DIFC)  
 
The DIFC is a Federal Financial Free Zone
92
 located in Dubai
93
 with three central 
bodies based on international principles: the DIFC Authority, the Dubai Financial 
Services Authority and the DIFC Judicial Authority.
94
 The DIFC has financial and 
administrative independence and is attached to the Dubai government by Dubai Law No 
9 of 2004,
95
 which entitles the President to create other bodies as he deems necessary. 
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The current President of DIFC is His Highness Sheik Mohammed bin Rashid Al 
Maktoum, the Vice President and Prime Minister of the UAE and the Ruler of Dubai.
96
 
 
The DIFC concentrates on several sectors of financial activity that may occur in the 
DIFC, as follows: ‗Banking Services (Investment Banking, Corporate Banking & 
Private Banking); Capital Markets (Equity, Debt Instruments, Derivatives and 
Commodity Trading); Asset Management and Fund Registration; Insurance and 
Reinsurance; Islamic Finance; Business Processing Operations and Ancillary 
Services‘.97Article 14 of Dubai Law No. 9 of 2004, states that financial institutions in 
the DIFC are entitled to a zero tax rate on income and profit for 50 years from the date 
of the law‘s enactment.  
                                                 
96
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Office of the President of the 
DIFC headed by FIFC Governor 
(Dr. Omar Bin Sulaiman
Dubai International Financial Centre 
Dubai Financial Services 
Authority 
(DFSA)
Dubai International Financial 
Centre Authority 
(DIFC Authority)
Dubai International Financial 
Centre Judicial Authority (DIFC 
Courts)
DIFC InvestmentsRegistrar of Companies
Registrar of Security
Dubai International Financial 
Exchange Limited (DIFX)
Hawkamah Corporate 
Governance Institute (CGI)
DIFC President
HH Sheikh Mohammed Bin Rashid Al Maktoum
Ownership
Reporting
 
 
Based on DIFC law No.12 of 2004 , the bodies in the chart above may not deal in UAE 
Dirhams and may not receive deposits from the UAE markets.
98
 The following 
summarizes key DIFC organisations. 
 
1.5.1 DIFC Authority 
 
Dubai Law No. 9 of 2004 recognizes the DIFC Authority as a legitimate body 
connected with the Dubai Government.
99
 The important function given to the DIFC 
Authority by this law is the development of overall policy, providing both direction and 
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operating management to the center as the executive body of the DIFC.
100
 Further, the 
DIFC is not limited to those roles, but is also in charge of the development of laws and 
regulations to cover all aspects of non-financial services, such as employment law, 
contract law, company law and real estate law that are not regulated by the Dubai 
Financial Services Authority (DFSA). In addition, the DIFC Authority was authorised 
to encourage licensees to operate within the Centre (DIFC), in effort to incorporate and 
register companies.
101
  
 
Regarding certain business and commercial sector considerations, such as the license 
application process, acquiring visas and resident permits for the applicant‘s employees, 
assistance was to be provided to prospective license applicants at all stages of the 
procedure by the DIFC Authority.
102
  
 
In fact, to provide opportunities for international investors in the region‘s emerging 
markets, the Dubai International Financial Exchange (DIFX) is held completely as a 
subsidiary to the DIFC Authority. Further, financial services are regulated to 
international standards by the Dubai Financial Services Authority.
103
These will be 
discussed in the following sections. 
 
1.5.2 Dubai Financial Services Authority (DFSA) 
 
Formed by Law No. 9 of 2004, the DFSA is the autonomous regulator of financial and 
subsidiary activities conducted in or from the DIFC.
104
 Entirely independent of the 
DIFC Authority and the DIFC Judicial Authority, the DFSA is responsible for 
                                                 
100
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   DIFC Law No. 1 of 2004. 
101
 Doing business in the DIFC, p.15  
102
 Ibid. 
103
 Al Tamimi, Setting Up in the Dubai International Financial Centre, Emirates Printing Press UAE, 
2006, p.15. 
104
 Ibid. 
 47 
 
administrating and developing regulations and rules
105
 in addition to developing policy 
related to market activity and implementing the legislation that it controls.
106
 
Significantly, the DFSA may issue any rules and regulations required to achieve its 
aims.
107
  
 
The DFSA‘s robust regulatory and legal structure is drawn from internationally 
recognized regulatory entities and primary financial institutions
108
  in order to inspire 
investor confidence.
109
 This robust and flexible regulatory framework remains in 
compliance with the DFSA‘s guiding standards: integrity, transparency and 
efficiency.
110
  
 
To achieve its aims, the DFSA forms alliances, through Memoranda of Understanding, 
with global organisations as well as other regulatory agencies within Dubai. It also has 
membership in the International Organisation of Securities Commissions (IOSCO)
111
 
and the Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB)
112
. This facilitates data exchange and 
the exercise of investigative and enforcement powers in the pursuit of individual and 
common objectives.
113
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1.5.3 DIFC Judicial Authority 
 
In accordance with Dubai Law No. 9 of 2004
114
 and the Judicial Authority Law, the 
DIFC Judicial Authority (DJA) was made independent
115
 and responsible for directing 
and implementing the civil and commercial laws of the DIFC.
116
 It has unlimited court 
jurisdiction to deal with all disputes arising from or within the DIFC, such as 
commercial transactions or all matters resulting from any contract, even personal injury 
actions or a number of smaller civil matters, so long as they occur in the DIFC area.
117
 
However, criminal issues are referred to a suitable outside authority.
118
  
 
The DJA rules are based on global principles of legal procedure
119
 and designed 
according to the Commercial Court Guide and the English Civil Procedure Rules; 
however they contain some major changes to provide the court with a more global 
outlook. The method of drafting the Rules of Court involves wide consultation with 
accepted court users from many different legal cultures.
120
 
The DIFC courts comprise a court of first instance and a court of appeal.
121
 The court is 
presided over by a Chief Justice--presently Sir Anthony Evans
122
-- and a Deputy Chief 
Justice—currently Mr. Michael Hwang SC123-- both of whom have international 
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reputations and are former leaders in the DIFC Courts. The official language in the 
DIFC Courts is English
124
; therefore, any advocate who has sufficient fluency in 
English can appear before the court. 
It is important to note that Article 3 Law No. 12 of 2004 provides the right of parties to 
submit to the jurisdiction of any other court in order to have their issues heard provided 
they deal with civil or commercial matters.
125
 This flexibility reflects the different 
circumstances and needs of companies and institutions and ensures that a dispute is 
heard within the legal structure that is most appropriate to their requirements.
126
 
 
1.5.4 Dubai International Financial Exchange (DIFX)  
 
On September 26, 2005, the Dubai Stock Exchange opened at the Global Financial 
Dubai Centre and was expected to play a key role in the growth of local capital markets 
by attracting major regional companies to list their shares and other securities on the 
exchange. This, in turn, was expected to draw worldwide investors and attract other 
inflows to the region, thus facilitating the region‘s integration with world markets.127 
 
The Dubai International Financial Exchange DIFX was established as part of DIFC
128
 
and its financial activities are controlled by international principles. DIFX is subject to 
the legislation of the Dubai Financial Services Authority.
129
 The DFSA holds 
responsibility for listing procedures, including powers of permission for securities and 
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policies concerning securities being admitted to an official list of securities. In setting 
up listing rules, the DIFX seeks to reduce duplication between the obligations imposed 
on issuers by the DIFX and those imposed on issuers under the Offered Securities 
Rules.
130
 Therefore, the DIFX works effectively with the DFSA.
131
  
 
Al Shaali-Nasir, the present executive director for operations of the Dubai Global Stock 
Exchange has said, ‗The Stock Exchange came to close the gap between East Asia, 
Europe, and America as the Middle East has more than two billion people who do not 
have an international centre for advanced financial services‘.132 He added, ‗The stock  
exchange deals with several items such as ordinary shares and deeds where it has the 
largest debt tools in the world.
133
  
 
Most listings on the DIFX originate from Initial Public Offering (IPOs).
134
 As the DIFX 
expands, it is expected that institutions from outside the area will dually list their shares 
on the exchange, using their listings to tap a large pool of investable assets in the state 
through the type of securities it lists. The DIFX also intends to improve its innovative, 
worldwide product policy to make the DIFX more attractive as a listing target.
135
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The achievement of a fair and informed market is the responsibility of the DIFX 
Markets Authority, whereas evaluating and approving applications for companies that 
desire their securities to be acceptable to the Official List are the responsibility of the 
DIFX Listing Authority.
136
  
Investors who wish to purchase securities in the DIFX hail from countries all over the 
world, such as the UK, Germany, South Africa, Australia, Switzerland, India, Kuwait, 
Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, as well as the UAE, proving the worldwide reach of Dubai‘s 
exchange. The exchange aims to set up other securities markets, such as derivatives and 
exchange-traded funds, many of which do not currently exist in the region.
137
 Bashir 
Ahmed, whose local firm includes 22 lawyers, states that he a significant benefit of the 
DIFX for clients from the US, the UK and South Africa: ‗Some are looking for a 
secondary listing, some to tap into liquidity in the market, while others are companies at 
the £100 million level, which look at the DIFX as another option to the Alternative 
Investment Market (AIM) in London.‘138 The DIFX now lists a wide range of financial 
instruments, including equities, bonds, mutual funds, Islamic (Sharia-compliant) 
structured products, derivatives, index products and alternative risk products.
 139
  
In September 2009, the DIFX had 20-member stockbrokers, including leading 
international and regional banks.
140
 Adam Wilson, Chief Executive of Hichens, 
Harrison, commented, ‗Since the DIFX opened in September 2005 it has become 
established as the international exchange serving its region. We will be able to offer our 
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international and regional clients access to an exciting and growing range of securities 
from companies active in the Middle East and beyond.‘141 
 
The DIFX poses a major challenge for other regional securities markets, as it attracts 
international and regional investments, leading a number of global brokerage firms and 
investment banks to establish a highly diversified base that is not influenced by any 
particular country. The Dubai Global Stock Exchange is gaining considerable 
distinction in the region.
142
 
1.6 Laws and Regulations at the DIFC  
 
The DIFC is designed to create a world-class regulatory system for the creation and 
operation of an international financial center.
143
 Therefore, DIFC Laws are based on the 
best practices of leading jurisdictions in Europe, North America and the Far East, while 
maintaining core principles of efficiency, transparency and integrity.
144
  Entities that are 
registered and operate in financial services within the DIFC are not obliged to obey 
UAE Central Bank Regulations, but are subject to laws that apply to the DIFC. In 
particular, UAE anti-money laundering and criminal law are not implemented on any 
disputes arising within or connected with the DIFC. Rather, the DIFC is given the 
power to establish its own laws, as a free zone that is autonomous for all civil and 
commercial legal matters.
145
   
 
Legislation within the DFIC is designed to govern the day-to-day operations of financial 
institutions and corporate entities, including individuals within the DIFC. DIFC laws 
constitute a commercial code that includes company laws, contract laws, arbitration and 
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insolvency laws, among others; all are administered by the DIFC Authority. The 
Financial Services Law includes Regulatory Law, Markets Law, Data Protection Law 
and the Law Regulating Islamic Financial Business. All of these laws are administered 
by the Dubai Financial Services Authority (DFSA).
146
 
The DIFC is subject to applicable rules under the core financial services legislation, 
which are considered subsidiary legislation. These rules can be located in the DFSA 
Rulebook, which is divided into specific modules that cover a variety of topics that are 
also applicable to individuals who utilize them. 
It is important to note that parties are generally free to agree to the application of some 
substantive laws other than the Law of the DIFC. Thus, Article 6 of the Judicial 
Authority Law states:  
The Courts shall apply the Centre‘s Laws and Regulations, except where 
parties to the dispute have explicitly agreed that another law shall govern 
such disputes, provided that such law does not conflict with the public 
policy and public morals.
147
 
 
One of most interesting aspects of Article 8 of Law No. 3 of 2004
148
 is that it provides 
that the laws of England and Wales be applied when no other applicable law can be 
ascertained. Thus, if the DIFC law No.12 of 2004 does not deal with a particular matter, 
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the ultimate fall back is the law of England and Wales. There is also a detailed 
regulatory structure that is familiar to anyone acquainted with the UK Financial 
Services Authority‘s rulebook.149 However, does this Article create conflict when the 
laws of England and Wales and the UAE and DIFC laws differ? Why does the DIFC 
use the UAE laws as a last resort?  Does this mean the UAE laws are deficient? If so, 
UAE regulators need to enable their legislation to improve and change according to a 
predefined international regulatory standard. 
 
1.7 Dealers in the Stock Market 
 
There are a variety of dealers in the securities markets including individuals, institutions 
and companies, which can be classified into categories as follows. 
 
1.7.1 Investment Funds 
 
Investment funds are restricted pools of currency with a number of savers, either 
persons or other companies
150
 who prefer their money to be invested over the long term 
to professionals or those who will increase value of investments extensively.
151
 These 
funds rely on pooled capital to provide higher price investments than are available to 
individuals who deal in these funds.
152
  
 
In fact, investment funds give those who do not have the capacity to manage their 
investments directly the opportunity to participate in global and local investment. 
Briefly, the idea of these funds is that a number of investors can pool their resources in 
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order to allow them to be managed by financial institutions to achieve benefits that 
cannot be achieved individually.
153
 
 
Funds are established by banks, insurance companies or joint-stock companies and run 
by joint-stock companies and independent bodies that have the necessary expertise and 
efficiency to manage investment funds. These companies issue investment documents 
and use proceeds from the funds to invest in securities, including achieving 
diversification and efficient returns for those documents.
154
  
   
In the UAE, the organisation of investment funds for trading must be in accordance with 
provisions of the Central Bank Law. Additionally, fund managers must obtain 
permission from the Emirates Securities and Commodities Authority (SCA). Investors 
must be notified regarding vital information via circulars that assess a fund‘s 
performance and returns prospects, giving it full background and details of the 
institution that is being floated, as well as details as to the size of the fund and its 
investment purposes and dividend strategy. Thereafter, investment funds can decide 
which securities market in the UAE to use and inquire as to the listings on it.
155
 
 
In the DIFC, the Dubai Financial Services Authority (DFSA) follows the Collective 
Investment Law of 2006, which regulates collective investment funds.
156
 The legislative 
framework is drawn up according to these rules in order to operate and classify 
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numerous types of investment funds, such as Islamic funds, ‗funds of funds‘, hedge 
funds, property funds and private equity funds.
157
   
 
The prescriptive regime of Collective Investment Law 2006 provides a high regulatory 
standard for the DIFC. The asset management community ascertains whether the 
benefits of market stability will create enough demand to encourage fund managers to 
submit their businesses to the regulatory scrutiny and compliance requirements 
associated with relocating to the DIFC.
158
 
 
1.7.2 Brokerage Firms 
 
Currently, there are 102 brokerage firms licensed by the UAE Securities and 
Commodities Authority (SCA).
159
 These firms are licensed and regulated by the SCA. 
Under ESCA Law 2000, applicable regulations are issued.
160
 Brokers and their 
representatives are required to avoid damaging the market, including its members or 
traders. They are also required to avoid purposefully deceptive transactions that are not 
genuine regarding securities transfers.
161
  
Regulations and rules define brokerages in terms of the ways in which they persuade 
customers to enter into securities and commodity deals. A broker may use different 
means of communication to sell his securities or commodities, including face-to-face 
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meetings in public places, visiting them at their places of business or at home, or 
contacting them by telephone. It should be noted that only an authorized broker can deal 
with customers. A broker who performs this type of business without official approval 
may face imprisonment or be fined. Regulations further empower the Chairman of the 
Authority's Board of Directors to suspend the activities of an unauthorized broker and to 
block his trades.
162
 
The DIFX and the SCA work hand-in-hand to allow easy access to UAE brokers.
163
 At 
present, the DIFX has 20 members, among which are prominent global and regional 
banks.
164
 The target of DIFX's broker program is investment banks and brokerage 
houses that seek to learn how to trade on the DIFX.  It offers opportunities for them to 
learn about the market, the DIFX's registry and custody services, as well as how to set 
up direct market approach arrangements.
165
 EFG-Herm‘s (UAE)166 became the first 
regional institution to gain membership in the DIFX and to join the exchange as a 
broker in the capacity of an Individual Clearing Member.
167
  
In order for companies to access the huge and relatively available market, the DIFC 
offers basic grounds for investing in financial instruments.  There are a variety of 
opportunities in the DIFC for those looking to participate in financial activities and 
invest via investment banks and financial intermediaries. In fact, the DIFC seeks to 
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institute insurance, private equity, private banking, trade finance and operations for 
brokerage services.
 168
   
 
1.7.3 Clearing and Settlement 
The department responsible for purchases and sales clearing is the Depositary, Clearing 
and Settlement Department for the Abu Dhabi Securities Exchange and the Dubai 
Financial Market. This department provides a location where securities are held by the 
market,
169
 giving investors‘ confidence, security and stability while protecting their 
property through confidentiality.  
One of the primary tasks of the Depositary, Clearing and Settlement Department 
(DCSD) is to exercise rigorous control over any broker's activities that are relevant to 
investor securities in order to protect investor's rights through concurrent establishment 
of a transparent and efficient market.
170
  
Due to the highly credible relationships between the DCSD and listed companies, it is 
able to store and protect securities listed in the market.  It is responsible for 
management, safe guardianship, down payment and immediate transfer of securities 
resulting from sale and purchase transactions, or those transfer processes conducted 
outside the transactions room. The department also has one more responsibility,  namely 
the arrangement of securities prices offered on the market, which it does by entrusting 
the recognised settlement bank to settle and clear the net due payment, while collecting 
payable amounts from authorised brokers.
171
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In the DIFX, Euroclear Bank
172
 and its agent in Dubai, Deutsche Bank, have worked 
together since early 2007 to provide access to the DIFX Central Securities Depositary 
(CSD). The US dollar is the main currency of all Euroclear trades; Euroclear Bank 
offers transactions in 36 currencies.
173
 As E. Larsson, current Chief Executive of the 
DIFX, said, ‗Investors who want to buy or sell shares listed on the DIFX can now 
choose to settle the trades efficiently through Euroclear Bank. This agreement is based 
on the growing demand from investors internationally and locally to trade DIFX 
shares‘.174 
The DIFX offers participants the most economic and internationally standardised, 
effective and affordable technological equipment. To achieve this, it contracts with 
AtosEuronext, a pioneer in IT services, to supply its automatic electronic trading 
platform. Another contract is held with Consultancy Services to provide software 
systems for the DIFX‘s clearing and settlement services.175 
 
1.7.4 Foreign Investors 
 
Foreign companies that start-up businesses in partnership with UAE nationals are 
subject to specific legal restrictions.
176
 Upon the introduction of the stock market, the 
government encountered a crucial issue regarding the role of foreign investors.
177
 
Article 22 of the FC law 1984, states:  
Observing that certain commercial activities are confined to nationals as 
provided in this Law or in any other Law, every company incorporated in 
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the State must have one or more national partner whose share in the 
company capital must not be less than 51% of the company capital.
178
  
  
This article is interpreted as requiring that UAE nationals hold a minimum of 51% of 
any registered company in the UAE. As for companies with licensed foreign branches, 
UAE nationals must act as sponsors with the right to carry out all of the activities of the 
parent company.
179
 The aim of this policy is to encourage foreign companies to form 
partnerships with UAE nationals. The UAE government plans to amend and update the 
Commercial Companies Law; one amendment suggests making foreign ownership 
subject to fewer restrictions.
180
 Continuous development seems to be encouraged by the 
authorities, awaiting a real commitment to the UAE Stock Exchange, which has been 
under debate for some time.
181
 In contrast, foreign financial institutions need not look 
for a local partner when setting up business in the DIFC
.182
   
 
Opportunities in the UAE securities market are widely available for foreigners, through 
either nationals or brokerage companies. From 1992 to 1996 the number of foreign 
commercial companies in the UAE had grown by a remarkable 35% in Dubai, 14% in 
Abu Dhabi and 22% in the rest of emirates. By the end of 1996, these companies and 
their branches had reached 884 and 39, respectively. The study further indicates that 
European companies have comprised 55% of the total foreign companies in the UAE, 
while American companies have comprised 8.5%, Japanese 4.9%, Arab 8% and Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC) companies 6% of the same total.
 183
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1.7.5 Companies and Financial Institutions 
 
Companies and financial institutions invest portions of their funds in securities, either 
for the purpose of investing the cash in securities for a short period of time, or for long-
term investments.
184
 Among the recipient companies,
 
the Abu Dhabi Investment 
Company, founded in 1977, was the first non-bank financial services company to be 
established in the United Arab Emirates, and is considered one of the most important 
financial services companies in the region. Further, throughout its long journey, the 
company has provided highly efficient treasury services, credit, joint loans, debt 
instruments, financial investments, asset management and intermediation for several 
categories of assets. Jassim Al-Zaabi,  the present Executive Chairman of Abu Dhabi 
Investment Company, stated: ‗Our Company is one of the leading companies in joining 
the stock field of the Middle East and North Africa since 1994‘.185 
 
1.7.6 Individual investors 
 
The number of investments in the UAE securities market as of June 7, 2010 is 
552,069
186
 in the Dubai Financial Market while in the ADX there are 887,787
187
 as of 
December 31, 2009. Significantly larger investors are characterised by how they direct 
their efforts, gathering information in sequence and monitoring market changes using 
various sources, so their investment decisions are typically based on certain standards.  
No such possibilities are available for smaller investors. Moreover, among small 
investors, there is a lack of investment awareness, which illustrates the need to raise 
awareness among this category of investors or direct them to invest their money through 
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investment funds in order to ensure that the market remains controlled while investors 
are not unnecessarily exposed to vigorous fluctuations.
188
  
 
1.8 Types of securities that are trading in the stock markets 
 
In the UAE, securities are customarily classified into two main groups: bonds and 
shares.  Both are issued by joint-stock companies. The bonds are also issued by the 
federal or local governments, public authorities and public institutions of the state.  Due 
to the economic instability of the region, these securities of tradable assets are subject to 
the risk of market price fluctuations.
 189
  
In accordance with UAE Company Law, the shares of a company must have the same 
value and cannot be divided. They must also bear the person's name and be subject to 
negotiation.
190
 Companies may issue negotiable bonds with equal value to obtain loans, 
on condition of the approval of the shareholders meeting.
191
 The issuance of bonds is 
dependent on the company‘s profit and loss accounts for the first financial year. In the 
case that the state, or one of the banks working under its authority, ensures 
reimbursement of the bonds or guarantees them by issuing instruments, the restrictions 
may be waived.
192
 In addition, bonds may be issued in a person's name or to the 
bearer.
193
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1.9 Conclusion  
 
This chapter provided a brief historical overview of the evolution of securities market 
regulation in the UAE. As the second and third sections of the chapter show, from the 
foundation of the United Arab Emirates in 1971 until 2000, the securities market was 
unregulated; the primary reason for the market crash in the summer of 1998. These 
sections also showed that from 1971 to 2000, there was a dramatic change in the 
region‘s economic environment that resulted in the UAE government‘s efforts to enact 
legislation that covered all aspects of the business and financial sectors. These efforts 
were done through the issuance of laws such as the FC law 1984 and the ESCA Law 
2000. The legislative authority believed that providing a safe regulatory environment 
would inspire investors with confidence. Thus, the primary goal of these laws has been 
to satisfy demand for change in economic conditions and also to approach a higher level 
of regulation.  
 
The remainder of the chapter reviewed the three key financial markets: the ADX, the 
DFM and the DIFC. Likewise, it examined the regulation and management of the 
markets. The ADX and the DFM markets are governed by the ESCA Law 2000 under 
SCA supervision, while the DIFC market is governed by its own laws and rules, as a 
free zone. In fact, the two laws, the ESCA Law 2000 and the DIFC law No.12 of 2004, 
have similar aims, which are to regulate both the market and investor activities. Each 
law encompasses a different territorial jurisdiction. A question is then raised as to what 
occurs if there is conflict between these two laws? Nonetheless, both laws provide 
important protection for market investors from misconduct in the marketplace.  
 
Finally, the chapter concluded by clarifying who the market players are, including 
details about the kinds of individuals, institutions and companies as well as the type of 
securities trading in the stock markets. The complexities of the market and its 
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importance to the economy of the UAE require that there be a set of clear and 
reasonable laws that deal with all of the matters related to the market. Current laws have 
some crucial deficiencies, which have helped to create less organization and efficiency 
and more insider trading and manipulation offences. Such illegal activities and their 
related issues will be discussed extensively in subsequent chapters.   
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CHAPTER TWO 
REGULATION OF MARKET ABUSE: OVERVIEW 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
 In general terms, regulation can be defined as the ‗laying down of rules‘.194  In this 
sense, regulation is related to governmental involvement in market activities, thus 
influencing the private sector‘s actions. It can be argued that for an effective financial 
market there should be regulatory intervention. There are a variety of reasons for 
intervention that can take place in the market, mainly to ensure that the market operates 
fairly and efficiently. The basis for legislative intervention is, therefore, that without it 
the markets would malfunction. In this view, one major principle of the regulatory 
system is to combat financial crimes, and especially abusive conduct on the securities 
market.  
 
The United Kingdom and the United States have both enacted regulatory legislation in 
response to crisis and scandal.
195
 A representative instance of this situation has been the 
UK‘s Financial Services and Market Act 2000. FSMA 2000 came into force on 1 
December 2001.
196
 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 in the United States developed as a 
consequence of the large corporate financial scandals, which involved Enron, 
WorldCom, Global Crossing and Arthur Andersen.
197
 This chapter aims to establish the 
various approaches to the subject of market abuse regulation. This chapter will attempt 
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to provide a general view of regulation of market abuse under three jurisdictions; UAE 
legal framework, the UK and the Dubai International Financial Centre (DIFC) regime.  
 
2.2 General View of Regulating the Securities Market under the UAE Legal 
Framework  
 
The UAE Government, like most governments, has stated that the principal aims of its 
established regulations are to preserve the integrity and accuracy of the securities 
market in order to protect investors.
198
 For this reason, the UAE enacted Federal Law 
No. 4 of 2000 concerning the Emirates Securities and Commodities Authority and 
Market (ESCA law 2000), to establish a public competent authority to regulate financial 
markets: the Emirates Securities and Commodities Authority (SCA). Article (2) stated 
that:  
A public authority with the name of the "Securities & Commodities 
Authority" shall be established in the State's capital. It shall enjoy juristic 
personality and financial and administrative independence, and shall 
have the supervisory and executive powers necessary to perform its 
functions according to the provisions of this law and the regulations 
issued in implementation thereof. It shall be adjunct to the Minister...
199
 
 
The most important objective of the UAE authorities in establishing SCA was to avoid 
the ambiguity of the market which accompanied the period of unregulated markets and 
to fill the vacancy which previously existed. While SCA seems intended to regulate 
financial services, in fact the capital markets in the UAE are regulated by several 
entities. There are two separate financial frameworks in the UAE, and each is regulated 
under a separate regulatory system: the Dubai International Financial Centre (DIFC) as 
a financial free zone inside the UAE, with its own financial services regulator and an 
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independent regulatory system; and the rest of the UAE for regulating financial services 
200
 of local and federal stage.  
 
There are some difficulties as a result of this arrangement. The major one is the different 
legislation at federal and local levels, as well as with the DIFC, which can lead to 
confusion. This raises questions as to the contrast and conflicts between the DIFC and 
UAE legislations,
201
 although that is outside the scope of this chapter. However, it is 
worth mentioning here that the DIFC laws are applicable to all civil and commercial 
disputes coming before court as long as they occur in the DIFC area or in connection 
with the DIFC.
 202
 The DIFC law takes into account a matter to be heard either within 
DIFC Courts or in the court of another recognised jurisdiction, depending on the 
parties‘ wish and which is appropriate to them.  There is no obligation to apply DIFC 
laws on their issues unless there is any absence of an agreement to the contrary; DIFC 
laws will govern the agreement, by default.
203
  There is flexibility as there are different 
circumstances and requirements of companies and institutions, and this ensures that a 
dispute is heard within the legal framework which is best suited to the parties‘ needs.204  
Apart from criminal matters, all criminal cases are governed by the Federal Criminal 
Law No. 3 of 1987 in the UAE and the UAE courts.
 
Accordingly, if any crime occurs in 
the DIFC jurisdiction, such as burglary or assault and battery, the Federal Criminal Law 
should be applied. However, market abuse practices are governed by the DIFC law if 
they take place within DIFC jurisdiction. This is likewise reflected in the ESCA law 
2000 which governs market abuse in the financial markets of the rest of the UAE. 
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Another difficulty is that of federal financial services. As a matter of fact, several 
entities regulate the marketplace; The Ministry of Economy (MOE) is responsible for 
implementing company law, corporate governance standards for issuers, prospectus 
disclosure requirements and the pricing of initial public offerings. The Central Bank of 
the UAE (CBU) is responsible for licensing and authorizing banks and non-bank 
financial intermediaries, including brokers and investment companies.
205
 However, the 
SCA is responsible in the securities market for licensing intermediaries in conducting 
financial services on the three stock exchanges, the Abu Dhabi Securities Exchange 
(ADX) and the Dubai Financial Market (DFM) and the Dubai Gold and Commodities 
Exchange (DGCE). These stock exchanges act as self-regulatory organizations, giving 
permission for firms to pursue their activities on their various exchanges, setting listing 
standards and accepting listings of public company securities. The law delineates the 
regulatory powers of both the securities market and the SCA. However, one of the 
difficulties is that the markets have not had specific powers assigned to them by SCA. 
To summarise, there is some duplication of the responsibilities of MOE and CBU 
authorities and SCA. The powers of the authorities engaged in financial services 
regulation need to be clearly set out, in particular more authority should be given to 
SCA.
206
  
 
In theory, a sufficiently developed legal framework should be effective in governing a 
financial market, and, in general, the UAE does have a sufficiently developed legal 
framework.  However, this framework is inadequate to govern financial markets in the 
UAE successfully. This is important, as investors tend to depend heavily on safe and 
consistent information. In relation to the subject of this study, Article 399 of the Federal 
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Criminal Law No. 3 of 1987 in the UAE, related to fraud, is limited in its ambit. As this 
is a general anti-fraud provision, it is apparent that fraudulent activities in the 
marketplace cannot be pursued by such limited provision. 
 
Therefore, it may be argued that the Federal Criminal Law No. 3 of 1987 in the UAE 
puts limits, or rather categorises what is a fraudulent offence, thus a fraudulent offence 
does not encompass all cases of persons charged with financial crimes. In fact, it only 
involves particular types of fraudulent procedure. The Federal Company Law No.8 of 
1984 provisions represents an insufficient method of checking up on all the acts of 
market abuse, particularly in the securities market.  Fraud is considered as a type of an 
element in crime, and fraudulent processes can include such activities as disposing of 
the money of others and taking a false name or a non-valid identity. These methods of 
fraud are, as a whole, fraud against an aggrieved party. In exercising these activities, the 
offender has the very specific aim of obtaining money. While the criminal law has 
identified methods of fraud, the provisions of the Federal Criminal Law No. 3 of 1987 
in the UAE are inadequate in countering all fraudulent techniques.  
 
The Civil Transaction Law in the UAE has been used by courts to seek civil liability in 
cases of violations of legal rights caused in this context. Despite being enacted in 1985, 
this law contains general principles that can be consulted with in the event of an absence 
of regulation in other laws as disputes arise. For example, Articles 185, 186, 187 and 
191 can be applied when there are misrepresentations
207
 (a type of market abuse in some 
                                                 
207
 English Law has three differences of misrepresentation theories, which are categorised as follows: 
fraudulent misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, and innocent or good intention 
misrepresentation. The three types may accept for requesting nullification of contract, whereas claim of 
compensation is possible only the first and second one. For more details, see: A.G. Guest, ed., Anson‘s 
Law of Contract, 26
th
 edition, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), pp. 209-239. See also Ahmed Al-
Melhem,  ‗Insider Dealing in the Companies Act of Kuwait No. 15 of 1960‘, (1998) 13 Arab Law 
Quarterly 1, pp.3-22. 
 70 
 
reasonable views)
208
 in case of absence of securities regulation. These articles provide 
for instances when one of the parties is misled and/or deceived by another party, thus 
giving consent to the agreement without full knowledge. One example of this is that if a 
person remains silent deliberately, then that is equal to misleading the other party, and it 
should be considered that the party would not have agreed to the contract if he/she had 
known the reality. However, regulating the securities market through the civil law might 
introduce difficulties in the control of market relationships when fraud and other kinds 
of abusive behaviour are involved. The inadequacy of the general legislation to regulate 
the securities market is due to the special characteristics of such markets, which 
distinguish it from any other market of goods and services.  
 
We now need to cover the theoretical background relating to the regulation of the 
market. Many theories have been developed regarding economic regulation.  These will 
be examined in the following section. 
 
2.3 Theories of Regulation of Economic Activities 
 
Economic regulation is a main challenge for governmental intervention in the market. It 
refers to the governing of economic activities and it involves a variety of principles that 
may differ vastly in type.
209
 Several theories that deal with economic regulation and 
governmental intervention have been developed.
210
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However, there are two theories which are the most significant: the public interest, and 
the public choice, theories. In order to identify and understand the system of regulation, 
the section below discusses briefly these theories.  
 
(a)The Public interest theory 
 
The Public interest theory, which is associated with Arthur Pigou,
211
 alleges that 
government interference depends upon public demand for regulation.
212
 Moreover, its 
purpose is for ‗the correction of inefficient or inequitable market practices.‘213 The 
major criticisms of this theory are: first that it overstates the issue of market failure, and 
second that it does not include the factor of competition in dealing with the problem.
214
 
However, Avgouleas alleges that government intervention comes from ‗a belief that the 
market is unable to regulate itself in a given field of social or economic activity‘.215 The 
central feature of this theory is that it assigns collective aims to the architects of 
regulation. Opinions on a definition of the `public interest' differ.  Amongst other 
factors, it depends so on the specific qualities of the activity subjected to regulation and 
the standards of the particular society where the regulation takes place.
 216
 It is possible 
that this regulation results from the pressure of groups that will not necessarily benefit 
from it, but that ‗merely desire the outcome‘,217 i.e. the outcome of benefiting the 
public. 
 
 
 
                                                 
211
 Ibid. 
212
 Avgouleas, p. 160. 
213
 Richard A. Posner ‗Theories of Economic Regulation‘, (Autumn, 1974)  5 The Bell Journal of 
Economics and Management Science 2, pp. 335-358. 
214
 StephenWeatherill,  p. 273. 
215
 Avgouleas, p. 161. 
216
 Ibid.  
217
Ibid.  
 72 
 
(b)The Public choice theory 
 
The Public choice theory 
218
of regulation reflects an inherent preference for market 
outcomes over regulatory procedures. Regulation, then, is not necessarily seen as for the 
public benefit. This view is reinforced by the fact that those who advocate the public 
choice theory frequently argue for more reliance on markets and less on governments. 
Controlling the power of the regulators would, they argue, improve social welfare, since 
the general interest would prevail over that of specific groups.  This theory argues that 
although the results of the free market have disadvantages, they are preferable to the 
problems which regulation would bring. 
219
 Stigler asserts that ‗regulation is acquired by 
the industry and is designed and operated primarily for its benefit‘.220 Therefore, the 
government does not act for society‘s benefit and the government is seen as rather ‗less 
benign and regulation as socially inefficient‘.221 This theory suggests, then, that the 
regulatory authorities do not always act to benefit society. Rather, they act in order to 
benefit themselves. The heads of industry may also be complicit in this, seeking 
arrangements which will give them the most profit. This can possibly lead to unfair and 
unwise practices. One argument for opposing regulation strategies is that the creation of 
a strong relationship between regulators and the industry will create empathy for those 
that have committed a crime.  The consequence may be that carelessness of enforcement 
of the regulations may develop.
222
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The two theories of regulation outlined here, the Public interest and Public choice 
theories, are the most popular ones that have been used by theorists in order to explain 
regulation. In this regard, defining the theories of regulation helps to create a greater 
understanding of the regulatory problems that exist, and an understanding of the 
arguments for and against regulation.  It also facilitates in the development of a wide-
ranging discourse on the subject of regulation.
223
   
 
The public interest theory would seem to be an appropriate theory to regulate financial 
markets. This is the basis of UAE legislative policy. The UAE government interference 
aims for the protection of investors against market abuse. Therefore, regulation is 
assumed to be justified for the public interest because the unregulated markets will fail 
to protect investors and markets as well as the correction of market failures, unless the 
government intervenes to produce a legislative environment safe for the public interest. 
 
A significant example of rationales put forward for the adoption of regulatory principles 
comes from the International Organisation of Securities Commissions (IOSCO). IOSCO 
is one of the regulators of international financial markets, and has developed 30 
principles of regulation. 
224
  These are guided by three main objectives which are related 
to securities regulation and supervision: ‗investor protection; market fairness, efficiency 
and transparency; and the limitation of systemic risk‘.225 The rationale for regulating the 
financial market is in large part to provide investor confidence.  It also ensures that 
suitable levels of protection are in place in order to guarantee the effectiveness and 
efficiency of the market.  
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2.4 More Protection gives more Investor Confidence 
  
The regulation of financial markets is necessary to ensure that markets remain stable 
and secure and to prevent a collapse of the existing financial and economic systems. 
Specific rules and regulations will, as Avgouleas maintains, ‗directly prohibit market 
abuse and maintain investor confidence‘.226   
 
Stability is a crucial issue in generating confidence in a market system. If investors see 
the market as unstable and dishonest, they will not invest their savings in the 
marketplace. When the market seems to be managed well and regulated, then investors 
are more likely to put their money in it. In this sense, the confidence of investors in the 
integrity of the market can be maintained by the use of government regulation and 
intervention. The regulatory authorities can especially protect the right of all investors 
to receive information in an equal manner. Thus, more protection leads to the 
maintenance of confidence in the market.  
 
The experience here of the United Kingdom is important. In the United Kingdom, the 
FSMA has produced market abuse rules which could be applied ‗to member of the 
public as well as regulated individuals‘.227 The FSMA has four regulatory objectives. 
They are: to maintain the confidence in the financial markets; to create public 
awareness; to decrease financial crime; and to protect investors.
228
 As the UK 
Government (HM Treasury) has pointed out, ‗We believe that it is essential to have a 
comprehensive market abuse regime to enable the Financial Services Authority (FSA) 
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to meet its regulatory objectives, in particular maintaining confidence in the UK's 
financial system and reducing financial crime‘.229 Accordingly, the FSA has stated that:  
where market users rely on timely dissemination of relevant 
information (as in this case on Alternative Investment Market) , those 
who possess relevant information ahead of its general dissemination 
should refrain from acting on that information. Confidence in such 
markets depends, in part, on market users' confidence that they can 
deal with each other on the basis that they have equal, simultaneous 
access to information that is required to be disclosed.
230
  
 
Therefore, the aims of the FSMA 2000 are to promote fairness and efficiency in the 
market.
231
 The UAE has similar aims to those indicated by the FSMA 2000, as the 
government has endeavoured to build up legislation to protect the securities market.
232
 
Article 3 of ESCA law 2000 states that SCA has the aim to make the investor feel 
protected through secure and reliable transactions, and thus through this protection, 
ensures that there will be a fair and normal supply and demand in relation to the fixing 
of prices. The SCA also educates and offers advice that will provide the investor with 
knowledge and understanding of his/her investments. It endeavours to maintain a stable 
economy and financial markets. In order the SCA regulator can achieve its goals, it 
must create a balance between promoting the opportunities for fair profit and limiting 
the opportunities for inequitable profit.  
However, the question which follows from this is: has the recent regulation in UAE 
markets been sufficient to compensate for the shortcomings of the past? This applies 
especially to areas where regulation has long been considered inadequate, for instance, 
                                                 
229
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the absence of laws on insider dealing, disclosure requirements concerning share 
ownership or business operations, and limited investor protection.
233
  
 
2.5 Promoting the Effectiveness of Regulation and the Efficiency of the Market   
               
Efficiency of the market has been a concern of those that have studied and developed 
regulatory practices. In terms of the literature available, most is not focused specifically 
on the topic of efficiency alone, but rather on the many different aspects of regulation. 
Nevertheless, by understanding the function that efficiency has in the market, one can 
understand just how essential it is.  This applies not only to deterring fraud, but also to 
keeping prices low and assisting the securities industry as a whole to sell at high 
prices.
234
 
 
While a main objective of regulation is the control of abusive behaviour, it is not the 
only one. Abusive behaviour can undermine confidence and damage integrity, for 
example with regard to insider information, but other motivations exist including 
regulation to deal with inefficiency and market failures. In this respect, the correct level 
of regulation in the securities market could increase market efficiency by imposing 
effective rules on members of the market to disclose important information and make it 
available to the market participants. The proper implementation of regulation reflects 
the integrity and strength of the market. This would be an incentive for markets to be 
efficient. Therefore, an efficient market exists when ‗it fully and correctly reflects all 
relevant information in determining security prices‘.235 The efficient market should 
adjust quickly to all new information and hopefully would not be affected negatively by 
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any information.
236
 An efficient market is one in which one investor does not have an 
advantage over another, and the values of the market are close to their estimated real 
value. As Beck-Dudley and Stephens state, ‗this definition implies that an investor's 
expected return will be consistent with the risk borne and that the prices of traded 
securities are accurate signals for capital allocation‘.237  
 
Lachlan Burn argues that ‗the regime should logically be extended beyond company 
reports to the full range of disclosures required of companies that are admitted to 
regulated markets‘.238 This would not be achieved without effective regulation, that is 
an imposed obligation on companies and other issuers to disclose all relevant 
information. Market prices should reflect all information that is available to the public 
and all information that is known only to the company and market specialists. However, 
it is not always possible to regulate the market in this manner, and very often market 
insiders will benefit from inside information. For this reason, the securities regulators 
should be concerned with the effect of information on the market, and they should aim 
to ensure the availability of information to the public. 
In the UAE, one of the most significant studies of the efficiency of the UAE securities 
market was that by Jay Squalli.
239
 Squalli tested the efficiency of the DFM and ADX 
between 2000 and 2005 using daily indices. He believed that the markets had created a 
highly volatile market and a potential bubble.
240
 In order to cope with the open market 
and international standards, he showed, the UAE needs to develop a highly structured 
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and efficient financial system. Squalli suggested that the authorities had an important 
role to play in regulating the market, in order to keep it secure and away from the harm 
posed by such activities as insider dealing and the overpricing of stock.
241  
A significant observation made concerning the above discussion is that there is an 
important link between the regulatory obligation to disclose information to the market 
and market efficiency. In order to improve the UAE‘s market efficiency, the 
government impose transparency in financial reporting, develop accountability 
measures, and create and enforce financial standards that are equal to international 
standards.
242
  
 
2.6 Mandatory disclosure and Transparency under UAE Regulations 
 
It has been established that disclosure is the core tool which ensures market 
transparency, and timely and full market transparency prevents the practice of market 
abuse and sustains market integrity. It has also been shown that there are deficiencies in 
UAE practice in this regard. It can be feared that both confidence in the market and 
investment in local projects will suffer if investors are frightened off by a lack of 
transparency and ignoring of the rules by listed companies. Without disclosure and 
transparency, the developing UAE markets have relied heavily on rumour.
243
 Because 
of the lack of comprehensive information and market inefficiency there has been a high 
risk factor and consequent investor losses.  Action by the authorities is required in such 
situations to ensure a timely disclosure system is firmly applied. The focus of the 
disclosure system should be clearly determined: that of releasing all material 
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information into the market to enable investors to make informed investment decisions. 
Experience has shown that investors will direct their investments to markets which have 
transparency and a compulsory disclosure system. If insiders are not deterred from 
using their positions to conceal and monopolise material non-public information, there 
will not be a transparent market benefiting the economy of the country. The SCA 
occupies a central position here as the legitimate enforcer of rules relating to insider 
dealing and timely disclosure.  The SCA authority is by law required to take the 
necessary steps to ensure investors‘ rights of equal access to information. It is also 
obliged to deter insider dealing and to raise the level of transparency closer to 
international standards. In this regard the SCA should have introduced a clear policy to 
enforce the regulations.
244
  
 
However, the fact is that ESCA law 2000 sustained principles which are an obligation 
on the securities market. For instance, the market‘s board should present reports and 
information to SCA and make the necessary press releases in an attempt to ensure 
transparency of information and disclosure.
245
 Furthermore, the law requires companies 
whose securities have been listed to publish any descriptive information when it is 
demanded by investors and the market, particularly if such information relates to their 
circumstances and activities. Without doubt, this secures the integrity of the market and 
the confidence of investors.
246
 Although securities markets are commonly open to a 
variety of abuses, market integrity regulations have long tackled issues of market abuse 
such as fraud, manipulation and insider dealing.  
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Disclosure and transparency are two terms which have come into frequent use in the 
capital markets. These terms are extremely important, a view which is confirmed by all 
of the legislation governing the capital markets which must be adhered to. The 
complexities of securities procedures and practices are well known thus, ‗the infamous 
complexities of securities practice arise from defining the details of disclosure and 
ascertaining which transactions are covered by the disclosure requirements‘.247 The 
following two sub-sections will discuss mandatory disclosure and transparency for 
listed companies.  
 
2.6.1 Mandatory Disclosure for listed companies 
 
 Mandatory disclosure rules are considered mechanisms of securities regulation in order 
to decrease the information asymmetries in capital markets and prevent insider dealing 
and market manipulation.
248
 This is achieved by compliance with the regulation that 
obliges the publication and disclosure of information to ensure transparency from 
companies who want to list their securities in the market.   
 
In the UAE two rules regulate the procedures whereby companies may list securities in 
the securities markets. Under the first, the UAE Federal Cabinet has promulgated 
Resolution No. 12 of 2000 which concerns the listing of securities and commodities. 
The second is the decision of the Chairman of the Board of Directors of the SCA, 
Decision No. 3 of 2000 concerning of Regulations as to Disclosure and Transparency 
(SCA Decision No 3 of 2000).The aforementioned decision of the SCA Board repeated 
the UAE Federal Cabinet Resolution concerning disclosure and transparency.  Article 
29 of SCA Decision No 3 of 2000 states terms for listed companies, and this is repeated 
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in Article 7 of Federal Cabinet Resolutions No. 12 of 2000. Obviously, the Cabinet 
Resolution would accomplish the objectives of Article 7 without the need to replicate 
the same provision issued by the Board of the SCA.  However, the SCA is given the 
authority to issue and propose the regulations 
249
so that the investors will be reassured. 
The extra requirements and regulations will offer ‗protection [to] investors by 
establishing the basis for sound and just dealings between the various investors‘.250 
 
Companies that want to list their securities must meet the specific criteria of the 
disclosure requirement before they may be listed. The disclosure regulations contain a 
number of provisions to which a company must comply.
251
 The regulator divides 
disclosure into two types: pre-listing disclosure and post-listing disclosure.  
 
(1) Pre-listing disclosure 
This section discusses pre-listing disclosure and makes use of four main articles: 
Articles 28 – 31 of SCA Decision No 3 of 2000. Article 28 deals with the prior approval 
of securities by SCA, without which it may be not listed in the market. The trade of 
securities in the latter case should take place through a broker registered in the markets. 
Article 29 provides the conditions for listing securities. It sets forth seven items and 
areas of information including a financial statement, in which registering companies are 
required to disclose the particular information and statements that reflect the true 
position of the company. Articles 30 and 31 explain the issue of liability of members of 
the board of directors for the completeness and accuracy of all information submitted, 
and dates and methods of disclosure by the two daily newspapers of wide circulation 
published in the Arabic language in the UAE.  
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Article 29 of the SCA Decision No 3 of 2000 embraces important items on the subject 
of pre-disclosure. The regulator desires companies to comply with extensive disclosure 
obligations.  These include: a statement from the company regarding the significant 
events it has experienced; statements from each member of the board of directors and 
executive managers as to how many and in what shares they and close relatives own; 
and the names of those whose holdings (in addition to those of their minor children) 
amount to 5% or more of the shares of the company applying for listing. The 
information is of great value in understanding the position of the company. Arguably 
these obligations prevent market manipulation such as squeeze and corner practices. 
The chapter on market manipulation below will discuss such practices.     
 
Article 29 of SCA Decision No 3 of 2000 requires listed companies to provide 
particular information as a reflection of the true position of the company. The Article is 
also statement of the significant events that the company has experienced from its 
incorporation up to the date of submitting the application for listing: Are there enough 
items to provide for disclosure regarding its true position?  Also, what does a 
‗significant event‘ mean? Is it necessary that such an event should affect its business 
activities or financial position to be considered ‗significant‘?   
 
With regard to the expression ‗significant event‘, the regulations do not clarify this term 
or give examples, while Article 33 defines the term ‗significant developments‘252, which 
is the obligation on a company to notify SCA when it faces developments. The 
definition has been augmented by giving examples of such developments. However, the 
expression ‗significant event‘ without any explanation from SCA shows the 
shortcomings of this article.  
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 Discussion regarding significant development in terms of company will be under post-listing 
disclosure in following section.       
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Responsibility for the truth and accuracy of the statement made in a registration 
statement lies with members of the board of directors of any listed company. Even if 
SCA examines the statement, it is not necessarily enough to prove its truth and 
accuracy. In other words, SCA‘s scrutiny of these statements does not guarantee that the 
statements are true and accurate, nor does it absolve the company from legal 
responsibility.
253
  
 
The continuing obligations regulation imposes an obligation on listed public companies 
whose securities are approved for listing to disclose publicly annual financial 
statements.  This should be done in print in two daily Arabic language newspapers in 
the country. The regulator considers that an annual financial statement is essential for 
investors to know about developments in the company and whether they are positive or 
negative. On the basis of this information, an investor may decide what to invest in, or 
to buy or sell his company shares. The statement should embrace an important analysis, 
a variety of financial data about the company‘s annual and interim financial statements, 
and a summary of the Board of Directors' report submitted for the purposes of listing.
 254
 
 
 (2) Post-listing Disclosure 
 According to the market regulation regime mentioned above, companies or entities 
whose securities have been listed in the market are compelled to perform fundamental 
duties for the purposes of disclosure. Articles 32 - 36 are designed to be adequate for the 
disclosure obligation regime. There are three underlying principles of obligation of 
disclosure embraced in the three articles in the post-listing disclosure rules. The three 
Articles are:  
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Article 33: 
The company or entity whose securities have been listed in the Market 
shall notify the Authority and the management of the Market of any 
significant developments affecting the prices of such securities upon 
learning of the same, such as catastrophes, fires, mergers, the issue of 
new securities, the discontinuance of a production line, voluntary 
liquidation or lawsuits filed by or against the company affecting its 
financial position. 
The board of directors of the Market shall have the right to publish any 
statement in respect of such developments in the local press and other 
media it deems appropriate. 
 
 
Article 34: 
A company or entity whose securities have been listed in the Market 
shall, when so requested, publish any explanatory information which 
relates to its circumstances and activities and is such as to secure the 
integrity of transactions and the confidence of investors. 
If any change occurs in a significant matter contained in a previously 
published press announcement, such entity or company shall issue a 
press announcement reflecting the actual situation after the change, the 
subsequent press announcement to be issued in the same newspaper or 
newspapers as contained the earlier announcement. 
 
 
and Article 36: 
Entities and companies whose securities are listed in the Market shall 
notify and provide the Authority and the Market of and with the 
following: 
1. All information and statistics requested by the Authority or the Market. 
2. Transactions effected in such securities outside the Market, before 
entering them in the register of shares. 
3. The number of shares owned by members of the company's board of 
directors, within fifteen (15) days as from their assumption of 
membership and also at the end of each financial year, and all trades 
effected by members of the company's board of directors and its 
executive management. 
4. Details of the sale or purchase of major assets which affect the position 
of the company. 
5. The documents relating to amendments introduced into the company's 
articles of association, as soon as approved. 
6. Any change relating to the company's management structure at the 
level of the board of directors and the executive management. 
7. Entities or companies whose securities are listed on the Market shall 
notify and provide to both the Authority and the Market short-form final 
accounts (preliminary financial statements which are unaudited and 
unreviewed) within forty-five days from the end of the financial year, 
signed by the board of directors or the person authorised to sign on its 
behalf.  
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b)  Entities or companies whose securities are listed on the Market are 
required to notify and provide to both the Authority and the Market the 
following reports:  
1.  Interim financial reports (quarterly  –  half-yearly) which are reviewed 
by the external auditor of the company within forty-five days from the 
end of the specified time period, signed by the board of directors or the 
person authorised to sign on its behalf.  
2.  Annual financial reports which are audited by the external auditor of 
the company, within ninety days from the end of the financial year, 
signed by the board of directors or the person authorised to sign on its 
behalf 
8. Copies of all printed materials destined for the company's shareholders, 
as soon as issued. 
9. The resolution of the board of directors of the company as to the 
distribution of profits to shareholders or the announcing of profits and 
losses, in order to obtain the approval of the management of the Market for 
the publication thereof. 
10. The names of those who own, or whose holding together with their 
minor children reaches, 5% or more of the company's shares, this 
obligation also to be complied with upon each occasion when the holding 
reaches 1% of the company's shares over and above the 5%. 
 
These articles include three principles. A brief analysis follows of the obligations 
imposed on companies and entities under these three principles:    
 Informing SCA and the market management of significant developments. 
 Disseminating any explanatory information which relates to its circumstances 
and activities.   
 Disclosing of information and data on a regular basis.    
 
(a) Significant developments 
The regulator obliges all issuers whose securities have been listed in the market to 
inform SCA and the management of the market about ‗any significant developments 
affecting the prices of such securities‘.255 This means that the significant developments 
must affect the prices of securities, otherwise there is no obligation on the issuer to 
disclose this information.  However, it is not clear whether the ‗affecting‘ is likely or 
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definite
256
. Without a clear definition from SCA, it is certainly an ambiguous 
proposition. On the other hand, the examples given of significant developments are a 
positive aspect of this article. The examples cited are ‗...such as catastrophes, fires, 
mergers, the issue of new securities, the discontinuance of a production line, voluntary 
liquidation or lawsuits filed by or against the company affecting its financial position‘.  
 
On the other hand, determining the time is essential for disclosure of information: when 
should the issuer make the disclosure? Article 17 of SCA Decision No. 3 of 2000 does 
not determine the time, but includes the expression ‗upon learning of the same‘. For not 
determining the actual time in which disclosure is obligatory was a problem. However, 
this article has been amended according to SCA Decision No. (5\R) of 2008. The 
amendment gave ADX and DFM the responsibility to monitor ‗listed companies' 
obligations to make disclosure of significant matters and information and financial 
statements, the publication of the same, and the timing of such publication‘. Timely 
disclosure of inside information is important for preventing exploitation of sensitive 
information. In other words, it is to prevent insider dealing taking place.  If a company 
needs time to think and evaluate the significant event or information before disclosing it 
to the  public, there is then a period of time for that. Should obligation for disclosure be 
immediate? The SCA gave this undertaking to the Markets to monitor listed companies.  
 
(b) Disseminating any explanatory information 
If any circumstances or activities that are ambiguous are related to the issuer‘s 
operation, there is responsibility on the shoulders of the issuer to publish explanatory 
information when required.  However, the UAE market is deeply affected by rumours as 
                                                 
256
 In fact that this expression of likely is used for inside information under the CJA s 56(1), when it is 
having the greatest impact on share prices as it stated ‗...(d) if it were made public it would be likely to 
have a significant effect on the price of any securities‘. Thus, in contrast of understanding, the definite is 
contrary of likely.  
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are many in the emergent markets. As Al Jarkass points out,
257
 ‗...investors in the UAE 
generally rely on rumours rather than on educated investment advice, which cause the 
wild gyrations in local stock markets....‘. If there is any rumour disseminated in the 
securities marketplace in relation to a company‘s activities or circumstances, the 
company should formally be obliged to respond to these rumours by giving  at least 
explanatory details in the marketplace and to investors. In practice this may not happen. 
For example, in May 2005, Amlak Finance and Real Estate Company‘s shares rose on 
rumours about it approaching a rights issue. Even though the company formally denied 
that it had plans to expand its capital, a week afterwards the market rumours were 
proved true by an official announcement. Huge sums of money were made by those 
who pursued the market rumours and who possessed the advantageous information. 
Neither SCA nor the company took action against the source of the information. The 
Company denied the rumours at first, then went ahead with the issue.
258
  
 
The SCA should in principle have taken definite action on this issue by obliging 
companies to disclose proper information which is relevant to any rumours which occur. 
Dissemination of false information or statements as rumours is a criminal offence under 
ESCA law 2000.
259
  An enforced free flow of information through disclosure and 
transparency tools would prevent such rumours, which amounts to market abuse.  
 
(c) Disclosure of information and data on a regular basis 
As has been mentioned above, the disclosure requirement which is based upon Article 
36 sets forth ten items and areas in terms of the listed companies. These items remain a 
central principle of the listing regimes for issuers after they have been admitted to 
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listing. The regulator clearly believes that continuing obligation to disclosure is 
indispensable for both investors and the market. It also helps SCA in the performance of 
its function of supervising dealings in the securities market. 
 
There are other particular disclosure obligations under Article 36 (9) which require 
issuers to notify SCA and the market about any decision by the Board of Directors in 
terms of the distribution of profits, shareholders or the announcement of profits and 
losses. This however is not always done. For instance, Emaar Company Properties took 
possession of 40% of total trading volume in the securities markets and increased this 
portion by transaction to more than 45% during 2007.  Emaar disclosed the value of its 
profits (which amounted to 6.37 billion dirhams) but did not disclose the distribution of 
profits to its shareholders. The proposed distribution of profits to shareholders is 
considered as fundamental and essential for investors. The board of Directors was 
supposed to disclose the information without reasonable delay. This produced an 
environment of rumours which were exploited by some speculators to manipulate the 
emotions of investors in the markets, and thus Emaar Company Properties securities 
prices fluctuated during February and at the beginning of March 2007.
260
 The practice 
broke SCA's rule regarding  ‗the resolution of the board of directors of the company as 
to the distribution of profits to shareholders or the announcing of profits and losses, in 
order to obtain the approval of the management of the Market for the publication 
thereof‘.261 
  
Disclosure obligations may be classified as periodic disclosure and continuous 
disclosure. Periodic disclosure is a requirement relating to the company‘s financial 
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position, as financial statements are supposed to be disseminated on a regular basis.
262
  
Article 36 (7) of SCA Decision 3 of 2000 requires of a business, interim financial 
reports (quarterly  –  half-yearly) within forty-five days from the end of the specified 
time period and annual financial reports within ninety days from the end of the financial 
year.  
 
Continuous disclosure requires certain information to be disclosed to the public on each 
occasion it arises. Companies that are listed are obligated to disclose information that 
can have an effect on share prices, including information that is not usually made 
public, such as ‗any significant developments affecting the prices‘263 of securities. 
Disclosure allows investors to make completely informed decisions, and also stops 
insider dealers from taking advantage of significant developments affecting the 
company‘s position in the case if delay in disclose of information. It also ensures that 
there is a proper market in the relevant securities.
264
 
 
2.6.2 Transparency of listed companies 
 
Transparency may be defined as the degree to which information about trading (both 
pre-trade and post-trade information) is made publicly available on a real-time basis. 
Pre-trade information concerns the posting of firm bids and offers in both quote and 
order-driven markets, as a means to enable investors to know with some degree of 
certainty whether and at what prices they can deal. Post-trade information is related to 
the prices and the volume of all individual transactions actually concluded.
265
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Market transparency refers to the openness of information that is available about a 
market, such as the pricing and availability of products within a market, so that 
consumers can make an informed choice. Market transparency should prevent market 
abuse and should help in the creation of a free market, that is one that is free of 
corruption and deceitfulness. It has been argued that an increase in the amount of 
market transparency will increase the quality of the market.
266
  
 
Market transparency then has become an important issue in terms of the regulation and 
structure of the market.
267
 Ariadna Dumitrescu describes transparency as ‗a central 
attribute of financial markets‘. In particular, transparency ‗represents the degree to 
which information regarding quotations for securities, the prices of transactions, the 
volume of those transactions and source of order flow is made publicly available‘.268 
Thus, the dilemma is how much information is actually available to be observed. Does 
the market participant know everything that it is possible to know about the product? 
For example, the pricing, the size of the product and the buyer of a product, are all vital 
information for market participants. Additionally, there is the question of who 
specifically is going to observe the information, and if this person is capable of making 
fair judgments. It is significant if the information can only be viewed by price-setting 
agents or if others such as those on the exchange floor, traders and potential traders can 
also view the information.
269
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Markets fulfil this function by inter alia reflecting securities prices on all available 
information, and hence most securities appear to be fairly valued and in equilibrium. In 
this line of reasoning, the Securities and Investment Board (SIB)
270
 in the UK have 
raised the issue that in some instances transparency should not be allowed, in order to 
ensure the flow and liquidity of the markets.
271
 
 
It is necessary, then, to know the extent to which transparency actually exists – since the 
markets and strategies are based upon the transparency of the market.
272
 In the UAE 
SCA has issued standard rules for disclosure and transparency in order to obtain a high 
level of transparency. As Rashid Al Baloushi
273
 states, SCA standard rules ‗...will 
improve transparency through extended disclosure requirements and will make the 
appointment of audit committees mandatory‘.274The Authority itself states that ‗The 
board of directors of the Market [ADX and DFM] shall issue the press notices necessary 
to ensure transparency of information and disclosure.‘275 However, Mohammed 
Alqoseen
276
 has pointed out that although ‗...the levels of disclosure and transparency in 
the UAE in general are good, there is a need for more transparency‘.277 The financial 
crisis has been in part blamed on the directors of the financial institutions who have 
shown to be not only deficient in terms of responsibility, but also deficient in 
transparency and providing financial reports.
278
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The establishment of SCA and the rules it brought out have not succeeded in improving 
market transparency to any great extent.  There has been no real break from a past of 
corruption in public corporations, where material information was held and concealed 
(rather than disclosed) by directors and executives and those connected to them. 
279
  
 
2.7 Market Abuse Regulations under Three Jurisdictions: the UK, The DIFC and 
the UAE  
 
 Regulation of market abuse differs to some extent in the above three jurisdictions. This 
section will mainly focus on the legal and regulatory framework for dealing with market 
abuse that has developed in the UK and the DIFC. The intent is to provide a 
comprehensive analysis of market abuse and to define the UAE regulations which were 
created to combat illegal practices in the securities market. A comparison will be made 
whenever necessary with the UK‘s FSMA 2000 and the DIFC law. The following looks 
at the reform of certain regulatory laws in these areas. 
 
2.7.1 Definition of Market Abuse 
 
Edward J. Swan has noted three types of behaviour that are considered to be an abuse of 
the market: misuse of information; giving false or misleading information; and 
distortion of the market. Misuse of information refers to information that may be 
available when investments are decided upon. Giving false or misleading information 
can involve the public or investors being misled over the price of the investment and the 
supply and demand of the product. Distortion of the market involves behaviour that 
leads to misrepresentation of it in some way.
280
 Avgouleas defines these illegal practices 
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as follows: ‗market abuse predominantly takes the form of abuse of inside information 
(insider dealing) and market manipulation‘.281 
 
One of the first and most infamous cases of market abuses occurred in 1720 in England, 
leading to what was known as the South Sea Bubble.
282
 This was the first of many such 
incidents of abuse that has occurred in financial markets around the world.
283
 In the 
UAE, the financial crisis of the summer of 1998 reduced investor confidence and 
market efficiency. When securities were priced beyond their value, severe rumours 
created a bubble. Informal statistics indicate that the market price of traded securities 
was around 51 billion Dirhams at the beginning of 1998. The market price soared to 182 
billion Dirhams by August 1998 and then declined sharply to 161 billion Dirhamsin 
September 1998.
284
  
 
 
The creation of a regulatory system discourages abuse of the market. Those who 
participate in the market have a duty to act within the laws for the benefit of all 
concerned, most especially for investors and other participants. Swan asserts that, 
‗…financial market participants have an overriding duty to ensure that the markets are 
run efficiently and fairly…not only for their own benefit, but for the benefit of market 
participants and investors generally‘.285  
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2.7.2 Market abuse under the UK jurisdiction 
 
UK regulation against insider dealing as a form of market abuse comes under a dual 
regime
286
 which is based upon FSMA 2000 and Part V of the Criminal Justice Act 
1993.
287
 The definition of insider dealing may be found under the CJA 1993 and FSMA 
2000.
288
 In March 1994, the CJA 1993 came into force, having replaced the original 
Company Securities Act 1985. The CJA 1993 was in fact an ‗extension of the basis of 
liability for insider dealing offence‘.289 Indeed, the purpose of a market abuse regime is 
to work in conjunction with criminal laws that already exist.
290
 In the light of this, the 
duel regime is discussed in the following sections.  
 
(a) Companies Securities (Insider Dealing) Act 1985 
 
The Companies Act came into existence after decades of attempts by the UK 
government to make insider trading a criminal offence.  In the 1970s and 1980s, 
parliamentary efforts to enact legislation against insider dealing eventually led to the 
establishment of the Companies Act of 1985. Later provisions were added in 1985, and 
it became the Companies Securities (Insider Dealing) Act 1985. While the 1985 Act 
was important, it was limited in scope. It only allowed for the criminal liability of 
individuals who had used inside information. As a matter of fact, notwithstanding that 
insider dealing had been an offence since 1980, no convictions took place under the 
1985 Act‘s provisions until the late 1980s. However, in 1986 more provisions were 
added to the Financial Services Act to give the government further power to enforce the 
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regulations.
291
 As a result, the provisions under both the Company Securities (Insider 
Dealing) Act 1985 and the Financial Services Act 1986 were repealed.
292
 
   
The Companies Securities (Insider Dealing) Act 1985 did prevent insider dealing, in 
that those with inside information were required to wait until the information was in the 
market before making use of it.
293
 The Companies Securities (Insider Dealing) Act 1985 
was later superseded by the Criminal Justice Act 1993, and represented an extension of 
the basis of liability for the insider dealing offence. The CJA 1993 contains a wider 
definition of ‗securities‘ and ‗insider‘ than the 1985 Act and the nature of the inside 
information necessary to impose liability has been altered.
 294
 Barry A K Rider  argues 
that, ‗there are now only three distinct forms of offences listed: dealing while in 
possession of inside information; encouraging another to deal in such circumstances; 
and disclosing information out with the proper performance of employment or 
professional duties‘.295 It can be argued that in order for these offences to be prosecuted 
there must be proof that an ‗insider‘ had possession of insider information. Thus, the 
1993 Act not only offers a larger interpretation of insider dealing than previous 
legislation,
296
 but also provides the authorities with the continued ability to enforce 
regulatory laws.
297
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(b) Criminal Justice Act 1993 (CJA 1993) 
 
Part V of the CJA 1993
298
 establishes three types of prohibited behaviour that is 
classified as insider dealing: the act of dealing on the basis of inside information; the act 
of encouraging another person to be involved in the price affected securities on the basis 
of insider information; and the act of knowingly disclosing insider information to 
another.
299
  
 
Despite the regulations that exist, it is recognised that insider dealing can be hard to 
define.
300
 While there is often a lot of confidential information available in a company, 
as Kern Alexander notes, inside information is ‗a substantial amount of information 
[which] will be generated within a company and be available to its directors, employees, 
and advisers. Much of this information will be confidential, and may have some impact 
on share prices‘.301 Alexander also states that during the UK parliamentary debate on 
this law, the ministers admitted their concern was over information about ‗dramatic 
events and major occurrences that would transform a company‘s prospects‘.302  
 
 On the other hand, in order to prove an offence of insider dealing the prosecution must 
show that the offence has occurred beyond a reasonable doubt. If not, then the accused 
                                                 
298
 Section 52 of the CJA 1993provides that offence as follow: 
(1) An individual who has information as an insider is guilty of insider dealing if, in the circumstances 
mentioned in subsection (3), he deals in securities that are price-affected securities in relation to the 
information. 
(2) An individual who has information as an insider is also guilty of insider dealing if- 
(a) he encourages another person to deal in securities that are (whether or not that other knows it) price-
affected securities in relation to the information, knowing or having reasonable cause to believe that the 
dealing would take place in the circumstances mentioned  in subsection (3); or 
(b) he discloses the information, otherwise than in the proper performance of the functions of his 
employment, office or profession, to another person. 
299
 CJA 1993, Part V, s.52(1) and (2). 
300
 See: Stephen Bainbridge,  ‗A Critique of the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984‘, (April 1985) 71 
Virginia Law Review 455, p.1. 
301
  Alexander, ‗ Insider Dealing and Market Abuse: The Financial Services and Markets Act 2000‘, p.6 
302
  Ibid. 
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will be acquitted.
303
 Furthermore, while the CJA 1993 allows for criminal liability in 
such cases of insider dealing, there is no civil remedy that the company or careless 
investors can appeal to.
304
 The high standards required by criminal prosecutions have 
created a burdensome procedure, to the extent that it is difficult to use it as a successful 
regulatory implement. As the Economic Secretary of a Standing Committee points out, 
‗there is a gap in the protections. The criminal law covers all market participants, but 
only a narrow range of serious criminal offences. The regulatory regime is capable of 
dealing with a wider range of damaging behaviours, but applies only to the regulated 
community‘.305  
 
The case of Mackie v HM Advocate supports this argument.
306
 Mr Mackie was a 
financial analyst who had a meeting with the chairman of a listed company. During the 
meeting, he was notified that in a short time the company would be giving a caution 
concerning the reduced profits in the Securities Market. Because of considerable sales 
in the market the share price fell significantly before any announcement of a profits 
warning was made.  It was alleged that Mr. Mackie gave advice to his customers on the 
basis of inside information. He was accused of counselling or procuring other persons to 
deal in contravention of the Company Securities (Insider Dealing) Act 1985. However, 
because the case was subject to a criminal prosecution which required standards of 
proof, the case had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt what was said in the meeting. 
The case failed on appeal because there was insufficient evidence what Mr Mackie was 
                                                 
303
 MacNeil,  p. 301. 
304
 Alexander, Insider Dealing and Market Abuse: The Financial Services and Markets Act 2000‘, p. 21. 
305
 Economic Secretary in Standing Committee A, November 2, 1999, c.652. The ability of an outsider to 
undermine a market was demonstrated by the effect Sumitomo Bank had on the London Metal Exchange 
even though it was not a member of that exchange, see Lord Bagri (Hansard, HL Vol.610, col.58 
(February 21, 2000)). 
306
 Mackie (Thorold) v HM Advocate, High Court of Justice, 16 February 1994. Mr Mackie's case took 
place in March 1993 in the High Court of Edinburgh. Although this prosecution was adjudicated under 
the Companies Securities (Insider Dealing) Act 1985, it is example for supporting the argument that it is 
difficult to prove the elements of insider dealing as criminal offence and establish all material facts 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
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told by the Chairman at the meeting or to prove that he disclosed that information to 
others.  
 
The high standards of proof required by criminal prosecutions created a burdensome 
procedure to prove insider dealing cases. This was the main cause for the changes that 
were introduced in FSMA 2000. Another shortcoming was that the provisions did not 
cover all types of market abuse behaviours. Thus, FSMA 2000 came to fill the gap left 
by criminal provisions and self-regulatory rules.
307
 
 
Sections 401 and 402 of FSMA 2000 provide the FSA with broad powers to take 
criminal action against several of the offences under FSMA and other regulations, for 
instance, offences related to violations of the FSA Listing Rules, specifically when there 
is an offer of new securities
308
 ‗to the public in the United Kingdom before the required 
prospectus is published‘.309 
 
The Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 provides a significant extension of the 
authority currently available to regulators to fight market abuse and insider dealing. 
Indeed, the regulation was intended to prevent such offences from taking place. The 
FSMA 2000 gives the FSA more power and strengthens its ability to enforce regulations 
and to investigate possible offences. The new legislation also provides the FSA with the 
ability to impose civil penalties and to obtain restitution for instances of abuse of 
information, whereas the Criminal Justice Act 1993 only provided for criminal 
                                                 
307
 Michael Filby, ‗Part VII Financial Services and Markets Act: Filling Insider Dealing‘s Regulatory 
Gaps‘, (2003) 24 Company Lawyer 334, p. 363. 
308
 Section 84 of FSMA 2000. 
309
 Section 85 (1) of FSMA 2000, under subsection (2) of this section provides criminal penalty for a 
‗person who contravenes subsection (1) is guilty of an offence and liable—  
(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding three months or a fine not 
exceeding level 5 on the standard scale;  
(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years or a fine, or both‘. 
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prosecution.
310
 In order to clearly understand the offence of insider dealing, the 
subsequent chapter offers an in depth discussion of it.   
 
(c) The Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (FSMA 2000) 
The FSMA 2000 defined market abuse under Section 118 as an offence and contained 
behaviours of the offence. These behaviours may amount to market abuse practices.
311
 
However, the Market Abuse Directive described the abuse of market conduct in simple 
                                                 
310 
Rider, Market Abuse and Insider Dealing, p. 4. 
311
The new section 118 of the FSMA 2000 determines behaviour amounting to insider dealing and market 
abuse as; 
118 Market abuse 
(1) For the purposes of this Act [FSMA], market abuse is behaviour (whether by one person alone or by 
two or more persons jointly or in concert) which- 
(a) occurs in relation to- 
(i) qualifying investments admitted to trading on a prescribed market, 
(ii) qualifying investments in respect of which a request for admission to trading 
on such a market has been made, or 
(iii) in the case of subsection (2) or (3) behaviour, investments which are related 
investments in relation to such qualifying investments, and 
(b) falls within any one or more of the types of behaviour set out in subsections (2) to (8). 
 (2) The first type of behaviour is where an insider deals, or attempts to deal, in a qualifying investment or 
related investment on the basis of inside information relating to the investment in question. 
(3) The second is where an insider discloses inside information to another person, otherwise than in the 
proper course of the exercise of his employment, profession or duties. 
(4) The third is where the behaviour (not falling within subsection (2) or (3)):– 
(a) is based on information which is not generally available to those using the market but which, if 
available to a regular user of the market, would be, or would be likely to be, regarded by him as relevant 
when deciding the terms on which transactions in qualifying investments should be effected; and 
(b) is likely to be regarded by a regular user of the market as a failure on the part of the person concerned 
to observe the standard of behaviour reasonably expected of a person in his position in relation to the 
market. 
(5) The fourth is where the behaviour consists of effecting transactions or orders to trade (otherwise than 
for legitimate reasons and in conformity with accepted market practices on the relevant market) which:– 
(a) give, or are likely to give, a false or misleading impression as to the supply of, or demand for, or as to 
the price of, one or more qualifying investments; or 
(b) secure the price of one or more such investments at an abnormal or artificial level. 
(6) The fifth is where the behaviour consists of effecting transactions or orders to trade which employ 
fictitious devices or any other form of deception or contrivance. 
(7) The sixth is where the behaviour consists of the dissemination of information by any means which 
gives, or is likely to give, a false or misleading impression as to a qualifying investment by a person who 
knew or could reasonably be expected to have known that the information was false or misleading. 
(8) The seventh is where the behaviour (not falling within subsection (5), (6) or (7)) :– 
(a) is likely to give a regular user of the market a false or misleading impression as to the supply of, 
demand for or price or value of, qualifying investments; or 
(b) would be, or would be likely to be, regarded by a regular user of the market as behaviour that would 
distort, or would be likely to distort, the market in such an investment, and the behaviour is likely to be 
regarded by a regular user of the market as a failure on the part of the person concerned to observe the 
standard of behaviour reasonably expected of a person in his position in relation to the market. 
(9) Subsections (4) and (8) and the definition of "regular user" in section 130A(3) cease to have effect on 
30 June 2008 and subsection (1)(b) is then to be read as no longer referring to those subsections. 
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terms: ‗market abuse … consists of insider dealing and market manipulation‘.312 The 
Market Abuse Directive was implemented in the UK through the Financial Services and 
Markets Act 2000.
313
 
 
Abuse of the market arises when a market user has been put at an unreasonable 
disadvantage (whether directly or indirectly)
314
 ‗by one person alone or by two or more 
persons jointly or in concert‘315in the market. Section 118 of the FSMA 2000 provides a 
definition of market abuse which can be broken up into three major categories of 
behaviour: 
 • using to their own benefit information which is not generally available to the 
relevant market.
316
 
 • creating a false or misleading impression,317 or 
 • distorting the market in such investments. 318  
These categories of market abuse are significant factors in creating inefficiency and 
incompetence in the market. They cause market participants to lose confidence and trust 
in the market.
319
 
 
In order to have a full comprehension of market abuse, there must be an understanding 
of the role of the regular user. Swan defined the regular user in these terms: ‗a 
hypothetical reasonable person; who regularly deals on the market in question; in 
investments of the kind in question‘.320  
                                                 
312
 Recital.2.2 (Directive 2003/6/EC). 
313
 Financial Services and Markets Act 2000( Market Abuse) Regulations 2005, SI 2005/381. 
314
 Consultant Paper 59, FSA Market abuse: A draft Code of Market Conduct,s.1.1, p 3 
315
 FSMA 2000, s 118(1)  
316
 Section 188(4)(a) of the FSMA 2000. 
317
 Section 118 (8) (a) of the FSMA 2000. 
318
 Section 118 (8) (b) of the FSMA 2000. 
319
 Richard Pratt, ‗Economic Crime-the Financial System as a Victim‘, (2004) 12 Journal of Financial 
Crime 1, pp. 66-68. 
320
 Edward J. Swan, ‗Market abuse regulation and energy trading‘, (2004) 4 International Energy Law & 
Taxation Review, pp. 91-100. 
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The FSMA 2000 required the FSA to issue a Code of Market Conduct in order to guide 
people trying to decide whether or not particular conduct constitutes market abuse, and 
which could provide safe harbours for those who act within its terms of market abuse.
321
 
While the FSA Code does not give a complete list of behaviour that is considered 
market abuse, the code looks at each type of market abuse and states the factors that 
determine whether abuse occurred. It then looks at whether the specific behaviour 
amounts or does not amount to market abuse. If a person behaves in a manner that the 
Code states is not related to market abuse, then they are not considered to have 
committed market abuse.
322
 
 
2.7.3 The Dubai International Financial Centre (DIFC): The Market Abuse Regime  
 
The DIFC law No. 12 of 2004 came into force on 16 September 2004 and was 
subsequently amended by DIFC law No. 2 February 2007.  This contains the provisions 
relating to market abuse in Chapter 1 through to Part 8. Market abuse under the DIFC 
law No. 12 of 2004 refers to conduct which contravenes provisions.
323
  It is defined 
under provisions 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42 and 43 which prohibit: fraud and market 
manipulation; misleading or untrue statement; misleading or deceptive conduct; 
misleading or deceptive statement; statement about future matters; inducing persons to 
deal; insider dealing; and providing inside information.
324
 It can be argued that market 
                                                 
321
 Section 119 of FSMA 2000 has stated that ‗The Authority[ FSA] must prepare and issue a code 
containing such provisions as the Authority considers will give appropriate guidance to those determining 
whether or not behaviour amounts to market abuse...‘ 
322
 See: www.morganleewise at : a summary of the Financial Services Authority‘s market abuse regime in 
the United Kingdom.  
323
 The DFSA Rulebook, Glossary Module (GLO), p. 42. 
324
 DIFC Law No. 12 of 2004 which amended by DIFC Law No. 2 2007 state the provisions of market 
misconduct as follow :  
36. Fraud and market manipulation 
A person shall not, in the DIFC or elsewhere, directly or indirectly, engage or participate in any act, 
practice or course of conduct relating to Investments that the person knows or reasonably ought to know: 
(a) results in or contributes to, or may result in or contribute to, a misleading appearance of trading 
activity in, or an artificial price for, Investments; or 
(b) perpetrates a fraud on any person. 
37. Misleading or untrue statements 
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A person shall not, in the DIFC or elsewhere, make a statement that the person knows or reasonably 
ought to know, at the time and in light of the circumstances under which it is made: 
(a) is misleading or untrue or does not state a fact that is required to be stated or that is necessary to make 
the statement not misleading; and  
(b) significantly affects, or would reasonably be expected to have a significant effect on, the market price 
or value of Investments. 
38. Misleading or deceptive conduct 
A person shall not, in the DIFC or elsewhere, engage in conduct in relation to Investments that is 
misleading or deceptive or is likely to mislead or deceive. 
39. Misleading or deceptive statements 
(1) A person shall not make an offer of Securities under a Prospectus or Supplementary Prospectus if 
there is: 
(a) a misleading or deceptive statement in: 
(i) the Prospectus or Supplementary Prospectus; 
(ii) any application form that accompanies the Prospectus or Supplementary Prospectus; or 
(iii) any other document that relates to the offer, or the application form; 
(b) an omission from the Prospectus, Supplementary Prospectus, application form or any other document 
as required by this Law or the Offered Securities Rules; or 
(c) a new circumstance that under the Law or the Offered Securities Rules requires a Supplementary 
Prospectus to be filed. 
(2) A person shall not in or from the DIFC make a misleading or deceptive statement in any document 
issued by him or on his behalf in connection with an Exempt Offer, whether in the DIFC or elsewhere. 
40. Statements about future matters 
(1) A person is taken to make a misleading statement about a future matter, whether by himself or his 
agent, if at the time of making the statement he did not have reasonable grounds for making the statement 
or causing it to be made. 
(2) The onus for proving that reasonable grounds existed for the purposes of Article 40(1) is on the person 
who made the statement. 
41. Inducing persons to deal 
(1) A person shall not in the DIFC or elsewhere, induce another person to deal in Investments: 
(a) by making or publishing a statement, promise or forecast if the person knows, or is reckless as to 
whether, the statement is misleading, false or deceptive; 
(b) by a concealment of material facts; or 
(c) by recording or storing information that the person knows to be false or misleading in a material 
respect or may be materially misleading. 
42. Insider dealing 
(1) A Reporting Entity or person in a special relationship with a Reporting Entity shall not, in the DIFC or 
elsewhere, deal in Investments of or relating to the Reporting Entity if the person possesses material 
information that: 
(a) is not generally available in the market; and 
(b) has not been disclosed to the market in accordance with this Law or the Rules. 
(2) In this Article: 
―Investments‖ does not include: 
(a) options to acquire or dispose of; 
(i) commodities of any kind; or 
(ii) an option to acquire or dispose of an Investment of the kind specified by Article 42(2). 
(b) rights under a contract for the sale of a commodity under which delivery is to be made at a future date 
and at a price agreed on when the contract is made; or 
(c) any right to or interest in anything which is specified by Article 42(2) (a) and (b). 
43. Providing inside information 
(1) A Reporting Entity or a person in a special relationship with a Reporting Entity shall not inform, other 
than in the necessary course of business, another person of material information that is not generally 
available in the market with respect to the Reporting Entity, before the material information has been 
disclosed to the market in accordance with this Law or the Rules. 
(2) A Reporting Entity or a person in a special relationship shall not procure another person to deal in 
Investments if that Reporting Entity or person has knowledge of the material information that is not 
generally available in the market or the material information has not been disclosed to the market in 
accordance with this Law or the Rules. 
(3) In this Article: 
―procure‖ includes: 
where a person induces or encourages another person by direct or indirect means. 
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misconduct in the DIFC law No.12 of 2004 is very widely covered. It seems to embrace 
all misconduct that constitutes market abuse. No importance is attached to the intention 
of the offender (as in the UK also). Rather, the prosecution is fully focused on the effect 
the action itself had.
325
 The focus is on the effect of the conduct, not on the intention 
that underlies it. It must have had significant effects, or would reasonably be expected to 
have a significant effect on the market price or value of the investment‘326. In addition, 
the type of behaviour that may constitute fraud and market manipulation includes those 
which are done ‗directly or indirectly‘.327 It can be implied by the law that it wants the 
DIFC market to have flexibility in dealing with cases of market abuse. However, this 
only relates to the jurisdiction of the DIFC and that which affects its markets and 
investors. The market abuse regime does not apply to conduct which occurs outside the 
DIFC jurisdiction unless that conduct affects the DIFC markets or users of the DIFC 
markets.
328
  
 
In fact the jurisdiction of market abuse under the DFIC Law is difficult to interpret 
because the rules relating to market abuse include complex terms. No case has been 
brought under these rules which may serve as a judicial interpretation, and there is 
rarely any academic reference in the field. However, there has been considerable work 
done on comparative jurisdictions, which can be approached whenever necessary.
329
In 
the light of this, the rules will be compared to their counterparts under other systems 
(such as the UAE and the UK) in the following chapters. 
 
 
 
                                                 
325
 Article 41(a) of the DIFC Law. 
326
 Article 37 (b) of the DIFC Law. 
327
 Article 36 of the DIFC Law. 
328
  Article 44 of the DIFC Law. 
329
 Albleooshi, p. 181.  
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2.7.4 Market abuse under the Federal Law No. 4 of 2000 ( ESAC law 2000) 
 
The UAE formulated the ESCA law 2000 in order to strengthen the securities regulation 
in its struggle against illegal practices on the market, such as insider dealing and market 
manipulation. The ESCA law 2000 provides a framework for the UAE securities market 
regulation against market abuse. It also protects market participants through Articles 
26(2), 36, 37 and 39 of the law.  
 
The ESCA law 2000 sets out provisions which are aimed at combating market abuse as 
follows: 
Article 26 (2) 
Licensed brokers and their representatives shall abide by the following: 
…Refraining from any act such as to harm the reputation of the Market, 
its members or transacting parties therein, or arranging or participating 
in any fictitious transactions not conducive to a true transfer of the 
Securities or funds which are the subject of the dealing. 
 
 
Article 36: 
‗The furnishing of false information, statements or data such as to 
affect the market value of Securities and an investor's decision to 
invest or otherwise shall not be permitted.‘ 
  
Article 37: 
‗The exploitation of undisclosed information which could affect prices 
of Securities in order to achieve personal benefits shall not be 
permitted. Any dealing effected in contravention of this shall be null 
and void.‘ 
 
 Article 39: 
‗It shall not be permitted for any person to deal in Securities on the 
basis of unpublicized or undisclosed information he acquired by virtue 
of his position. 
It shall not be permitted for any person to spread rumours regarding 
the selling or buying of shares. 
 
Nor shall it be permitted for the chairman and members of any 
company's management or its employees to exploit their inside 
information as to the company in the purchase of shares or the sale 
thereof in the Market. Any transaction effected by any person in 
contravention of the provisions of the two preceding paragraphs shall 
be null and void.‘ 
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In addition, SCA is empowered to issue rules and enforce such rules in order to 
maintain the securities markets‘ ‗fairness and efficiency‘. The ESCA law 2000 permits 
SCA to make suggestions and delegates it the authority to issue regulations to exercise 
its power.
330
 On this ground, SCA issued a number of resolutions and rules such as the 
Regulations as to Disclosure and Transparency.
331
 One area in which SCA used the 
powers delegated to it by the ESAC law 2000 is in the regulation of manipulative 
conducts which are damaging to the market. The SCA Decision No 3 of 2000 
implemented the above-mentioned Articles under the ESAC law 2000, which are 
directed at market abuse. There are three articles stipulating the punishments for such 
abuse.  They read as follows:   
 
Article 37:  
1-Pursuant to Federal Law No. 4 of 2000 concerning the Emirates 
Securities & Commodities Authority and Market, any person shall be 
liable to imprisonment for a period of not less than three months and 
not more than three years and a fine of not less than one hundred 
thousand (100,000) Dirhams and not more than one million 
(1,000,000) Dirhams, or either of these penalties, if he:  
a. Furnishes any data, or proffers any declaration or information being 
untrue and such as to affect the market value of the securities and an 
investor's decision to invest or otherwise. 
b. Deals in securities on the basis of unpublicised or undisclosed 
information he acquired by virtue of his position. 
c. Spreads tendentious rumours regarding the selling or buying of 
shares. 
d. Exploits unpublicised information which could affect the prices of 
securities to achieve personal benefits. 
 
Any dealing or transaction effected on the basis of the preceding shall 
be null and void. 
 
2- The Board may, in the event of contravention of the provisions of 
the Authority‘s law and regulations, impose administrative sanctions 
by levying a monetary penalty and by barring any investor from 
trading, whether a natural or juristic person, for a period not exceeding 
one year from the date of the rendering of the decision to bar him, or 
either of these two sanctions. 
                                                 
330
 Article 4 of ESCA law 2000. 
331
 Regulations as to Disclosure and Transparency, Decision No. 3 of 2000 which amended by decision 
No. 155 of 2005. 
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Article 38: 
The chairman and the members of the board of directors of a company 
whose securities are listed in the Market and its general manager and 
any of its employees shall be liable to imprisonment for a period of not 
more than three years and a fine of not less than one hundred thousand 
Dirhams and not more than one million Dirhams, or to either of these 
penalties, if he effects dealings through himself or through others in 
any transaction in the securities of the company, before disclosing to 
the Market the purchase or sale transaction, the quantities and prices 
thereof, and any other information required by the Market, and the 
obtaining of the approval of the Market's board of directors for such 
transaction. Any transaction not effected pursuant to such disclosure 
shall be null and void. 
 
Article 39: 
 Any chairman and any of the members of the board of directors of any 
company or any of its employees who exploits his inside information 
as to the company in the purchase of shares or the sale thereof in the 
Market shall be liable to imprisonment for a period of not less than 
three months and not more than three years and a fine of not less than 
one hundred thousand Dirhams and not more than one million 
Dirhams, or either of these penalties. Any transaction so effected shall 
be null and void. 
 
As a result, Articles 37, 38 and 39 of the SCA Decision No 3 of 2000 are an 
implementation of Articles 26 (2), 36, 37 and 39 of the ESCA law 2000. Similarly, 
Articles 15, 16 and 17 of Regulation as to Trading, Clearing, Settlement and Transfer 
provide for an annulment of transactions.
 332
   
Article 15:   
‗Any transaction in Securities effected by any person shall be null and 
void if: 
1. The transaction is effected on the basis of unpublicised or 
undisclosed information the transacting party acquired by virtue of his 
position. 
2. The transacting party is the chairman of the company, or a member 
of its board of directors, or an employee of it, and has exploited his 
inside information as to the company in his transaction‘. 
 
Article 16: 
‗Any dealing in Securities with the aim of deceiving other transacting 
parties shall be null and void. 
Resort to a series of illusory transactions representing essentially 
fictitious Trading conducive to the deluding of others as to the 
                                                 
332 
Articles 15, 16 and 17
 
of  the Regulations as to Trading , Clearing , Settlement , Transfer  of 
Ownership and custody of Securities which amended by Decision No. 9 of 2006.
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existence of an active market in the Securities traded shall be deemed a 
form of deception.‘  
‗Any act aimed at causing a rise or a fall in the price of any Securities 
with the intention of encouraging other transacting parties to join in, 
whether as sellers or purchasers of the Securities, as the case may be, 
shall be null and void‘. 
 
Article 17: 
‗No person, whether alone or in collusion with others, shall be 
permitted to effect any dealing or disposition conducive to the fixing 
of the price of any particular Securities in a manner which is artificial 
and contrary to the provisions of the laws and regulations in force in 
the Market‘. 
 
Accordingly, the major prohibited actions may be categorised as the following types of 
behaviour:  
 Furnishing any data or information being untrue which affects the 
market value of the securities and an investor's decision. 
 Dealing in securities on the basis of inside information he acquired by 
virtue of his position. 
 Spreading rumours regarding the selling or buying of shares. 
 Exploiting unpublicised information which could affect the prices of 
securities to achieve personal benefits. 
 Arranging or participating in any fictitious transactions not conducive to a true 
transfer of the Securities or funds. 
 Any act such as to harm the reputation of the Market 
All of these prohibited behaviours affect transactions in the securities market in the 
UAE. These actions can be done ‗alone or in collusion with others‘. They might lead to 
price fixing and could affect any financial dealings. Thus they are illegal and against the 
market regulations. The operation of trading should reflect the real conditions of 
supply and demand for the financial instrument in question. However, the ESCA law 
2000, and SCA‘s regulations do not refer explicitly to the meaning of market abuse.  
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Rather, they refer to courses of conduct which amount to market abuse, such as  
‗dealing‘ or ‗furnishing‘ or ‗transactions‘ or ‗exploitation‘ that occur which affect the 
market value or investor‘s decisions on the basis of a misleading statement. They also 
refer to affecting the prices of securities based on the use of inside information with 
intent to achieve personal benefit, or if a person uses inside information obtained 
through his position (insider information). In ESCA law 2000, there is no clear 
definition of market abuse, whereas the FSMA 2000 in Pt. VIII in the original Section 
118 clarifies and gives an official comprehensive definition to cover a wider range of 
activities that may amount to market abuse.  
 
2.8 The UAE judicial system 
 
In the UAE, the seven emirates of the federation
333
 are under the UAE Federal Judicial 
Authority. However, the Federal Constitution of the UAE allows each emirate to 
establish its own judicial authority. Abu Dhabi, Dubai and Ras Al Khaimah decided to 
create and maintain their own judicial systems, which therefore are not under the 
Federal Judicial Authority of the UAE. Abu Dhabi only recently formed its independent 
judicial authority under law No. 23 of 2006. This judicial authority is called ‗The Abu 
Dhabi Judicial Department‘.  With the federation of the UAE in 1971 until June 15, 
2007, Abu Dhabi was under the Federal Judicial Authority.  
 
The UAE courts, whether at the federal or local level, are similar to the court systems of 
most of the other countries in the region. The court systems are divided into two main 
divisions, criminal and civil courts.     The Shari‘ah court is a separate third division of 
the court system that was created at first to adjudicate disputes of a personal nature. 
                                                 
333
 Regarding the federation of UAE, see Chapter One. 
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There are generally three stages of litigation in the criminal
334
 and civil courts: the Court 
of First Instance, the Court of Appeal, and the Court of Cassation, which is equivalent 
to the Federal Supreme Court of the UAE. Federal laws are applied in the courts of the 
UAE. The local courts first apply the federal laws, such as criminal laws or the Civil 
Code. When federal laws are absent or do not address a certain matter, laws and decrees 
are issued by the ruler of the emirate (Abu Dhabi, Dubai and Ras Al Khaimah).   
 
Matters are adjudicated in the courts by one or more judges depending upon the court. 
The jury system is not practiced in the UAE, which is in contrast to the UK system.  
Each of the three courts, the Court of First Instance, the Court of Appeal and the Court 
of Cassation, requires a different number of judges to hear a case. The Court of First 
Instance is presided over by one judge; the Court of Appeal is presided over by three 
judges, and the Court of Cassation is presided over by five judges. The highest court in 
the UAE is the Federal Supreme Court, which is also presided over by five judges.  The 
Court of Cassation exists at the local level in only the three emirates: Abu Dhabi, Dubai 
and Ras Al Khaimah. In the other emirates, final cases for appeal are heard by the 
Federal Supreme Court, which is located in Abu Dhabi. Both the Cassation Court and 
the Federal Supreme Court hear disputes only on matters of law. Legal standards and 
opinions that have been decided by the Federal Supreme Court and the Court of 
Cassation must be accepted by the lower courts.  
 
                                                 
334
 In the UAE legal jurisdiction, when a criminal act has taken place, the case will be prosecuted in the 
jurisdiction where the crime occurred.  After the crime is committed, a complaint is filed at the local 
police station in the area in which the crime occurred. The police investigate the matter fully and take 
information and statements from all relevant persons. Once the preliminary investigation is completed, 
the local police will typically send the case to the office of the prosecutor. This happens within forty eight 
hours of the initial complaint being filed. In some cases, the police will seek the counsel of the prosecutor 
as to whether charges should be filed and if the matter should even reach the prosecutor‘s office for 
further action.   
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A basic explanation of the UAE legal system is necessary to understand the following 
sections that discuss the specialist courts and judges.  The purpose of creating a 
specialist court for the financial market is to enable judges to make proper decisions 
when dealing with technical issues arising from the financial market. The specialist 
court would be created in the belief that, by giving judges specialised knowledge, their 
competency will be enhanced, which will lead in turn to greater uniformity and justice 
in applying the law. Overall, an erudite judge will make better and more judicious 
decisions. The following section will discuss the idea of establishing a specialist court 
for the financial market in the UAE. 
 
2.9 Specialist courts for the financial market 
 
This section endeavours to present the important role that establishing a specialist court 
could have for the financial market in the UAE. A specialist court, one in which the 
court has expertise and knowledge of the type of cases that are to be adjudicated by it, is 
important in that its expertise may create speedy and consistent decision-making. In 
terms of financial market lawsuits, a high level of technical or specialised expertise is 
needed. In fact, the development of a vital facility, such as a judiciary with a specialist 
court, that is specialised in financial markets would result in the growth of the skills of 
the justices. It is important to look at the possible significance that specialisation can 
have on judicial decision-making.
335 
 
 
                                                 
335
 To show the impact that non-specialised courts have, we can look at the events of October, 2008, in 
Kuwait, when a regular (non-specialised) court issued an unacceptable verdict. The decision was made to 
close the Kuwaiti stock market and stop all trading in it. The court said that the reason for the verdict was 
that, if the stock market remained open, it might threaten the interests of the investors and the individuals.  
This was why such a risky verdict occurred in Kuwait. Since the stock market reflects a country‘s 
economy, it is not easy or beneficial to close or stop the work of the stock market except when there is a 
unique issue or a severe economic issue.  However, this verdict lasted only one day, as it was given over 
on a Thursday before the weekend. The following Monday, the verdict was cancelled by the Court of 
Appeal.  This verdict shows the importance of the specialised courts. See Mazhar Farghaly Ali (PhD in 
law) Legal Consultant at the Securities & Commodities Authority, Interview conducted  in May 2010  , 
Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates. 
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The Chief of the Appeals panel in the Dubai Appeal Court Judge Ayssor, supports the 
idea of creating specialised courts. He insists that the financial market in the UAE 
should have a specialised court. He suggested that dealers in the financial market 
believe that judges are not qualified to deal with such lawsuits.
 
 The specialised court 
may, he added, lead to a speedy decision and keep in line with the so-called 
‗modernisation of justice‘. He ended this discussion by re-iterating his wish that the 
legislators in the UAE would establish a specialist court for the financial market.
 336
 
 
In cases that are particularly complex, the specialist court could render a decision 
quickly. Thus, the expertise of the specialist judge would be essential.
337
 Once judges of 
the specialist court gain more experience, they are likely to become more efficient in 
such cases.  Even if judges do not have much experience in the specific technical area, 
in time, they will gain knowledge of the specialised issues and become proficient in 
them.
338
 Therefore, with increasing experience in the same field, they should be able to 
understand and comprehend the technicalities of the securities market. They also might 
be able to judge and decide the lawsuits without the assistance of various experts. Even 
when a judge needs an expert‘s opinion for a specific lawsuit, in time, the judge should 
be able to make his own evaluation.  After the judge evaluates the expert‘s work, the 
judge will then be able to render a decision more rapidly. Making informed, speedy 
decisions is required, as the situation cannot bear tardiness, since tardiness will affect 
the markets‘ efficiency.339 
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 Judge Ayssor is a Chief of the Appeals panel in the Dubai Court of Appeal, Interview conducted, May 
2010, Dubai court, United Arab Emirates. 
337
 Ellen R. Jordan, ‗Specialized Courts: A Choice?‘ (1981) 76 Northwestern University School of Law 
745, p. 146 ( hereinafter Jordan, Specialized Courts: A Choice?‘). 
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 Banks Miller and Brett Curry, ‗Expertise, Experience, and Ideology on Specialized Courts: The Case 
of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit‘, (2009) 43 Law & Society Review 4, p. 848.  
339
 Mazhar Farghaly Ali (PhD in law) Legal Consultant at the Securities & Commodities Authority, 
Interview conducted  in May 2010  , Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates. 
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The value that proficient, specialist judges would have should not be ignored, especially 
when complicated and difficult cases come before the court. A judge with specialised 
knowledge would simply make more speedy faster decisions than a non-specialist 
judge.
340
 Complicated and intricate cases, such as those dealing with the financial 
markets and thus possibly with extremely technical regulatory issues, are difficult for 
any judge to decide but certainly more so if the judge has not been deeply engrossed in 
this area and lacks experience in it. According to Ellen R. Jordan, when cases are 
brought before a general court, the judges may not even understand the complex issues 
brought before them, which increases the incoherency and delays in decision-making 
and creates further problems for the public at large. It is considerably wasteful in terms 
of resources and time.
341
 In addition, it has been noted by Jordan that such complex 
cases are a burden for judges who are not experts in these areas and inflict a heavy 
weight upon them because of indecision, interruptions, and the simple waste of judicial 
resources.
342
   
 
During the interviews with specialists and legal experts conducted in the UAE by the 
researcher, a majority of interviewees agreed that a specialised court for the financial 
market would achieve justice. As the Legal Consultant at the SCA in the UAE stated, ‗a 
specialised judiciary in the financial market guarantees speedy and specialised justice.‘ 
He also pointed out that the lack of knowledge by judges regarding technicalities of the 
financial market means that ‗the judges will completely depend on the experts and will 
not be able to use their own thinking and judgment, thus the verdicts, in addition to 
being slow in waiting or the experts opinions, will also be issued only according to the 
                                                 
340
 Jordan, ‗Specialized Courts: A Choice?‘, p 146. 
341
 Ibid., p 145. 
342
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experts reports‘.343 As an example, this exact situation arose in a case involving Dubai 
Islamic Bank‘ shares. The Dubai Court of Appeal completely relied upon expert opinion 
and thus acquitted the accused according to the expert report. The Dubai Islamic Bank‘ 
shares case will be discussed in Chapter Four.  
 
Some interviewees argued against the need for a specialist court for the financial 
markets in the UAE.  Ghanaim stated that there is no point in establishing a special 
court for the financial market, because actual practice has proven that financial markets 
are covered within a comprehensive legislative system. The legislative system has 
proven its effectiveness since the establishment of the financial markets. He added, 
however, that there would be nothing wrong if the regulator were to establish the 
specialised courts under what is called a legislative policy.
344
 One should, nevertheless, 
consider this approach from another angle. Judge Al Hammadi 
345
 disagreed with the 
concept of a specialised court. His argument is based upon the difficulty of establishing 
a special court for every new law that arises in the future.  He asked, if a specialist court 
were to be created for financial law, should a specialist court also be created for 
terrorism law or the money laundering law?  He believed that it is better to have a 
specialist panel in the ‗regular‘ court than to establish a specific specialist court. 
 
The conclusion can be drawn from all of the above that a specialised court for the 
financial market in the UAE is important.
346
 The reason is that the financial market in 
                                                 
343
Mazhar Farghaly Ali (PhD in law) Legal Consultant at the Securities & Commodities Authority, 
Interview conducted  in May 2010  , Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates. 
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 Hussein Ghanaim (PhD in Law). Former lecturer in law faculty in the UAE University, he was a 
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June 2010, Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates. 
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 In the questionnaire, an anonymous person, who answered the open-ended question, believed that it is 
important to have a specialised court for the financial market. He said: ‗I think it is appropriate now to 
think of establishing a specialised court for the financial markets.‘ See appendix 2. 
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the UAE is considered an emerging market. Thus, there is a need for such a court to 
deal with complex matters that may arise related to the financial market. Judges who are 
in the specialist courts will have the knowledge necessary to enable them to work more 
efficiently. Furthermore, the decision of a specialist court will be made swiftly.  The 
expertise of the specialist judge would be considered essential. While the research has 
shown that there is a need to create a specialist court to deal with financial criminal 
cases, in some instances there are other solutions rather than actually going to court. A 
very real alternative to a judicial proceeding and indeed to settling lawsuits outside of 
the courtroom is the concept of criminal reconciliation. 
 
2.10 Criminal Reconciliation  
 
This section endeavours to present the concept of criminal reconciliation as an 
alternative to criminal prosecution. Criminal reconciliation is an appropriate approach 
for the market abuse problem. The argument in favour of criminal reconciliation will be 
developed through a review of literature on the subject and through interviews with 
legal experts and judges in the UAE. The research aims to show that there is a way to 
resolve illegal practices without depending upon the traditional criminal justice system. 
  
All legal matters, whether criminal or civil, take a period of time before they are 
adjudicated by the court. Criminal reconciliation occurs when parties are willing to 
settle their matters before traditional criminal prosecution takes place.
347
 In other words, 
people who are involved in criminal cases and do not want to face criminal prosecution 
may choose to avoid criminal prosecution by using the criminal reconciliation system. 
The system is an instrument for the redemption of the accused and also for restitution, 
as the accused must agree to render financial compensation paid to the government, the 
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 Group 3, Economic Crime in a Globalizing Society its Impact on the Sound Development of the State, 
126th international senior seminar reports of the seminar, Resource material series no.66, p. 217. 
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authority, or the victim.
348
 The exact financial settlement to be paid by the accused is 
determined by law. The resulting settlement may be recorded by an officer of the 
court.
349
 However, if the accused fails to agree to the settlement, he or she will be 
referred to the criminal court. The victim will then be able proceed with a civil suit. 
 
 
On the whole, criminal justice systems today centre their attention on abuse or violation 
of the law, making sure the accused is held accountable and punished for his or her 
crime. The victims of the crimes themselves are often secondary to the legal procedures. 
In a legal sense, a crime is seen as having been committed against the public, and, as a 
result, the state has the right to prosecute as it sees fit. The system is in this way single-
mindedly focused upon the criminal wrongdoer and not upon the victim.
350
  
 
The criminal system does not fully consider the complete circumstances of the crime 
simply because of the system‘s organisational limitations. These shortages in the system 
can be compensated for in a legal and social sense by the use of criminal reconciliation.  
Criminal reconciliation is a subject of much interest today, as there is a focus and desire 
for more consistency, efficiency and pragmatism in the criminal justice system.  
However, even among those who work in the criminal justice system and among legal 
theorists, criminal reconciliation is seen as something of a Western idea or a modern 
idea. 
351
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 Wu Xiaofeng , ‗Understanding of Criminal Reconciliation in Ancient China‘, (2010) 5 Frontiers of 
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Once a case has been dealt with through criminal reconciliation, the criminal case is 
terminated.  It can be argued that criminal reconciliation is a way to redress reparation 
claims and can sometimes become the core principle of the final penalty. It can be seen 
that the trial in a criminal prosecution seeks retributive justice, while mechanisms of 
criminal reconciliation focus on restorative justice. Minow noted that criminal 
prosecution acts against reconciliation, because ‗all of the practical dimensions of 
prosecutions could work against the goals of healing, reconciliation, and full truth-
telling‘.352   
 
Restorative justice is commonly known in western countries as criminal 
reconciliation
353
 and is considered a third alternative to either retributive or 
rehabilitative justice.  Restorative justice is concerned with the actual crime but also 
looks at it as an ‗inter-relational problem,‘ while retributive justice focuses upon crime 
and punishment of the wrongdoer, and rehabilitative justice looks at the recuperation 
and reintegration of the wrongdoer.  In restorative justice, the wrongdoer must accept 
the blame for his actions and the results, including the damage that the victim endured, 
whether the damage was physical or emotional.  This acknowledgement of the crime 
and its effect on the victim can also influence the victim in becoming part of the process 
of restorative justice, which can offer the victim redress and reparation.  Accepting 
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 Martha Minow, Between Vengeance and Forgiveness: Facing History After Genocide and Mass 
Violence (Boston: Beacon Press, 1998), p. 89. 
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culpability for one‘s actions, keeping to agreements, and establishing reconciliation are 
a few of the aspects of mediation and restorative justice.
354
  
 
2.10.1 Criminal and civil reconciliation 
 
Despite the fact that criminal and civil reconciliation differ, they both rely upon 
convergence of the wills of their parties to determine the compensation based upon their 
agreements.  Civil reconciliation is concerned with a civil dispute about private 
interests. In contrast, criminal reconciliation is related to a crime having been 
committed, which affects the public. Criminal reconciliation is in effect a consensual 
civil contract for the parties to the conflict, including the authority to act in their own 
private interests, and it also contains a concession by both parties. In a sense, judicial 
intervention is completely eliminated.
355
  
 
When criminal reconciliation occurs, the parties involved in the criminal case are 
willing to end the conflict and desire not to pursue criminal proceedings. Reconciliation 
is different in a civil case, in which the relationship is based upon the consensual 
acceptance of the offender to pay an amount as compensation or reparation to the 
victim. In a criminal case, paying a financial settlement is the result of a violation of the 
law or the rules by the accused.  
 
In the UAE, the criminal law system does not provide for criminal reconciliation as a 
third option. However, civil and commercial reconciliation is in force, since its 
promulgation by Federal Law No. 26 of 1999 regarding the establishment of the 
Reconciliation & Settlement Committees (RSC law 1999) in courts. Moreover, this law 
provided that the Reconciliation & Settlement Committees (RSC) are competent to 
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settle civil and commercial disputes, whatever the amount in controversy might be, as 
well as disputes that do not involve money damages, through reconciliation.
356
 The law 
also gave the RSC the right to access papers, documents, records and other evidence 
that it deems appropriate without being bound by the Law of Civil Procedures and 
Advocacy Law and official working hours.
357
 The law aims to facilitate the RSC‘s work 
to achieve its objectives. 
 
Legislators in the UAE found that reconciliation is important because of its benefits. 
Reconciliation represents an easier and faster way to solve conflicts, and it saves time 
and money for the parties to the conflict. Therefore, the legislature decided that the 
Court of First Instance cannot record any claims that are under the jurisdiction of the 
RSC. This rule can be avoided only in cases where the beneficiaries have a non-
objection statement from the RSC allowing them to take their case for consideration by 
the courts. Each party can explain in writing to the RSC why each is unwilling to 
resolve the dispute through reconciliation.
358
 In order for a dispute to be adjudicated 
before the courts, the RSC must give a no-objection statement to them.  
 
2.10.2  Criminal and administrative reconciliation 
 
There is a difference between criminal and administrative reconciliation. Administrative 
reconciliation is concerned with a dispute between the government‘s administration and 
personnel. Therefore, if reconciliation fails, jurisdiction will be held by the civil or the 
administrative courts to prosecute the case. If criminal reconciliation fails to take place, 
the case will be prosecuted through the criminal justice system. 
359
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2.10.3 Criminal Reconciliation in legal perspective  
 
The concept of criminal reconciliation is based upon a civil agreement. This agreement 
imposes a monetary and administrative penalty on the accused. In such cases, the 
administration will try to ease the severe penal provisions and avoid legal proceedings 
by the payment of a sum of money set by law.
360
 Accordingly, it is a consensual and just 
administrative agreement.
361
 
 
2.10.4 Defining Reconciliation in a legal perspective  
 
Reconciliation can bring about a satisfactory and agreed upon punishment. This is 
important for certain types of crimes, such as market abuse cases, that do not have to be 
prosecuted under the judicial authority. When an agreement is made between with the 
offender, it is considered an administrative agreement and not a criminal punishment.  
By agreeing to the reconciliation process and coming to an agreement, the offender will 
voluntarily accept his guilt and pay the penalty to the administration, which can deter 
him from returning to criminal behaviour again.  
 
The result of using the reconciliation system is that it makes crime the subject of 
reconciliation and then of an administrative status, which also leads to the establishment 
of a special link between the offender and the government administration. As a result, 
an administrative agreement is reached and implemented by the administration and not 
by a judicial or a punitive authority. The administrative agreement differs from one 
carried out by the judicial or punitive authority, which would be in accordance with the 
substantive procedural rules established by the legislature in this regard. 362 
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During the process of interviews, the researcher found that the concept of criminal 
reconciliation has been considered to be a third option in lawsuits involving the 
financial market.  All of the interviewees agreed that the criminal reconciliation system 
could be a perfect solution, as the main direction these days is in terms of adopting the 
alternative option to settling disputes instead of going to court. 
363
 As Judge Al-
Hammadi said, the basic desire in resolving a case is reconciliation; and it is better to 
not submit cases to the courts where reconciliation can solve the issue.  However, he 
added, it should be up to the SCA to decide whether the case should be handled in the 
criminal courts or if it should go through the process of reconciliation. 
364
 Once 
reconciliation is completed, the claim will end. 
365
  
 
One official in the Dubai Financial Market believes that there is a good reason to accept 
this concept of reconciliation, since a majority of the investors do not have enough 
knowledge of the laws and regulations. Their lack of knowledge leads them to 
committing unintentional errors.
366
 This idea is supported by another official,
367
 who is 
the Manager of Market Operations and Surveillance at the Abu Dhabi Securities 
Exchange. The Manager said that a majority of the violators who commit acts of 
manipulation do not realise that they are manipulating. They want only to gain as much 
as they can as quickly as possible.  In the meantime, however, they are manipulating 
and harming serious investors by their acts. 
                                                 
363
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The use of the reconciliation system is an effective way to compensate the government 
for the damage it has undergone, especially when a settlement may be difficult to obtain 
through conventional procedures.
368
 The researcher supports the reconciliation system 
regarding financial market crimes because of the difficulty of proof and prosecution, 
which make guilty verdicts difficult to obtain, as the result of which the perpetrators 
may remain unpunished. Moreover, criminal reconciliation is an alternative penalty to 
achieve the concept of public deterrence. The punishment of the criminal provides a 
general satisfaction that justice has been served.  Adopting a reconciliation system for 
the crimes of the financial market is a comprehensive, speedy and fair conclusion to a 
criminal case, thus easing the burden on the court system.   
 
2.11 The criminal liability of market abuse 
 
Criminal liability always uses a construct that presumptively is based upon two factors: 
a guilty act (actus reus) and a guilty state of mind (mens rea). Actus reus refers to ‗all 
the factual objective elements of the offence, as distinguished from its mental 
elements.‘369 Accordingly, actus reus is a technical term under Federal Criminal Law 
No 3 of 1987 in the UAE and ‗consists of the material elements of the criminal activity 
to commit an act or omission where the commission
370
 or omission
371
 [is] considered as 
criminal in law‘.372 Criminal liability then refers to an act defined by the law as criminal 
and that produces prohibited consequences. The actus reus of a crime is attached to 
three components – behaviour, which refers to the actual physical action of the accused; 
causation, which refers to the causal link between a criminal action and the result of the 
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crime; and the consequence, which is the effect of the conduct that occurred under the 
associated circumstances.
 373
 In this sense, the actus reus ‗means the whole definition of 
the crime with the exception of the mental element‘.374    
 
However, once an act is committed that violates the criminal law, it is essential to know 
the state of mind (mens rea) of the accused. Article 38 of Federal Criminal Law No 3 of 
1987 states that the mental element of the crime is ‗available at the will of the offender 
to commit an act or omission where this commission or omission of criminal law and 
the intent to cause a direct result of, or any other criminal law as a result of the offender 
may be expected‘. Therefore, the mens rea encompasses the state of mind of the 
accused in connection with the actus reus. The essentials of the actus reus must have 
occurred simultaneously with the mens rea. The illegal behaviour can be punished as a 
crime only if it is associated with a certain mental state. 
 
Accordingly, the mens rea 
determines whether the accused intended to commit the crime or not, intentionally or 
recklessly. 
 
Analysing elements of market abuse as an illegal activity in financial crimes does not 
differ from studying elements of any typical criminal action as defined and applied by 
the criminal law. However, studying a crime and its perpetrator under criminal law is 
beyond the scope of this section. This section will concentrate on demonstrating and 
explaining a guilty act (actus reus) and a guilty state of mind (mens rea) under the 
ESCA law 2000 and will be divided into two subsections; the guilty act and the guilty 
state of mind.  
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2.11.1 The guilty act in market abuse according to the ESCA law 2000 
 
The guilty act consists of three basic elements that have been committed or practised: 
conduct, causation
375
 and result. The actor must commit a criminal act. The act can be 
active or passive conduct. Such an act should lead to a specific result in the form of a 
violation of the interests protected by the law. It is necessary that this specific act or 
behaviour is directly connected to this specific result, which is the causal link between 
the guilty act and the result. If the act is not performed, then the result is not reached. 
This is called the cause and result connection, where the action or behaviour causes the 
result. The legislation exists to try to prevent crime from occurring.  
 
Market abuse under the ESCA law 2000 shows that it can be classified under the group 
of crimes that require a physical act or behaviour, where the physical part of the crime is 
confirmed or ascertained, i.e. the criminal originated or initiated an act or a behaviour 
depending upon his or her voluntary physical act. In most of the stock market crimes, 
the physical element of the crime is represented as a positive act or behaviour, which is 
forbidden by the legislator as clearly stated in the words and phrases used in the context 
of the ESCA law 2000.  Such words include to ‗furnish,‘ ‗exploit,‘ ‗fail,‘ ‗deal‘ and 
‗spread.‘ All of these actions are based on the guilty act (actus reus). 
 
In the UK, market abuse under FSMA 2000 refers to behaviour that includes action or 
inaction.
376
 For example, if one acts ‗by word or conduct‘377 on behalf of an issuer or 
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  edition ( Oxford: Oxford  University Press; 2001), p. 68. 
376
 Swan, Market Abuse Regulation, p. 32.  
377
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any person who has a duty under law or regulation, and ‗he has not done so‘,378 the 
accused can be guilty of market abuse, even if the actions were passive.
379  
 
The criminal behaviour represented is as a positive action; it is also a negative action or 
behaviour, because it is a failure to act in a positive manner (omission).
380
 An example 
of a positive action with an insider offence occurs when an insider commits an act (the 
guilty act) positively in the sense of engaging in a trading transaction that is the result of 
using inside information. The negative action (failure to act or ‗omission‘) occurs when 
there is an obligation, for example, to disclose information, but the accused fails to do. 
Such an obligation is mentioned in Article 9 of ESCA law 2000, which sets up a duty 
for each member of the Securities and Commodities Authority Board to declare in 
writing, forthwith upon assuming his or her duties, to the Authority (SCA) regarding the 
securities he or she owned by himself, his spouse and his minor children. Hence, if any 
member fails to disclose such information, he or she will be guilty. This is a so-called 
negative action.
 
 
Accordingly, the question is when is it considered that an act of a person constitutes a 
crime? For example, will a person be considered guilty of insider dealing if he or she 
merely gives an order to a broker to buy or sell securities? Or does a person‘s liability 
start when the broker executes the insider‘s order? So the actus reus of this offence is to 
‗exploit‘ and ‗deal‘ with the inside information or to ‗disclose‘ the inside information to 
another party. Insider dealing offences will be discussed in the following chapter.  
 
                                                 
378
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379
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380
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The question of when exactly the crime begins was raised in an interview conducted in 
the UAE. Ghanaim stated that a criminal act may start as soon as an order has been 
given to the broker, even if the transaction is not carried out for reasons beyond the 
insider‘s control.381 However, it could be argued that, if an order is given to the broker, 
who does not carry it out, the order constitutes a so-called attempt. An attempt is a 
crime, which is defined ‗where the criminal result of an attempt is not accomplished 
simply because of an obstruction in the way of the thing to be operated upon, and these 
facts are unknown to the aggressor at the time, the criminal attempt is committed.‘382 An 
attempt then is trying and failing to complete a crime; its consists of actus reus and 
mens rea.
383
   
 
There are instances when an insider cannot go through with a crime because of reasons 
beyond his or her control, such as when there is a sudden disruption to the electronic 
system and the order cannot go through or even when a broker does not carry out the 
order for a myriad of other reasons. These attempts by the insider or the manipulator are 
not criminalised under the ESCA law 2000.  
 
2.11.2 The guilty state of mind in market abuse according to the ESCA law 2000 
 
The state of mind of a person who has committed a crime is important. It establishes 
whether the accused is guilty or not. Thus, the criminal act (guilty act) is not enough, 
because the accused must also have had a guilty state of mind when he or she 
committed the act to constitute the offence. State of mind must also be determined to 
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 Hussein Ghanaim (PhD in Law). Former lecturer in law faculty in the UAE University, he was a 
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 People v. Lee Kong, 95 Cal. 666, 668, 30 P. 800, 801 (1892) 
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regarding attempts to commit a crime and condition liability. He has drawn a useful distinction between 
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decide whether the act was committed accidently or deliberately.
384
 The difficulty is 
how to present conclusive evidence that a practice is illegitimate, as the standard of 
proof required for a criminal offence is always proof beyond reasonable doubt.   
 
In general, the legal construction of a crime must include the element of intention, 
without which the action cannot be considered a crime legally. Accordingly, crime does 
not occur without intention. The ESCA law 2000, in Judge Al Hammadi‘s opinion,385 is 
different from the Federal Criminal Law No 3 of 1987, which penalises any person who 
commits a reckless or deliberate action. The Federal Criminal Law No 3 of 1987 stated 
that, if a deliberate action was not explicitly mentioned in any of the law‘s articles, the 
criminal still has legal responsibility for his or her actions, be they intentional or 
reckless.
 386
  
 
The ESCA law 2000 requires that crimes and offences be committed intentionally to be 
punishable. If the accused discloses information as a result of his or her neglect or 
recklessness, the accused will not be punished criminally for his or her unintentional 
act. This means that, under the ESCA law 2000, there is no evidence of the state of 
mind when the accused acts in a negligent and reckless manner.
387
 
 
The ESCA law 2000 requires that any person who engages in market abuse have 
intended to commit the act. Therefore, in the criminal court of the UAE, for a guilty 
verdict and punishment to be handed down for the act of market abuse, there must be 
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sufficient proof that the offender had a guilty state of mind when he or she engaged 
either in insider dealing or market manipulation. However, insider dealing behavior 
does not just require general criminal intent; it requires specific intent. The ESCA law 
2000 requires under Article 37 that the defendant must have acted (the exploiting act) 
with the specific intention of achieving personal benefit. If the defendant did not have 
this specific mental state, he or she will not be guilty.
388
 On the other hand, the accused 
could be guilty under Article 39 of ESCA law 2000.   
 
In the UK, contrary to UAE jurisdiction, the FSMA 2000 does not include the 
requirement of intent; the law ‗does not require the person engaging in the behaviour in 
question to have intended to commit market abuse.‘389 The purpose of the law is to deter 
insider dealing and market manipulation, but the prosecution would face a great 
difficulty if it had to prove intent.  There is a similarity with the DIFC law No.12 of 
2004   in that intent is not required to find the offender guilty. Rather, the prosecution is 
fully focused on the effect the action itself had.
390
 The focus is on the effect of the 
conduct, not on the intention behind it.  
 
The difficulty involved in establishing criminal liability is that the prosecution is 
obliged to prove market abuse, insider dealing or market manipulation beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  This standard of proof is especially difficult with regard to such 
crimes, because most market abuse cases are based upon circumstantial evidence. There 
must be evidence that the accused intended to induce investors, or either created a 
misleading impression or created an artificial price.  
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2.12 Punishments of market abuse under ESCA law 2000 
 
The purpose of punishment is to combat market abuse, deter offenders and protect 
investors. None of this can be achieved without an appropriate punishment. However, 
one question pertaining to criminal punishments under ESCA law 2000 is the extent to 
which the punishment accomplishes its goals. This section and chapter five will provide 
an answer based on investors‘ opinions.  The ESCA law 2000 contains the following 
three articles for punishing market abusers: 
 
Article 41:  
Any person who contravenes the provisions of Articles (36, 37) 
and (39) of this Law shall be liable to  imprisonment for a period 
of not less than three months and not more than three years, and 
to a fine of not less than one hundred thousand Dirhams and not 
more than one million Dirhams, or to either of these penalties. 
Article 42:  
Any person who contravenes the provisions of Article (38) of 
this Law shall be liable to imprisonment for a period of not more 
than three years, and a fine of not less than one hundred 
thousand Dirhams  and not more than one million Dirhams, or to 
either of these penalties. 
 
Article 43: 
 
Without prejudice to the penalties prescribed in this Law or in 
any other law, any person who contravenes any other provision 
of this Law and the regulations issued pursuant thereto shall be 
liable to imprisonment and a fine, or to either of these penalties. 
 
These Articles categorise two types of punishment: imprisonment and fines. 
Imprisonment should be for not less than three months and not more than three years.  A 
fine should be not less than one hundred thousand Dirhams and not more than one 
million Dirhams. In this sense, the judge has discretionary authority to impose one or 
both penalties.  The UAE legislature determined that the maximum fine is one million 
Dirhams. This decision to set this limit on has been criticised by researcher as not 
commensurate with the damage caused by market abuse in the securities markets and 
not high enough to deter potential offenders.  
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Market abuse practices may negatively affect the market place and harm investors. 
However, there has been no proportionality between fine that is imposed and the 
damage which may have been inflicted on investors and the market. In the case of the 
Dubai Islamic Bank, for example, the Court of First Instance
391
 applied Article 41 of 
ESCA law 2000 and fined defendants 1,000,000 Dirhams, but the value of the 
transactions carried out by the defendants reached Dh9.34 billion. The fine imposed 
should not be less than the expected profits to be obtained or the loss to be avoided. 
These proportional fines will be discussed in the next section.  
 
The UK jurisdiction has adopted a dual regime for punishing market abuse offenders: 
criminal punishments and civil penalties. Criminal sanctions aim to deter market abuse 
and punish offenders, while the civil sanctions give compensation to market participants 
who have been harmed by misconduct or where the criminal proceedings have not been 
satisfied with the standard of proof of criminal misconduct.
 392
 The FSA has the 
discretion to decide when criminal or civil action is appropriate.  If there is sufficient 
evidence to prove market abuse is beyond reasonable doubt, there may be a criminal 
prosecution; otherwise civil action will be initiated. Accordingly, market abuse practices 
could be punishable by an unlimited fine or imprisonment of up to seven years.
 393
  In 
the UAE, imprisonment for market abuse is limited to three years and fines to one 
million Dirhams. The Legal Consultant at the SCA
394
 stipulates that the punishments 
provided by the ESCA law 2000 are insufficient to deter or combat market abuse.  
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2.13 The proportional fines and media publishing  
 
This thesis suggests two alternative penalties. The first type is the fine penalty, which is 
the so-called proportional fine.  The proportional fine would be paid by offenders to the 
Authority, the amount corresponding to the graduated gain or avoided losses. The 
legislature should take into consideration the consequences of such crimes and the 
resulting damages. Most of those interviewed by the researcher
395
 agreed that the 
proportional fine should be imposed on defendants. One of the interviewees stated ‗the 
fine penalties should be double [the amount lost]. So we call it the proportional fine. In 
some countries the fine can be paid to the Authority up to three or four times of the 
individual‘s gains or avoided losses‘.396 The proportional fine is imposed in the United 
Kingdom. Under Part VIII of the FSMA 2000, in civil proceedings there could result in 
civil penalties of an unlimited fine; ‗There is no "cap". The financial punishment can be 
as severe as the FSA deems it is sufficient to inflict‘.397 The FSA also authorised to 
bring a wider range of disciplinary proceedings and civil penalties. For example, it has 
the power to order the repayment of the losses of damage to another party who has 
suffered a resulting loss due to market abuse.
398
 To make these penalties of market 
abuse effective, the FSA has recourse to the judiciary.  Under sections 381 and 383 of 
FSMA 2000, the FSA can apply to the court for an injunction restraining or an order of 
restitution, respectively. The FSA also has authority to issue a notice to require 
compensation in compliance with section 384 of FSMA 2000.
 399
 It seems that the trend 
in UK jurisprudence is to depend on the financial penalties regime to deter and combat 
market abuse. It can be seen that a financial regime is more efficient than a criminal 
                                                 
395
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regime. This is also the issue in the DIFC, which has instituted financial penalties 
against market abuse. 
 
As second alternative punishment of market abuse that this thesis suggests is for the 
SCA to publish violators‘ names in the media.  Publishing violators‘ names, their 
punishment and the kind of offence which they have committed may discourage market 
abuse in the financial market. Publishing such statements in the media is not common in 
the UAE legal system and the SCA would need permission from the UAE legislature. 
However, this punitive approach has been evident in recent legislation in the UK.  For 
example, under Section 123(3) of the FSMA 2000, the FSA is given permission to 
publish a statement which names people who have committed market abuse. Public 
statements about misconduct are public censure and called ‗naming and shaming‘.  The 
FSA has a choice either to impose a fine or publish a statement about a person‘s 
conduct. Nonetheless, the FSA takes into account all circumstances of a case before 
deciding a fine or publishing a statement.
 400
  
 
 This issue has been raised in an interview and in a questionnaire that will be discussed 
in chapter five. The majority of interviewees agreed with this practice. However, 
‗naming and shaming‘ or issuing a public statement of defendants‘ behaviour and name 
are reputational penalties.  The effect of this penalty may be greater than that of a 
financial penalty.  
 
2.14 The SCA as Monitoring and Punishment agency 
 
The SCA has authority to monitor the transactions in securities and participants in the 
market place. Articles 4 and 12 of the ESCA law 2000 authorised it to monitor the 
                                                 
400
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operational transactions in the marketplace to ensure that the regulations mentioned in 
ESCA law 2000 are applied. Article 12 (2) of the ESCA law 2000 authorised the SCA 
to receive notifications and complaints relating to the activity of the markets or brokers 
and to take appropriate resolutions according to the provisions of ESCA law 2000. 
However, one can ask if the SCA has the authority to punish investors.  What is the 
nature of the relationship between the SCA and investors?   Which sort of appropriate 
resolutions can the SCA take?  Answering these questions is not easy because issues are 
left vague by the ESCA law 2000 itself.  This function has been repeated under Article 
11 of the Council of Ministers Decision No. 11 of 2000
401
 which states:  
The Authority may take receipt of information laid and complaints 
made relating to Market or broker activity, conduct the necessary 
investigation, require any person to submit a written statement as to 
the circumstances and concomitant factors relating to the 
contravention which is the subject-matter of the information or 
complaint, and take appropriate decisions pursuant to the provisions 
of this Law and the regulations issued in application thereof. 
 
 
Some observations could be made from the above Article. Under this Article, the SCA 
became empowered with three functions:  it is capable of just receiving complaints; it 
can conduct the necessary investigations; and it can take appropriate decisions 
according to the provisions of ESCA law 2000. However, what kind of decisions may it 
take? Does this mean that the SCA is entitled to impose penalties?   Can it decide 
whether or not to transfer cases to the Court? The Article is vague. It could be argued 
that if UAE legislature wants to give the SCA the authority to impose penalties, the 
legislature would express that explicitly as it did about markets when it (the legislature) 
gave the markets authority to impose administrative penalties on brokers. This is found 
under Article 27 of ESCA law 2000. In comparison, the FSMA 2000, in the UK as 
                                                 
401
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mentioned above, has given the FSA explicit authority to impose a wider range of 
penalties and unlimited fines.  
 
It could be said that the ESCA law 2000 restricts the authority of the SCA to impose 
penalties against offenders. However, the SCA recently, in fact, has imposed monetary 
fines and taken some actions which are mentioned under Article 27 of ESCA law 2000. 
Accordingly, this Article sets out a range of penalties which are imposed only on 
brokers by markets; as has been stated explicitly, ‗the Market may impose on Brokers‘ 
penalties.
402
 The researcher strongly criticised the SCA for imposing penalties on 
investors without citing any text from the ESCA law 2000 (which empowers the SCA to 
take such action).  In an interview conducted in the UAE, a lawyer interviewed by the 
researcher stated that ‗there is neither offence nor punishment which is not set out in the 
law. Therefore, the SCA has not got the right to address and impose penalties on the 
investors. Whereas, this right has been given to the SCA for imposing penalties on 
brokers according to the ESCA law 2000, because the broker has had a relationship of 
subordination with the SCA while investors do not.
 403
   
 
However, Judge Al Hammadi said ‗the UAE legislature authorised the SCA to issue 
rules and disciplinary regulations and thus as long as investors entered the market, it 
means that s/he agree and accept those rules and regulations. Therefore, the SCA has the 
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right to impose punishment when the investor is found guilty of violating law or 
regulation.
404
   
 
In fact, this seemed a controversial issue because it is not clear which kind of power – 
‗to prosecute‘ or ‗to punish‘ – has been given to the SCA. This shows the difficulties 
brought by the shortages of the ESCA law 2000. 
 
2.15 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has attempted to provide a comprehensive theoretical explanation of 
economic regulation and market abuse. It offered criticism when it was deemed 
necessary. The chapter criticised the role of the SCA for imposing penalties and 
presented the importance of establishing a specialist court and the concept of criminal 
reconciliation as an alternative to criminal prosecution. The following conclusions can 
be derived from the discussions in this chapter. 
 
There is no doubt that the UAE government needs to play an important role in adopting 
regulation in order to take action against market abuse to correct insufficient regulation 
in order to promote fairness and efficiency in the marketplace. A regulated marketplace 
contributes to limiting violations and standardizing economic activities. Edward J. Swan 
states that ‗The regulation of any behaviour is not an exact science with clearly defined 
boundaries. It can probably only be understood as a mandated direction of travel, the 
exact route of which will have to be modified as a result of unforeseen events and 
changing conditions as the journey progresses‘.405 
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Under ESCA law 2000, the present system of UAE federal securities regulation is far 
from perfect. In terms of regulation by SCA, there appears to be an inability of the 
authority to perform its natural role of controlling the mechanisms of the market or in 
reducing illegal practices engaged in the market. A practical example of the weakness of 
supervision of SCA is the Dubai Islamic Bank (DIB) share collapse. There was a huge 
circulation of DIB shares on the Dubai Financial Market because of the manipulation of 
the market.  This eroded public confidence in the markets
406
 and served as an example 
of the need for more supervision. As Lilian Miles
407
 argues, in the case of Malaysia, 
poor regulation and weak enforcement meant that there is no simple way to deal 
effectively with the violent fluctuations in securities prices and to prevent fraud and 
market abuse. Moreover, the authorities cannot tackle market manipulation, false and 
misleading disclosure, insider trading and unclear accounting and reporting practices. 
Measures against all of these are crucial to the proper functioning of any financial 
market. If investment is to be encouraged, then markets must be regulated more strictly 
by supporting regulations and instituting effective enforcement mechanisms. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE REGULATION OF INSIDER DEALING 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The case of insider dealing in the UAE law is one of the main issues of this thesis and 
will be examined in this chapter. It is at the centre of a situation that requires a solution. 
Insider dealing
408
 in financial markets has been a dominant topic of concern to the legal 
community as well as to scholars of the economy. It is a vague concept, and there is no 
global agreement regarding its definition. Regulatory solutions relating to different 
aspects of insider dealing are still discussed widely. However, in general, it is agreed 
that insider dealing should be forbidden. 
 
This chapter will examine the issues involved in the criminal misconduct of insider 
dealing from a criminological viewpoint. It will be more specific than the previous 
chapter (The Regulation of Market Abuse), treating insider dealing as one form of 
market abuse. However, the manner in which Federal Law No. 4 of 2000 concerning the 
Emirates Securities & Commodities Authority (ESCA Law 2000) has shaped the 
offence of insider dealing will be discussed. The analysis will be pursued through a 
comparative study that will examine the different juridical actions taken under the UAE 
law, UK laws and Market Law No. 12 of 2004 of the Dubai International Financial 
Centre, and will consider the advantages of each. The study will be supported by the 
opinions and knowledge of legal experts in the UAE as gathered from interviews 
conducted.   
   
                                                 
408
 There are two phrases; ‗insider dealing‘ and ‗insider trading‘. The phrase ‗insider dealing‘ is usually 
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International Economic Law 241, pp. 256-257. 
 137 
 
The core questions addressed in this chapter are the extent to which the regulation of 
insider dealing under the UAE jurisprudence is efficient and how has it been applied to 
protect market integrity and the market participants by remedying illegal practices 
regarding insider dealing. Therefore, the point at which the determination of irrefutable 
insider dealing has occurred must be considered. Other dimensions also need to be 
explored. Who is defined as the player in insider dealing? What kind of behaviour 
constitutes insider dealing? What information should be considered as coming from an 
inside source and therefore banned from being exploited? Is it sufficient to put market 
participants on an equal level in terms of information? Although no doubt exists that the 
UAE Authority has spared no effort to regulate the behaviour of market participants, are 
these actions sufficient to deter market abuse? Seeking answers to these questions is not 
an easy task, but it is essential to look carefully at the UAE law in comparison with the 
law of the UK and the DIFC. This chapter will offer a comprehensive overview of 
insider dealing and will analyse the rules relating to its regulation, illustrating their 
deficiencies in the UAE legal framework. 
 
The chapter will deal with seven main areas. The first area concerns the economic and 
legal aspects of regulating insider dealing. This is needed to lay the foundations for its 
regulation. The second part of this chapter will evaluate the regulation of insider dealing 
under UAE law. This will be followed by a definition of inside information, and an 
attempt to define exactly who an insider dealer is. Finally, the chapter will look at the 
lack of a definition of insider dealing under UAE law, criminal offences and the 
‗exploitation‘ of the offence of insider dealing.   
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3.2 The Economic and Legal Aspects of Regulating Insider Dealing 
 
There is general agreement that insider dealing should be forbidden. In spite of this, the 
ethical and financial debates about whether insider dealing is damaging are on-going. In 
these arguments, economists frequently use ethical reasons to justify the prohibition of 
insider dealing. They often employ straightforward arguments, such as ‗it‘s just not 
right‘ or ‗it‘s unfair‘.409 The issue of the regulation of insider dealing is one of the most 
divisive among legal and economic scholars.
410
  This section will offer a short analysis 
of the arguments put forward. It will look at the development of the dialogue at both 
social and academic levels. While not providing a new approach to the subject or going 
into a detailed analysis of these debates, this discussion will help to broaden our 
understanding of the economic and ethical features of the debate.   
 
The debate on insider dealing has divided scholars into two main camps: those who are 
in favour of regulating insider dealing based upon fairness and moral considerations 
(this includes the belief that those with privileged information should not be unfairly 
enriched) and those who have argued against regulation based upon the grounds that 
insider dealing enhances market efficiency without regard to fairness and equality. As 
pointed out by Huddart et al, the regulatory goals of free accessibility to the disclosure 
of insider transactions are aimed at decreasing the information asymmetry between 
insiders and market participants, restricting the unjust enrichment of those who have the 
right of entry to inside information, and protecting marketplace integrity.
411 
Laura 
Nyantung Beny has asserted that, from an economic perspective, the vital issue for legal 
scholars is whether insider dealing is ‗economically inefficient‘ and should be under the 
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influence of government regulation or, on the other hand, whether it is ‗economically 
efficient‘ and, as a result, should not be regulated.412 According to K. Krawiec, ‗insider 
trading inspires immediate and passionate reaction among legal scholars, regulators, and 
the general public‘.413 In fact, economists and law professors have different points of 
view concerning the regulation of insider dealing. The debate on regulation is divided 
between those who support
414
 Professor Manne‘s theory, which asserts that insider 
dealing is beneficial because of its ability to improve efficiency in the financial market, 
and those who favour prohibiting insider dealing.  As the argument continues, disputes 
have arisen as to whether insider dealing should be prohibited.  
 
 
 
3.2.1 The Economic Arguments over Insider Dealing 
 
The economic disputes largely concern the issue of deregulation of insider dealing. In 
this regard, Professor Manne was the first scholar
415
 to address the concept of 
deregulation of insider dealing in his book Insider Trading and the Stock Exchange.
416
 
Manne advanced two main arguments outlining the way insider dealing brings 
advantages for people or companies whose shares are insider traded. Firstly, he asserted 
that an insider‘s trade causes the price of shares to move in a proper direction more 
rapidly than would occur in the absence of insider dealing. Thus, insider dealing is 
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excellent because of increased financial efficiency.
417
 If so, both the investors and the 
company receive a benefit from the process of raising the price. Secondly, he viewed 
insider dealing as an efficient method of rewarding executives for having produced 
information. In this case, both the company and society profit: directly in the case of the 
company, since executives have a substantial inducement to generate extra information 
regarding value to the company, and indirectly in the case of society.
418
  
 
In fact, Manne has continued this debate not only in his book but also in an article 
entitled ‗In Defense of Insider Trading‘.419 The tone of his views is economic rather 
than legal. He does not contend that there is nothing morally wrong with insider 
dealing. The fundamental hypothesis of Manne and others that insider dealing is 
favourable has not been followed at the policy level, but in academic circles those 
propositions are still interesting and valuable.
420
 The arguments fall into three main 
categories: (1) the enhancement of market efficiency; (2) a form of executive 
compensation argument; and (3) the victimless crime argument. This section will 
examine each of these augments separately.   
 
(1) Enhancing market efficiency 
 
The first justification for the deregulation of insider dealing was developed by Manne 
denoting that the transaction of insider dealing guides a security‘s price gently in the 
proper direction. This will be recognized as noteworthy by participants in the 
marketplace and will be believed to be something interesting in relation to securities. 
                                                 
417
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The result will be an increase in the demand for securities. Increasing a security‘s price 
will continue steadily until the information reaches the market.  The disclosure of inside 
information will certainly increase the price but not as much as insider transactions that 
have already caused the price to rise.
421
  
 
The simple answer to this was provided by Roy A. Schotland, who asserted that the 
reachable ‗empirical evidence‘ pointed to insider dealing not having a strong effect on 
the market value of securities. In addition, despite the possibility that academic 
investigations may be inaccurate or their deductions unsuitable to a marketplace with no 
limitations, it is doubtful whether permitting insider dealing would cause any 
considerable variation in prices. When the price rises without providing the public with 
any reason for the increase, some investors might be linked to insiders on the ‗buy‘ side. 
On the other hand, some people will decide that the share is priced beyond its value and 
will offer their shares for purchase or sale short. It is improbable that insiders can 
organize adequate wealth to move the stability price up even close to the point at which 
it will escalate on public announcement.
422
 In contrast, short-term dissimilarities in the 
supply and demand for securities could briefly have an effect on prices. However, 
because of the lack of new information in relation to the price of securities, any price 
changes caused by insider dealing are expected to be short-lived.
423
 Indeed, allowing 
insiders to exploit inside information on the pretext that it increases market efficiency is 
an unacceptable argument, because it tempts directors to delay the public disclosure of 
valuable information to benefit from inside information to the maximum extent 
possible.  
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(2) An argument for executive compensation   
 
Not many writers argue that making financial gains from insider dealing is a suitable 
compensation for company insiders.
424
 Yet, such arguments do exist. It can be said that 
insider dealing encourages executives to act in the company's interest. Insider dealing 
inspires entrepreneurship.
425
 According to Manne, the salary market is not capable of 
sufficiently compensating these people. He points out that insider dealing gives 
entrepreneurs in the business world the ability to promote their ideas.
426
 Despite the fact 
that the typical entrepreneur gains the greatest advantage from the improvement, the 
company's stockholders, not the administration, enjoy the fruits of change. As a result, 
encouraging executives to be motivated and to make changes needs the presence of 
inducement. As Hartmann has asserted, insider dealing raises inventive behaviour.
427
 In 
addition, Manne has stated that a law that would give insiders the capacity to trade 
without inhibition might help to keep the current corporate system going. Trying to stop 
insider dealing actually may unintentionally disrupt ambition and wealth.
428
 
 
Manne paid attention to company executives, who were compensated in the course of 
insider transactions ‗for their entrepreneurism,‘429 while insider dealing on non-public 
information (deemed as a compensation implement) submissively acts in an 
unreasonable approach somewhat unconnected to the assistance that, in Manne's vision, 
is projected onto compensation.
430
 There are so many ambiguities and qualifications 
that Manne‘s hypothetical defence is hard to evaluate. Apparently, many people who 
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carry out ‗entrepreneurial services‘ agree that stock options, bonuses, and other 
remuneration instruments are sufficient payment.
431
 Such executives are not the only 
insider dealers. Others, such as clients or customers of a company, also act as insiders.  
 
(3) The victimless crime argument 
 
Major controversy exists in the regulation of insider dealing concerning the 
identification of an individual victim who is harmed by insiders. Insider dealing is often 
described as a ‗victimless crime‘.432 Herzel and Katz stated that ‗insider trading lacks 
credible plaintiffs, not victims. The two are not the same‘.433 Questions have frequently 
been raised regarding this issue. Who, in fact, is victimized by the act of an insider? Is it 
the person who has sold his shares or is it the company itself? 
434
 Even though every 
single transaction that arises out of insider dealing has one or more specific victims, 
these injured parties are unidentified. They exist, yet no specific person can be 
verified.
435
  
 
The difficulty stems from the fact that stock transactions are usually enacted in a 
particular manner at ‗arms length.‘ 436 The majority of insider dealing takes place on the 
impersonal, unknown securities market, where there is no possibility of setting up any 
connection between insiders and outsiders, apart from the coincidence of both being in 
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the securities market simultaneously.
437
 Furthermore, it is hard to make a distinction 
between a deal made for this reason and another that would have been made in any case. 
Also, it may not be easy to distinguish information that arises from legitimate research 
from that which is the result of an illegal tip
.438
 Moore
439
 argues that it is improper to 
claim that insider dealing is a victimless crime, as its proponents claim. However, it is 
not easy to recognize accurately who the victim is and the degree to which he or she has 
been injured.  
 
2.2 Arguments for Regulating Insider Dealing  
 
Those who want to prohibit insider dealing have used a number of arguments. These 
arguments rest upon three main bases: the logic of fairness, property rights in 
information, and damaging a third party. Each one of these is briefly summarized 
below. 
 
(1) The logic of fairness 
 
The main argument against insider dealing is that it is unfair or morally wrong.
440 
Insider dealing is seen as immoral, and its main characteristic is a ‗disparity of 
information‘ between the parties to the deal. Insider trading should be based upon a so-
called ‗level playing field.‘ Advocates allege that the ‗disparity of information‘ inclines 
the playing field in the direction of one player and against the other player. Since  there 
is no ‗equal access‘ to inside information for both parties, and the parties do not have 
‗equal information,‘ any transaction between them  could be seen as  unfair.441 It could 
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be asserted that this fairness argument derived from legal scholars who were aroused 
against a practice which they considered unethical.  
 
Equal access to material information is a fundamental legal principle. The Second 
Circuit Court of Appeals in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur emphasized that ‗all investors 
trading on impersonal exchanges have relatively equal access to material 
information‘.442 Some others argue that the concept of equal access is still unclear.443  
Judge Frank Easterbrook
444
 has contended that ‗access to information‘ has to take 
account of the cost of obtaining such information. He has stated: ‗People do not have or 
lack "access" in some absolute sense. There are, instead, different costs of obtaining 
information. An outsider's costs are high; he might have to purchase the information 
from the firm....‘. Moore 445 maintains that there is no injustice, nor is there anything 
wrong with, individuals profiting from information advantages obtained through their 
own efforts. Moore also believes that citing justice as the basis for seeking ‗equal access 
to information‘ is not an absolute rationale.  
 
To conclude, then, the fairness justification for equal access means that outside 
investors should receive equal access to important information upon which to make 
proper investment decisions. Disparities in information between insiders and outsiders 
create bad investment decisions. This occurs when there is unequal access to the 
information. Equal access, then, may be reached by disclosing important information 
without delay in the securities market in order to keep dealing on an equal footing.  The 
fairness of equal access concerns who obtains information on equal terms.   
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Suggestions of this vision of justice are present in some of the legal views of Lord Lane, 
UK Chief Justice. He has maintained verbally that ‗gaining an unfair advantage...[is] 
cheating the other party to a transaction …‘.446 If an insider profits at the expense of 
another party who is not on an equal footing, it is considered unfair, because they are 
not equally well-informed concerning the subject of the transaction. Disparity of 
information based upon the fairness argument
447
 has been resorted to as a justification 
for prohibiting insider dealing, because any variation in the information available to 
insiders and outsiders in the securities market is unfair and, therefore, unethical. When 
justice and fairness for investors are underestimated, this treatment will affect investors‘ 
confidence in the integrity of the securities market.  
 
 
(2) Inside information as an intangible property right  
 
The view that inside information is a property right that insiders should be authorised to 
use is rejected as morally unpleasant and legitimately unsound.
448
 Inside information is 
considered a beneficial, valuable and allegedly intangible property right. Intangible 
property rights, referred to as intellectual property rights, include trademarks, patents, 
copyright, and confidential information. The assertion that inside information material 
is a type of property leads to the conclusion that insider dealing breaks the law, because 
it involves an infringement of property rights. As Irvine points out, this is the ‗theft 
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theory‘.449 If one party discovers material information and therefore such information 
belongs to this party, then insider dealing can be deemed theft when some other party 
benefits from the information by exploiting it in a way for which it was not meant.
450
 
Moore
451
 asserts that, if non-public information were property that belongs only to the 
company that produced it, insider dealing would be immoral if the possessor company 
forbade the employment of it. It would, in this case, be a breach of contract.  
 
 
(3) Harmful and damaging counterpart 
 
The exercise of insider dealing is harmful to regular investors who take part in trading 
with insiders.  This leads to participants in the market withdrawing and thus damaging 
the marketplace in a general sense.
452
 The investors who are harmed or damaged by 
insider dealing have a vital role in justifying the prohibition of such practices.
453
 While 
Manne
454
 argues that academic research shows that there is no financial damage worthy 
of attention done to any distinguishable investor from insider dealing, but the lack of 
study in this field might explain this lack of any convincing proof. A claim for damages 
can be reasonable seen in the emerging securities markets and cannot be easily 
disregarded in this way.
455
  
 
The harm of ordinary investors occurs when insider dealing takes advantage of material 
information before it is disclosed to the capital market. In this case, insiders use inside 
information at the expense of others. This certainly harms the ordinary investor and the 
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market as a whole. The other version of this argument, as Mine Cinar points out,
 456
 
relates to when the public sees insider transactions in the financial markets that take 
advantage of investors. This will certainly result in a loss of confidence and will lead to 
investors ending their investments. The public will have a lack of confidence and a 
negative opinion of any financial market that is established in the knowledge that 
insiders benefit from information to the detriment of other stockholders.
 
This conclusion 
is the result of the first practice of insider dealing, which leads to the destruction of 
investor confidence in the market.  
 
The idea that individual investors have experienced financial damage may not in itself 
be a strong basis for a new law, as it is difficult to show a causal link between insider 
dealing and the damage arising from the impersonal securities markets.  However, this 
does not mean that all acts protecting the individual investor by regulation are 
rejected.
457
 An enactment of laws is essential not only to protect ordinary investors, but 
also to maintain high standards of confidence and integrity in the financial market.  
 
 
3.3 Evaluation of Insider Dealing Regulation under the UAE Law 
 
Insider dealing has been a criminal offence in the UAE since the ESCA law was enacted 
in 2000. During the preceding period, especially in the summer of 1998, the corruption 
of insider dealing and other market misconduct had reached a volatile peak. According 
to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), a flawed regulatory system permitted:  
the market [to be] susceptible to abuse by insiders as well as other 
forms of market malpractice. Following market disruptions in 1997 
and 1998, the UAE authorities decided that [an] effective regulatory 
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regime was needed to address the negative market perceptions and 
improve the integrity of the markets.
 458
  
 
The principle problem was the previous absence of specific legislation to remedy such 
offences. Even if executives of several companies, or other insiders who possessed 
confidential information, exploited it for personal gain or disclosed it to another party, 
the lack of clear rules left authorities debating which law could be applied to the abuses 
and even if it were possible to prosecute those individuals for insider dealing offences.   
 
Prior to the establishment of ESCA Law 2000, Federal Company Law No.8 of 1984 
was applied to perpetrators and provided for the criminal liability of company 
officers.
459
 Article 322(7) of this law stated that the punishment would be imprisonment 
for a period of not less than three months and not more than two years and/or a fine of 
not less than ten thousand Dirhams and not more than one hundred thousand 
Dirhams.
460
 Either of these penalties was to be imposed upon each manager, member of 
the board of directors, member of the board of supervisors, consultant, expert, auditor, 
his assistants or employees and any person entrusted with the inspection of the company 
who disclosed secret information that had reached him as a result of his position in the 
company, or who exploited such secrets to obtain personal benefit for himself or 
another person.  
 
This provision involved two prohibitions upon insiders. The first banned disclosure of 
company secrets that had reached an employee through his position in the company. 
The second related to the exploitation of the information to obtain a personal benefit for 
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himself or for another person. However, it is unclear whether an insider who exploits 
secret information aiming to gain some benefit but is unable to obtain this benefit due to 
an unforeseen event would be subject to criminal responsibility under this 
aforementioned proviso. The culpability of a person who has not been mentioned in this 
provision and is not in direct connection with the company (such as secondary insiders 
[tippees])
461
 needs to be considered. Would he or she also be subject to this provision?  
 
However, the regulatory provision
462
 of the Federal Company Law No.8 of 1984 was 
intended to preserve company secrets that may be considered so-called trade secrets or 
business secrets, not to regulate inside information
463
 that the market might rely upon to 
determine the price of whatever commodity is the subject of the market. Thus, the term 
‗trade secrets‘ is defined as any valuable business details that are retained as 
confidential to preserve an advantage over competitors, that cannot be disclosed without 
a breach of trust, and that are the subject of reasonable efforts to protect 
confidentiality.
464
 Frequently, inside information has two characteristics: firstly, it is not 
generally available, and, secondly, it can affect the price of the company‘s securities if 
divulged. It can be argued that the UAE regulatory agency‘s wording limits the capacity 
of this provision, because it could not be applied to those individuals (the secondary 
insiders) who come into possession of a company secret but do not have a direct 
connection to the company. Yet, this provision is a good step toward deterring to some 
degree the illegal practice in question and achieving some protection against criminal 
access to secret information. The key element in the prohibition is the idea that a 
business secret was used or given to attain an advantage. However, the Federal 
Company Law No.8 of 1984 is not within the scope of this study. An exhaustive 
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discussion of all of its aspects will thus not be offered, except to the extent necessary to 
explain issues concerning insider dealing.   
 
In contrast, provisions specifically outlawing criminal insider dealing are found under 
Articles 37, 38, 39 and 41 of ESCA Law 2000. Indeed, this law defines certain 
prohibited activities and criminalizes acts which amount to insider dealing. Moreover, 
the SCA Decision No 3 of 2000 promulgated in Articles 37, 38 and 39 in accordance 
with the ESCA Law 2000 imposed a similar criminalization of actions and raised 
administrative sanctions.
 
The following sections will evaluate these provisions through 
comparative study.   
 
The starting point for any consideration of insider dealing should take into account what 
is meant by ‗inside information‘ and who exploits such inside information, the 
possession of which is the key to being within the legislative provisions. This does not 
mean simply that obtaining information about a company is prohibited. Instead, it 
means that access to privileged confidential information at the expense of others could 
lead to a breach in the principle of equality of access to information. This is based upon 
the ground that the practice offends the basic notions of fairness when the possessor 
exploits such confidential information in the securities market to gain financial profit. 
Since not all information should be considered inside information, it is essential to 
determine the content and characteristics of information prohibited from use in the 
securities market by insider dealers. What are the elements required to determine that an 
individual did indeed possess inside information?  
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The section below attempts to offer a definition of inside information under three 
jurisdictions: UK law, DIFC
465
 Market law and the UAE federal law.
466
 The UK 
definition of inside information is covered by two pieces of legislation: the first appears 
in the Criminal Justice Act 1993 (CJA 1993), and the second is in the Financial Services 
and Markets Act 2000 (FSMA 2000).  
 
3.4 Defining Inside Information 
 
The gears of financial markets turn on information, and the open flow of information is 
essential to supporting a knowledgeable and effective market. Data, news, statistics, and 
personal insights form the stuff on which the market depends to select the cost of a 
particular type of goods. However, does every piece of information that has not yet 
reached the public constitute inside information and the behaviour of its exploiter 
constitute an illegal act? It is not an offence to use information, however important it is. 
But there are certain features that have an effect on the emergence of the responsible use 
of this information. Delineating between ‗public information‘ and ‗inside information‘ 
is critical to this process. Public information can be accessed at any time and lawfully 
used by any individual. In contrast inside information may be restricted in some way.  
Even if it is leaked, the inside information cannot be considered public information 
unless it is in accordance with the applicable rules of disclosure. 
 
Legislators are agreed on the need to resolve the exact character of inside information, 
because establishing a unified, distinct denotation of inside information is critical. The 
determining characteristics should delineate between readily available, widely used 
public information and discrete inside information that forms the essence of the issue of 
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a variety of regulatory mandates, exemplified by the control of insider dealing and 
timely disclosure.
467
 
 
In the UAE, inside information is defined in the ESCA Law 2000 as:   
Article 37: 
The exploitation of undisclosed information which could affect prices of 
Securities in order to achieve personal benefits shall not be permitted... 
 
Article 39(1): 
It shall not be permitted for any person to deal in Securities on the basis 
of unpublicised or undisclosed information he acquired by virtue of his 
position... 
 
These Articles contain no clear definition of inside information. However, they do 
determine some characteristics of inside information, such as ‗affect[ing] prices of 
Securities‘ and ‗unpublicised or undisclosed information‘. This definition is insufficient, 
because it does not specify the dimension of the sway on prices that may have been 
induced by information released into the market or, conversely, whether this data is 
specific, precise, or factual. Even non-factual innuendo may affect the worth of 
securities in the marketplace.
468
 In this regard, the ESCA Law 2000 still remains vague. 
The Legal Consultant
469
 at the Securities and Commodities Authority (SCA) alleged 
that ESCA law 2000 identifies three features of inside information which are: 
unpublished, a significant influence and precise. Two of these features are included in 
Article 37 and the third was not mentioned in Article 37 and there is no not need to 
mention it. He added ‗I cannot say that this is a deficiency in Article 37 of ESCA law 
2000 for not mentioning a precise feature, although it would be better if the regulator 
were to define inside information as precise and accurate‘. The interviewee concluded 
by saying that inside information must not have been previously released to the public 
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(unpublished); it must be precise and not unclear or vague; and it must have a 
significant influence on the securities price. 
 
In the UK, the definition of inside information comes under two laws: the CJA 1993 
and the FSMA 2000. Section 56(1) of the CJA 1993 and Section 118(2) of the FSMA 
2000 require that inside information be a vital element of the offence. The CJA 1993 
defines inside information by mentioning four characteristics as provided in Section 
(56): 
‗inside information‘ means information which—  
(a) relates to particular securities or to a particular issuer of 
securities or to particular issuers of securities and not to securities 
generally or to issuers of securities generally;  
(b) is specific or precise;  
(c) has not been made public; and  
(d) if it were made public would be likely to have a significant effect 
on the price of any securities.  
(2) ... securities are ‘price-affected securities’ in relation to inside 
information, and inside information is ‘price-sensitive information’ in 
relation to securities, if, and only if, the information would, if made 
public, be likely to have a significant effect on the price of the 
securities.‘ 
 
The FSMA 2000 has also adopted the same meaning of characteristics as provided in 
Section 118C: 
(1) ‗... ‗inside information‘ for the purposes of this Part. 
(2) In relation to qualifying investments, or related investments, which 
are not commodity derivatives, inside information is information of a 
precise nature which- 
(a) is not generally available, 
(b) relates, directly or indirectly, to one or more issuers of the 
qualifying investments or to one or more of the qualifying investments, 
and  
(c) would, if generally available, be likely to have a significant effect 
on the price of the qualifying investments or on the price of related 
investments… 
 
(5) Information is precise if it- 
(a) indicates circumstances that exist or may reasonably be expected 
to come into existence or an event that has occurred or may 
reasonably be expected to occur, and 
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(b) is specific enough to enable a conclusion to be drawn as to the 
possible effect of those circumstances or that event on the price of 
qualifying investments or related investments. 
(6) Information would be likely to have a significant effect on price if 
and only if it is information of a kind which a reasonable investor 
would be likely to use as part of the basis of his investment decisions.‘ 
 
It is vital to highlight the differences between the FSMA law and the UAE law in 
interpreting the term ' insider information'. The characteristics and components of inside 
information should encompass details that correspond to a distinct category as well as to 
a specific security, while eliminating general information. The FSMA 2000 general 
information, then, is that which can be acquired by research or analysis by or on behalf 
of users of a market.
470
 
 
The DIFC Market law is similar to the UK laws to some degree, defining inside 
information (in DIFC law No. 12 of 2004 in Sections 42 and 45(1)) as material 
information that is ‗... not generally available‘ or that ‗has not been disclosed to the 
market in accordance with Law or the Rules‘ as material information, as opposed to the 
UK term of inside information. Section 45(1) states that meaning material information 
relates ‗to investments..., to the affairs of a reporting entity471 and to a change in the 
business, operations or capital of the reporting entity,‘ and that such information 
‗significantly affects, or would reasonably be expected to have a significant effect on 
the market price or value of the Investments in or related to the reporting entity‘.  
 
Almost all of the comparable legislations in question agree that the characteristics of 
inside information are essential elements to be evaluated, and the determination will 
                                                 
470
  Alexander,‗Insider Dealing and Market Abuse: The Financial Services and Markets Act 2000‘. 
471 
A Reporting Entity is a person who has made a Prospectus Offer in the DIFC or has securities admitted 
to an Official List. He then becomes a Reporting Entity. A Reporting Entity is required to report certain 
information as prescribed in the Offered Securities Rules (OSR) which relates to itself and the securities it 
has issued. For details, see: 
http://www.dfsa.ae/Pages/DoingBusinesswithDFSA/BeingSupervised/ReportingEntities.aspx.  
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depend in each case upon whether the information possesses these characteristics. 
However, as a result of the absence of a clear definition of inside information under the 
ESCA Law 2000, comparable legislation should be referred to here as that provides a 
greater understanding of elements that are key to determining the definition of inside 
information. The subsections below will discuss the characteristics of inside 
information extensively and in sequence. 
 
3.4.1 The Characteristics of Inside Information 
 
Identifying inside information, to prohibit the exploitation of such information, is vital 
in a legal sense. Four characteristics of inside information are found under the 
aforementioned comparable legislation: non-public information, price sensitive 
information, specific or precise information, and relevant information to specific issuers 
or securities. 
 
(1) Non-public information 
 
Non-public information is distinguished from information that has not yet been made 
public. Insider dealing is done on the basis of using non-public information, that which 
is not publicly available. Thus, the insider is able to use non-public information to gain 
an advantage at the expense of other investors. This is the main reason for prohibiting 
insider dealing.  
 
There are variations in the definition of ‗public‘ information. In the ESCA Law 2000, 
Article 37 requires that the exploitation should use ‗undisclosed information,‘ whereas 
Section 42 under DIFC law No. 12 of 2000 requires that the information should be ‗not 
generally available in the market‘ and adds ‗not disclosed to the market‘ in accordance 
with law or the rules. The UK uses two terms: ‗not generally available‘ under the 
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FSMA 2000 and ‗has not been made public‘ under the CJA 1993. In the UAE, the 
ESCA Law 2000 uses different two terms: ‗unpublicized information‘ and ‗undisclosed 
information‘.472 These terms do not provide the regulator in the UAE with a clear 
picture of the issue in question.  
 
In the UK it can be argued that using different terms under the CJA 1993 and the FSMA 
2000 is a reasonable choice if these two terms emphasise the critical issue of having the 
information available to market participants and not having it available to the general 
public.
 473
 It remains to be determined if the two phrases can be used interchangeably or 
if they are synonymous. At this time, no clear decision presents itself. The confusion 
stems from the use of the term ‗inside information‘ on two occasions, each providing a 
different definition of the same term. Yet, when evaluating the definitions applied to the 
two acts, it is possible to say that the two phrases refer to the same behaviour.
474
 If 
divulged according to the systems of disclosure rules in the securities market, 
information can be deemed ‗made public‘; the ESCA Law 2000 in Articles 33, 34 and 
35 regulates the disclosure of inside information in this regard.
475
 Accordingly, 
information that is required to be published and is divulged via the systems provided 
will be considered data that has been made public.   
 
The UK legislation provides the most clarity in defining the moment when company 
details are ‗made public.‘ In this law, information does not have to be broadly 
announced or made available to a large sector of the public, but only to a limited 
segment. Additionally, the ‗made public‘ heading includes information that can be 
                                                 
472
 See Articles 39/1 and 37 of ESCA law 2000. 
473
 Barry Rider et al. Market Abuse and Insider Dealing (London: Butterworths,2002),  p.85. 
474
 Albelooshi, p. 245. 
475
 For more details, see: Regulation of Market Abuse in the UAE, chapter two, section on ‗Mandatory 
disclosure and Transparency under UAE Regulations,‘ p. 17. 
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obtained only by individuals ‗exercising diligence or expertise‘ and can be comprised of 
information made available to a segment of the population outside of the UK.
 476
  
 
However, even making insider information public will not necessarily completely 
diminish the ability of insiders to take advantage of the market, as a time lag exists 
between the publication and absorption of information. It is common knowledge in the 
financial field that the cost of securities does not immediately alter even upon the 
disclosure of material information.
477
 The critical issue is whether the information was 
made public before or after dealing occurred.  
 
The Economic Secretary to the UK Treasury highlighted the importance of this detail 
when he stated that, when someone has access to inside information intending to make 
it public, but uses it before it has actually been divulged publicly, then that person can 
be considered guilty of insider dealing. Yet, the person who possesses inside 
information and releases it before taking action on the information has done nothing 
wrong. The issue is the timing of the deal. Whether a deal is made before publication of 
the information or after determines whether the act is insider dealing or not.
 478 
The 
moment when data becomes public is critical, because that determines, within the 
pertinent laws of insider dealing, whether the behaviour occurring before or after is 
legal or illegal.
479
 Data essentially enters the public domain at the time of publication or 
disclosure, but it does not need to be assimilated and assessed by other investors before 
dealing can take place.
480
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Once sensitive information has been introduced to the public, it is no longer possible to 
consider this information ‗inside information‘. Thus, the laws for insider dealing will 
not apply, and anyone who deals in the relevant securities may do so with impunity.
481
 
A landmark case in insider trading, the case of Cady, Roberts & Co., explains this 
perspective: 
Analytically, the obligation [to disclose non-public information earlier 
than trading] rests on two principal elements; first, the existence of a 
relationship giving access, directly or indirectly, to information 
intended to be available only for a corporate purpose and not for the 
personal benefit of anyone, and second, the inherent unfairness 
involved where a party takes advantage of such information knowing it 
is unavailable to those with whom he is dealing.
482
 
 
The concept of fair play is at the root of these opinions, and the precept that fair play is 
necessary to preserve the coherence and soundness of the securities markets, as well as 
to retain the overall confidence placed in them by the general public, is vital. Beyond 
that, the point of equal access to material information suggests that the rule should be 
extended to encompass all material non-public information, even if it is accessed by an 
inside source or someone outside of the company.
 483
 
 
A clearer set of standards regarding the denotation of the term ‗made public‘, allowing 
for greater distinction, is provided by the CJA 1993. In this definition, the moment that 
information is ‗made public‘ can only happen when information is released from the 
company announcements office, and specific stipulations provide guidance for the 
permissible recipients of the release through that office. For instance, if the 
announcement is made outside of the business hours of the Regulatory News Service, 
the rule stipulates that the information must be sent to two or more UK publications and 
to two separate news agencies to provide satisfactory coverage. The company 
                                                 
481
 Brazier,Insider Dealing: Law and Regulation,. 
482
 Cady, Roberts & Co. (1961) 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (footnote omitted). 
483
 Kenneth E. Scott, ‗Insider Trading: Rule 10b-5, Disclosure and Corporate Privacy‘,(1980) 9 Journal of 
Legal Studies ,pp. 801-818. 
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announcements office must receive this information before or at the same time that it is 
given to the other entities to permit the information to appear to have been made public 
at the moment of the newspapers‘ publication.484 Accordingly, the Economic Secretary 
to the UK Treasury
485
 added that information can be submitted directly to the stock 
exchange, and, through its agreements with press firms and purveyors of news, it can be 
released broadly to the public. The third method is to release the information directly to 
news sources, press firms, and a variety of other recipients at the same moment that it is 
released to the stock exchange.  
 
(2) Price sensitive information 
  
The second characteristic of ‗inside information‘ is that it is information that has an 
effect on the price of securities. To qualify under this definition, the information must 
be likely to have a significant effect on the price of any securities if it were made 
public.
486
 This is the most essential feature of the statutory definition of inside 
information. The court‘s determination of whether a business fact is considered inside 
information pivots, then, on the significance and scope of its effect at the moment when 
a transaction occurs, rather than on the breadth or depth of the information itself. This is 
the distinguishing quality that underlies the concept of price sensitivity, a critical 
moment during the transaction when information remains unattained by the general 
public.
487
  
 
In the DIFC market, the Dubai Financial Services Authority (DFSA)
488
 asserted that 
price sensitive information is that which is most likely to generate significant changes in 
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the cost of securities, as well as to hamper the ability of debenture issuers to meet their 
commitments. The DFSA concluded that the Reporting Entity is best qualified to 
evaluate if information is most likely to instigate significant changes in the price of its 
securities, as the particular varieties of situations related to the company will determine 
what information will be considered price sensitive.
489
 
 
The UK case of R v. Asif Nazir Butt
490
 is a practical example of one person taking 
advantage of inside information that qualified as price sensitive information. Mr Asif 
Nazir Butt worked in an investment bank and, through his position as vice president, 
had access to highly confidential inside information. The price sensitive details or price-
affected outcomes concerned the status and performance of companies that his 
employer was advising. Over a period of three years, he used confidential inside 
information relating to these companies for personal gain before such information was 
released to the public. As a result, he was convicted of committing insider dealing in 
contravention of Section 52(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 1993.The clearest 
determination can be made if the employee conducts transactions for personal gain very 
close to, but before, the moment when the crucial company details become public 
knowledge. 
 
The FSMA 2000 uses language that is parallel to that used by CJA 1993. It specifies 
that inside information ‗… would be likely to have a significant effect on the price of 
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any securities...‘, whereas DIFC law No. 12 of 2004, Section 45(1) states that 
‘…information that significantly affects, or would reasonably be expected to have a 
significant effect, on the market price or value …‘ (Emphasis added). Obviously, a 
slight difference exists between the words of the DIFC and the counterpart phrase in the 
UK Law. However, the DIFC law No.12 of 2004  uses the phrase ‗reasonably be 
expected,‘ which implied a meaning derived from the term ‗would be likely‘. The 
ESCA Law 2000 also refers to information ‗...which could affect prices of 
Securities‘.491 (Emphasis added). Accordingly, the use of these similar terms under each 
separate piece of legislation supposes that the possibility of this action influencing the 
price of securities is enough, whether moving them upward or downward, even if a 
resultant effect does not actually happen.  
 
Moloney
492
 argues that the controlling terms (that the information ‗would...be likely‘ to 
have a ‗significant‘ effect) are adequately ambiguous to provide considerable flexibility 
in the execution of this requirement. However, very little difference in potency exists 
between the phrases ‗reasonably expected‘ and ‗would be likely‘. Both terms offer the 
sense of a fair probability. The precise alignment that suggests the potential for an effect 
is not sufficient. A level of probability that borders on certainty is not very important. 
Arguably, this presents a precarious situation in which the effect of this possibility on 
prices must be evaluated in terms of the level of probability that the possession or use of 
such information creating an effect on the price could occur with any reasonable 
expectation.
493
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 Article 37 of the ESCA Law 2000. 
492
  N.  Moloney, EC Securities Regulation, (Oxford: Oxford University Press: 2002), p. 758. 
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 Janne Hayrynen,  ‗The precise definition of inside information?‘ (2008)  23 Journal of International 
Banking Law and Regulation 2,  pp. 64-70.  
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The critical issue here is to understand the actual meaning of the term ‗reasonably be 
expected.‘ As part of this understanding, identifying whether the test of reasonableness 
is subjective or objective is critical. From the perspective of the person who is in 
possession of the information, the subjective approach is applied. In this way, the term 
‗reasonably be expected‘ expresses more of a determination of what a reasonable 
participant should have been able to comprehend of the incident when the pertinent 
action occurred. Consequently, it is reasonable to expect that the test of preciseness 
should be an objective one.
494
 However, a dual test is applied by US courts. It is both 
subjective and objective in determining if the information in question has any effect on 
the price of securities. In Basic, Inc. v. Levinson,
495
 the United States Supreme Court 
determined that details would be considered price-sensitive information if there was a 
substantial likelihood that a reasonable investor would deem the release of this 
information as having certainly changed the ‗total mix‘ of data released. Yet, there is no 
definition under UK laws of the term ‗significant effect.‘ How can the concept of 
‗significant effect‘ be measured? 496 Neither the Act nor the General Note to the Act 
puts forward any explanation. The new guidance
497
 on the subject issued by the Stock 
Exchange also offers no assistance,
498
 as it denies the feasibility of being able to isolate 
any percentage movement in a share price that could clearly make released information 
price sensitive. It further suggests that attempts at achieving a more precise definition of 
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the term ‗price sensitive‘ are impossible for a triad of reasons: the volatility of each 
share price, the actual price of the share, and the dominant market trends at the time of 
the incident. In addition, the document details how the increasing level of specificity of 
the information released correlates with the increasing risk of it also being price 
sensitive.
499
 
 
In securities markets, various kinds of information connected to a company may cause 
significant movement in securities prices. These include information which relates to a 
new item for consumption, the fact that the company has received a large order or begun 
a major redundancy programme, or the transaction of a new product that is not meeting 
investor expectations. In the meantime, to make an immediate and accurate 
determination of the potential effect of any released details, businesses and executives 
should be aware of the market expectations that are part of each organization‘s share 
price. This awareness is critical to a prompt and decisive determination. 
 
However, the absence of a definition of ‗significant effect‘ or ‗effect on securities 
prices‘ makes it seem that the ESCA Law 2000 and its counterpart legislation in 
question expected the court system to engender the guidelines that would determine if 
information has an effect on a company‘s securities price or not. A decision such as a 
merger or failure of a merger, or a transaction in a large project, or discovering an oil 
well, or metals, can each subjectively raise or lower the financial state of the company, 
which in turn raises or lowers the value of the share. Thus, the measure of this issue is 
seen as dependent on subjective criteria, to be evaluated by the judge of the subject 
matter, and is controlled by the judge‘s evaluation.  As a result, it is not required that 
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influence actually takes place. The measurement is the possibility (potential) for it to be 
influential.
500
  
 
Some bias underlies the seemingly objective test that can be applied by the law, because 
it seems to favour skilled investors and, in particular, those investors who work at an 
institution, as they are more likely to connect disclosed data with a seemingly 
insignificant piece of non-public information that would allow them to make an 
advantageous determination about their shares. Private investors normally would not 
have the experience or immediate access to the information to enable them to make 
these links. This distinction inherently causes a disadvantage to private investors. 
 
 
(3) Specific or precise information 
 
There is no particular requirement under either the ESCA Law 2000 or the DIFC law 
No.12 of 2004 as to whether inside information should be specific or precise, in contrast 
to the UK laws. The CJA 1993 employs two terms: ‗specific‘ and ‗precise‘ information. 
It states that inside information means information that is ‗specific or precise,‘501 while 
the FSMA 2000 expressly refers to ‗precise nature,‘502 rather than using two terms as in 
the CJA 1993. Therefore, it seems that the CJA 1993 requirement that inside 
information must be ‗specific or precise‘ was drafted in a less narrow way than the 
FSMA 2000, which requires no more than being of a ‗precise nature.‘  
 
It may be questioned how the use of the words ‗specific‘ and ‗precise,‘ alternately, 
contribute to fighting insider dealing. It has been argued that the UK government was 
concerned ‗...that precise alone might be interpreted narrowly be the courts, so specific, 
                                                 
500
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which is employed in existing legislation, has been added...‘.503 With regard to 
‗specific‘ or ‗precise‘ information, an example was given by the Economic Secretary to 
the UK Treasury.
504
 At a luncheon or meeting, a company executive might disclose to 
an analyst that ‗the outlook for the company exceeds market expectations.‘ The 
disclosed information would not be considered precise, as the executive did not say 
exactly what the results were believed to be. However, the statement could be 
considered specific, because the executive clearly would be speaking about the 
company‘s results.505  
 
The term ‗specific,‘ as explained by the Economic Secretary to the Treasury, was 
retained as a buffer against the ‗narrow, exact, and definitive‘ meaning suggested by the 
use of the word ‗precise‘ alone to describe the pertinent information. In his 
communication to the Standing Committee,
506
 he provided an anecdotal description of a 
situation in which one individual had knowledge of an impending takeover bid. He 
made clear that the knowledge of this takeover bid would be deemed precise 
information.
507
 This was an attempt to exclude any information that could be construed 
as ‗rumour‘. 
 
In contrast to this approach, the FSMA 2000 identifies ‗precise information‘ as that 
which: (a) indicates circumstances that exist or may reasonably be expected to come 
into existence, or an event that has occurred or may reasonably be expected to occur; 
and (b) is specific enough to enable a conclusion to be drawn as to the possible effect of 
                                                 
503
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these circumstances or the event on the price of qualifying investments or related 
investments.  
 
Consequently, this FSMA 2000 approach to the term ‗precise‘ would include 
information suggesting ‗circumstances [which] may reasonably be expected to come.‘  
As a result, it is likely that the term ‗precise‘ has a broader application. 508 These 
definitions engage the idea of ‗precision,‘ a word that suggests in this context situations 
that may exist or are reasonably likely to exist. These situations contain enough specific 
detail that a surmise may be produced regarding the changes that would result in the 
price of any investments. The information in question would qualify only if is likely that 
a thoughtful and reasonable investor might use it as a determiner in his market activity 
choices.
509
 In the case of Arif Mohammed v. FSA,
510
 Mr. Arif Mohammed was 
employed as an audit manager for an accounting firm whose work encompassed details 
regarding Delta plc. As a result, he accessed the confidential data that Delta was 
preparing to offer its electrical division on the market. Even though he was told that the 
details he had accessed were deemed highly confidential and should remain undisclosed 
in any fashion, he acquired shares in Delta. Once the announcement of the sale was 
communicated publicly, Mr. Mohammed made a profit by trading his shares. This 
action was found to be a breach of Section 118 of the FSMA 2000; investigators alleged 
his conduct was a ‗misuse of information.‘ He filed an appeal to the Financial Services 
and Markets Tribunal regarding this determination. 
 
As part of the appeal, Mr. Mohammed conceded that he was aware of the impending 
sale of the electrical division, yet he argued that his knowledge of the impending sale 
                                                 
508
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was not ‗specific and precise‘. He argued that this lack of specificity and precision 
derived from a lack of significant corollary information related to the sale, such as the 
price and profit data, the stipulations of the sale, and whether the amount to be received 
overall posed a benefit that might provide an increase in the company‘s share price.511  
 
After deliberating on the points of this appeal, the Financial Services and Markets 
Tribunal determined that, when Mr. Mohammed bought the Delta plc shares with the 
minimal information of an impending deal, he was fully aware of the ongoing 
transaction. This fact provided the Tribunal with grounds for assessing that the 
information alone was specific and precise. The Tribunal‘s reasoning stated that Mr. 
Mohammed had access to certain data that other market participants may have only 
conjectured, that Delta had initiated a transaction that might, in the event that the sale 
was completed, affect the share price of the company. Even without certainty as to what 
the outcomes of the impending transaction might be, the data that prompted his 
purchased of Delta shares before the completion of the sale were considered specific 
and precise.
512
 
 
The particulars of this appeal highlight some refined delineations of the nature of 
‗precise‘ information. First, the premise that information must be true and objective at 
the moment it comes into the possession of the user to make it ‗precise‘ overrides any 
subsequent proof of its inaccuracy that may occur if, for instance, a merger fails or an 
offer for purchase is withdrawn. Another aspect precludes the consideration of any 
rumour or speculation that at some later time may provide a positive result or generate a 
successful evaluation. Furthermore, the details in question do not have to refer to only 
one event nor do they need to be wholly specific to qualify as ‗precise.‘ According to 
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 169 
 
this approach, a decision by one company to take over another can be considered 
‗precise‘, even if the amount payable had not yet been proffered. In this same manner, 
data detailing potential actions directed at one of the several businesses can be included 
under the rubric of ‗precise,‘ and the subsequent trading in either or both of the 
companies, or the suggestion to others to engage in such conduct or to divulge pertinent 
data, would comprise insider dealing, even if the action to bid or take over was directed 
at only one of the companies.
513
 
 
 
(4) Relevant information 
 
Inside information is non-public, specific or precise, price sensitive information that 
would be likely to have a significant effect on the securities after announcement. It 
should be information relevant to specific issuers or securities. It appears that this 
element in defining the inside information in question is logical, because inside 
information would not be exploited by the insiders aiming to gain benefit, but only with 
regard to the sale or purchase of securities. Clearly, relevant information should pertain 
to the issuer or its securities. 
 
In the UK, both the CJA 1993 and the FSMA 2000 require information to be relevant to 
particular securities or to an issuer of securities. This aspect of the requirement pertains 
to how the information relates to the issuers, to the securities, and to the sectors in their 
entirety. The CJA 1993 provides interpretation under Section 60(4) regarding this issue 
by stating: ‗For the purposes of this Part, information shall be treated as relating to an 
issuer of securities which is a company not only where it is about the company but also 
where it may affect the company‘s business prospects.‘ The scope of the application of 
the term ‗inside information‘ then broadens to encompass the entire industry in which a 
                                                 
513
 This viewpoint is based upon the Committee of European Securities Regulation guidance, which has 
been emphasised by Avgouleas, pp. 257-258. 
 170 
 
company does business.
514
 In contrast, in the ESCA Law 2000, this obligation was 
omitted by the UAE lawmaker.  
 
The DIFC market law imposes this requirement using different wording, stating that the 
meaning of ‗inside information‘ relates to investments and to the affairs of a Reporting 
Entity, and information relating to a change in the business, operations or capital of the 
Reporting Entity.
515
 The FSMA 2000
516
 defines ‗inside information‘ as that which 
relates, directly or indirectly, to one or more issuers of qualifying investments. The 
DIFC Market law omits making a determination that information should be that which 
directly or indirectly relates to the particular issuer or to its securities. The omission of 
an explicit statement by the DIFC Market law that information should include what can 
be considered as ‗indirectly‘ relating to the securities or the issuer left a shortfall. The 
provisions which have included a more explicit delineation of the term and the 
application of ‗indirectly‘ as related to inside information. The available denotation 
encompasses those persons who acquire information related to an impending takeover, 
as well as those who come into possession of this type of data as a result of a loose 
association that connects them indirectly through a business or other professional 
interaction.
517
 However, it is important to note that the information in this instance can 
also be generated by persons outside of the issuing company while simultaneously 
being directly related to the issuer
 
.  
 
 
 
                                                 
514
 Rider and Ashe,,  p. 30. 
515
 See; Section 45(1) of DIFC Market Law. 
516
 Section 118C(4)(c) of the FSMA 2000.  
517
Albelooshi, p. 240.  
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3. 5 Who is categorized as an insider? 
 
Understanding the meaning of insider dealing depends upon the exact definition of an 
insider. The underlying principle for banning insider dealing refers to an unjust 
exploitation of information by someone with a special position.
518
 A good example of 
an insider is referred to in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, in which a company owned a 
piece of land that had massive mineral deposits. As soon as the media learned of this, 
they contacted the company for confirmation. The company denied the report. The 
managers of the company (i.e. the insiders) then exploited the situation by buying a 
significant number of company shares before the deposits were announced publically. 
This certainly affected the market, as the company‘s shares increased rapidly, enabling 
the managers of the company to make huge profits. This demonstrates that the insider is 
the one who exploits the power of his or her position to profit on price-sensitive 
information.   
 
The generic concept of defining insider dealing refers to the one who has access to 
sensitive and non-public information by means of his or her position, such as a 
corporate officer, director or other position closely connected with the company. As a 
result, persons holding such positions take advantage of inside information either to deal 
for themselves (i.e. sell and buy securities) or for other people by encouraging them to 
trade dishonestly.  
 
The question that may arise is to the extent to which securities law should broaden the 
definition of insider dealing to embrace those who access to inside information 
indirectly. Defining insider dealing differs from one jurisdiction to another, because it 
                                                 
518
 Brian Ikol Adungo, The New European Union and United Kingdom Regimes for Regulation of Market 
Abuse (January 8, 2009). A research paper submitted to the University of Manchester for the degree 
LL.M Masters (International Financial Law) in the Faculty of Humanities: School of Law. Available at 
SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1324678. 
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depends upon the broad concept of an insider. Scholars define an insider as someone 
who has access to inside information but who is prohibited from dealing irrespective of 
how he or she accessed this information.  On the other hand, other jurisprudence 
scholars define an insider by referring to his or her relationship with the issuer whether 
through broad membership, employment or professional duties, whom they call a 
‗primary insider‘.519 In other words, the meaning of an insider in the insider dealing 
laws could be based upon two different insider approaches; the so-called ‗person 
connection‘ and the ‗information connection.‘ The former considers the person an 
insider due to his connection to the public issuer of securities, while the latter views the 
insider as any person who has access to price-sensitive information that is related to the 
issuer.
520
 Jurisdictions always endeavour excessively to avoid any loopholes or leave 
any gap in the law through which insider dealing might escape prosecution. Perpetrators 
commonly use ambiguity as a justification for engaging in market misconduct. For 
example, the appellant, Asif Nazir, in the case of R. v Asif Nazir Butt,
521
 claimed to have 
found a loophole in the law and did not believe that he would face criminal charges. 
 
There are, then, two scenarios that can exist. First, the insiders obtain direct profit from 
a gradual increase in the price of the issuers‘ shares when positive news is announced or 
to attempt to avoid loss when the news is negative. Second, insiders who take advantage 
of their authority to access inside information and then pass it on to other parties, by 
‗tipping‘, either to make financial gains by sharing or by just guaranteeing profit to the 
                                                 
519
 Welch et al., . p. 9. 
520Z. Su and M. A. Berkahn, ‗The Definition of ‗‗Insider‘‘ in Section 3 of the Securities Markets Act 
1988: A Review and Comparison with other Jurisdictions‘, (November 2003) ISSN 1175-2874, Massey 
University, School of Accountancy, Discussion Paper Series 218, p 1. 
521
 R. v Asif Nazir Butt, Court of Appeal,12 January 2006,[2006] EWCA Crim 137,[2006] 2 Cr. App. R. 
(S.) p 295. On 20
th
 December, 2004, Asif Nazir Butt was declared guilty of conspiracy to engage in 
insider dealing contrary to s.52 (1) of the Criminal Justice Act 1993 and s.1 of the Criminal Law Act 
1997. As a result, he was sent to prison for five years. A confiscation order was subsequently made in the 
sum of £348,325, and the applicant was ordered to pay £60,000 toward the prosecution costs. 
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third party. This scenario involves dealing with outside traders, who are not well 
informed of the material of inside information.
522
    
 
Different jurisdictions, then, have defined an insider in their own ways. UK law defines 
insiders by highlighting the distinction between primary and secondary insiders. This 
produces justified clarity as specific acts could only be forbidden for ‗primary‘ or 
‗secondary‘ insiders. Some other jurisdictions, however, simply define insider dealing, 
by prohibiting any person who deals on the basis of non-public information that he or 
she obtained by virtue of his or her position. This, in fact, leaves grey areas in the law. 
This issue is discussed in the section below entitled ‗Lack of insider definition in the 
ESCA law 2000‘.   
 
It is important to understand the differences between ‗primary‘ and ‗secondary‘ insiders.  
Primary insiders are most likely to possess inside information from its primary source 
by virtue of their service or other position, and have a relationship with the company or 
entity, which enables them to access inside information.  Secondary insiders, contrary to 
primary insiders, are neither in a relationship with the company or entity nor directly 
have access to inside information but they directly or indirectly receive inside 
information from a primary source.  To categorise those into two groups is important in 
terms of a legal aspect. As Farghaly makes clear that, a primary insider, as the regulator 
assumes, knows of inside information, and he or she will not attempt to deny knowledge 
of such information. Thus, when a primary insider deals on the basis of inside 
information, he or she cannot claim, in response to an accusation or investigation 
authority, that he or she was not in the know about inside information. The legislator 
assumes that the primary insider knows inside information. The secondary insider, 
                                                 
522
 Avgouleas, The Mechanics and Regulation of Market Abuse, p.79-80. 
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however, is not assumed by the legislator to know inside information.
523
 In any event, 
some cases require a determination of the category of insiders in which each has fallen 
and who engages in the act of insider dealing, whether he or she is responsible for an 
offence or not.  
 
To appreciate the practice in the jurisdictions in question (UK laws, DIFC market law 
and the UAE law), it is essential to look at the specific meaning of an insider under each 
of these regimes. However, it is not easy to illustrate DIFC law No.12 of 2004, because 
of the complicated terms and the lack of academic sources in the field. The following 
section will shed more light on the two categories.  
  
3.5.1  Primary insiders 
 
‗Primary insiders‘ refers to those individuals who, by virtue of their service or other 
position, are enabled to access inside information.
524
 The classification adopted by the 
securities laws both of the UK and DIFC laws in question identifies two specific types 
amongst primary insiders:
525
 (1) true insiders, who have access based upon their 
position in the issuers, such as directors, managers or other officers;
526
 and (2) quasi-
insiders, who have privileged access depending upon the services they provide to the 
                                                 
523
 Mazhar Farghaly Ali (PhD in law) Legal Consultant at the Securities & Commodities Authority, 
Interview conducted  in May 2010  , Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates. 
524Thomas Lee Hazen, ‗Defining Illegal Insider Trading: Lessons from the European Community 
Directive on Insider Trading‘, (Autumn 1992) 55 Law and Contemporary Problems 4, pp. 231-239. 
525
Commentators have approached defining insiders differently, which is according to legislation and to 
how insiders possessed inside information by their access; Z. Su M.A. Berkahn divided primary insiders 
into two categories, traditional insiders, such as directors, officers and majority shareholders, and 
temporary insiders, such as lawyers, brokers and accountants. see Z. Su and M. A. Berkahn, ‗The 
Definition of ‗‗Insider‘‘ in Section 3 of the Securities Markets Act 1988: A review and comparison with 
other jurisdictions,‘ (November 2003) ISSN 1175-2874, Massey University, School of Accountancy,  
Discussion Paper Series 218, p. 4. Michael T. Ashe defined insiders under provisions of the Insider 
Dealing Directive into three categories of persons. Primary insiders are those who have access to the 
inside information of a company by virtue of their status. See Michael T. Ashe ‗The Directive on Insider 
Dealing‘ (1992) 13 Company Lawyer 15, p. 17. Albelooshi has pointed out in his dissertation that there 
are two categories of primary insiders: traditional insiders and access insiders. See Albelooshi, pp. 207, 
214. 
526Shazeeda Ali, ‗Market abuse: it's not just a Wall Street thing‘, (2006) 27Company Lawyer 7, pp. 222-
224. 
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issuers, such as professional advisers, lawyers, auditors and financial advisers.
527
 Quasi-
insiders have a connection with the issuers that enables them to have a right of entry to 
inside information.   
 
(a) True insiders 
 
In the UK, the CJA 1993 defines true insiders as those who ‗have information from an 
inside source if and only if (a) he or she has it through- (i) being a director, employee or 
shareholder of an issuer of securities...‘. Accordingly, under the CJA 1993, a true 
insider is the one who obtains information from an inside source through being a 
director, employee or shareholder of an issuer of securities.
528
 Certainly the directors of 
a company are capable of having much more information under their control on the 
subject of the company. Therefore, it is expected that they can be in an advanced 
position when trading their securities.
529
 For this reason, directors are automatically 
considered insiders under the CJA 1993 law. In particular, all staff members hired by a 
company are considered insiders ‗through being‘ employees; it is not necessary to prove 
that the employees are in a position that will most likely allow them to access inside 
information. The office cleaner, for instance, who is a capable of accessing and viewing 
written secret memoranda unintentionally left behind on the copy machine, is 
automatically an insider under the CJA 1993.
530
 This is a significant breakthrough in the 
law that seeks to grasp illegal behaviour by individuals who have not got any 
connection but have direct access to price-sensitive information.
531
Insider dealing 
                                                 
527
Philip R Wood, International Loans, Bonds and Securities Regulation, (London: Sweet & Maxwell; 
1995), p. 356. 
528
 Section 57(2)(a)(ii) of CJA 1993. 
529
 Paul L. Davies, Gower and Davies' Principles of Modern Company Law .7th edition (London: Sweet 
& Maxwell, 2003), p. 375. 
530
 Wotherspoon, pp. 419-433. 
531
White,pp.163-171.  
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provisions were drafted in the CJA 1993 as to meet the requirements of the European 
Directive on Insider Dealing.
532
  
 
The FSMA 2000 defines a true insider as any person who has access to inside 
information. Section 118B (a) and (b) states: ‗…an insider is any person who has inside 
information- (a) as a result of his/her membership of an administrative, management or 
supervisory body of an issuer of qualifying investments, (b) as a result of his/her 
holding in the capital of an issuer of qualifying investments...‘ Therefore, the FSMA 
2000 provides that true insiders are members of an administrative, management or 
supervisory body, or shareholders.
533
 However, do all these positions encompass all 
managers and staff members of an issuer? This gives the impression that confusion 
exists under the FSMA 2000,
534
 because the regulator explicitly states ‗members of an 
administrative, management or supervisory body.‘ Is the office boy, for instance, 
considered an insider under the FSMA 2000?  Nonetheless, if the office boy is not 
included under this law, he may be included under another category of insiders, such as 
quasi-insiders, who may share in the knowledge of inside information in the course of 
their professional responsibilities by virtue of their employment, or secondary insiders, 
as both will be explained below. Both the CJA 1993 and the FSMA 2000 automatically 
confer insider status upon individuals who might have non-public information as a 
result of their positions. Consequently, amongst the primary insiders, there are those 
who have naturally been expected to have inside information as a result of their status or 
connection to the issuer. This, in turn, qualifies them to have direct access to the top 
                                                 
532
 Alistair Alcock, ‗The rise and fall of UK quoted company regulation?‘, (October 2007) Journal of 
Business Law , pp.733-758.   
533
 Section 118B(a) and (b) of the FSMA 2000: ‗…an insider is any person who has inside information- 
(a) as a result of his membership of an administrative, management or supervisory body of an issuer of 
qualifying investments, 
(b) as a result of his holding in the capital of an issuer of qualifying investments,...‘ 
534
 This viewpoint has also been mentioned by Albelooshi, p 209. 
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secret information that is related to the issuer. Therefore, their first priority should be to 
abstain from misusing their capacity to achieve personal financial profit.
535
   
 
However, it is noteworthy that the CJA 1993 applies only to individuals (natural 
persons), while the FSMA terms relate to any person. To be precise, ‗anyone‘ is meant 
to include persons and issuers, both natural and legal persons.  Similarly, the FSA Code 
of Market Conduct takes the same attitude in applying provisions to both natural and 
legal persons. The FSA glossary defines a person as ‗including natural and legal 
persons.‘ 536 The DIFC Market law defines a person to include any natural person, body 
corporate or body unincorporated, including a legal person, company, partnership, 
unincorporated association, government or state.
537
 All of these aforementioned 
jurisdictions define which kind of person will probably have legal responsibility. In 
contrast, the ESCA Law 2000 does not provide any definition of a person whether he or 
she is natural or legal.  
 
Shareholders have the status of insider under  both the CJA 1993 and the FSMA 2000. 
Regardless of how many shares they hold, there is neither obligation of domination 
shareholding nor minimum of holding shares. Nevertheless, a shareholder who owns a 
large number of shares is practically expected to have more access to non-public 
information.
538
      
 
In contrast to the UK, the DIFC Market law divides insiders into complex sub-
categories. An insider is considered ‗a person in a special relationship,‘539 who shall be 
deemed to have access to sensitive information, details of which are set out under 
                                                 
535
Ibid. 
536
 Welch, et al., , p. 9. 
537
 See Article 1 of Schedule 1 to the Regulatory Law of DIFC Law No 1of 2004.  
538
 Albelooshi, p 209. 
539
 Section (45)(2) of DIFC Law No.12 of 2004,  
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Section 45(2)(a) of the DIFC law No.12 of 2004 , which states that: ‗…a person that is a 
director, officer, employee, affiliate, associate or adviser of: 
(i) the relevant Reporting Entity; 
(ii) a person that is proposing to make a Takeover Offer 
under Part 7 for the shares of the Reporting Entity; or 
(iii) a person that is proposing to be involved in a takeover 
with the Reporting Entity; 
 
The DIFC law No.12 of 2004 , in this sub-section, provides characters of persons who 
are regarded as insiders; a person who is a director,
540
 an officer, an employee, an 
affiliate, an associate
541
 or an adviser pertinent to the Reporting Entity.
542
Directors as 
                                                 
540
 The DIFC Market defines a director or equivalent member of an entity‘s governing body. See; Article 
3 under Schedule to interpretation of the DIFC Law No.12 of 2004. 
541
 Associate is defined as a term under The DFSA Rulebook, Glossary Module, which is:  
 (1) In AUT [The Authorisation module of the Rulebook] and ASP [The Ancillary Service Providers 
module of the Rulebook], means, in respect of a Person 'A' holding Shares or entitled to exercise, or 
control the exercise of voting power, in an Authorised Firm or a Holding Company of an Authorised Firm 
means:  
(a) the spouse of A; 
(b) a child or stepchild of A; 
(c) the trustee of any settlement, including any disposition or arrangement under which property is held 
on trust or subject to a comparable obligation, under which A has a life interest in possession; 
(d) an Undertaking of which A is a Director; 
(e) a Person who is an Employee or partner of A; 
(f) where A is an Undertaking:  
(i) a director of A; 
(ii) a subsidiary or wholly owned subsidiary of A; or 
(iii) a Director or Employee of such a subsidiary or wholly owned subsidiary; or 
(g) a Person who has an agreement or arrangement with A with respect to the acquisition, holding or 
disposal of Shares or other interests in the Authorised Firm or the Holding Company of an Authorised 
Firm or under which they undertake to act together in exercising their voting power in relation to an 
Authorised Firm or the Holding Company of an Authorised Firm that other Person. 
(2) Except in AUT and ASP means in respect of a Person 'A', any Person, including an affiliated company 
which is:  
(a) an undertaking in the same Group as A; or 
(b) any other person whose business or domestic relationship with A or his Associate might reasonably be 
expected to give rise to a community of interest between them which may involve a conflict of interest in 
dealings with third parties.‘ See; The DFSA Rulebook, Glossary Module. P 5 
542
 Reporting Entity The DIFC Market Law, under Article 3 of Defined Terms of interpretation schedule, 
defines Reporting Entity as a person and it states that ‗‗Reporting Entity is a person - 1) Subject to (2), a 
person is a Reporting Entity if:  
(a) the person has or had Securities admitted to an Official List of Securities at any time; 
(b) the person has filed a Prospectus with the DFSA under Article 15; 
(c) the person merges with or acquires a Reporting Entity; or 
(d) the person is declared in writing to be a Reporting Entity by the DFSA. 
(2) A person is not a Reporting Entity if:  
(a) the person is a properly constituted government, a government agency, a central bank or other type of 
national monetary authority of a country or jurisdiction, a supranational organisation whose members are 
either countries, central banks or national monetary authorities, a public authority or a state investment 
body; or 
(b) (i) the person previously had Securities admitted to an Official List of Securities; 
     (ii) the person currently has no Securities admitted to an Official List of Securities; and 
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primary insiders should be aware of their duties, whether in relation to conflicts of 
interests and misuse of position or restrictions and prohibitions under insider dealing 
regulation.
543
 Those individuals, who have a special relationship with the Reporting 
Entity due to their positions or services, and who have access to inside information, are 
categorized under ‗true insider‘ status. An affiliate, an associate or an adviser should not 
have access equivalent to those who have access, such as a director. They have access to 
insider information only as the result of their offered services. They are not classified as 
an ‗affiliate, associate or adviser‘ in the ‗true insiders‘ category. Despite this, the DIFC 
law No.12 of 2004  gives an affiliate, associate or adviser the same status as a director, 
because their position may be reasonably expected to give them access to relevant 
information concerning the Reporting Entity.  
 
Another type of  insider under the DIFC law No.12 of 2004  covered in the above sub-
section, are persons who propose to make or get involved in a takeover bid offer for a 
particular Reporting Entity. Such a person could be a director, officer, employee, 
affiliate, associate, adviser or any other person who proposes or is involved in a 
takeover bid relating to the Reporting Entity. Therefore, these persons are considered 
primary insiders due to their connection with the offeree or with a targeted issuer.  In 
general, the offer which is made may include sensitive inside information. The DIFC 
law No.12 of 2004 considers such individuals to be primary insiders whether they 
possess relevant information relating to Reporting Entity or have a connection with 
material takeover information as an insider. In other words, an insider is referred to as 
‗someone who is in a special relationship‘.544  
 
                                                                                                                                               
     (iii) the current holders of at least 75% of voting rights in the Reporting Entity have agreed in writing 
that the person is no longer a Reporting Entity; or 
(c) the DFSA so determines. 
543
 See Annex A Takeover Rules Module (TKO) 1.5. 2 Guidance. 
544
 Section 45(2) of DIFC Law No. 12 of 2004.  
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(c) Quasi-insiders 
 
Another category amongst primary insiders in the UK may be so-called quasi-insiders. 
As mentioned above, this group has access to inside sources by their offered services. 
According to both laws, the CJA 1993 indicated that ‗…a person has information from 
an inside source if and only if  (a) s/he has it through- (ii) having access to the 
information by virtue of his/her employment, office or profession;‘ while the FSMA 
2000 stated that ‗…an insider is any person who has inside information …(c) as a result 
of having access to the information through the exercise of his/her employment, 
profession or duties, (d) as a result of his criminal activities...‘545 These provisions refer, 
in fact, to a broader category of those who have access to the inside information by 
virtue of his or her employment, office or profession, such as investment bankers, the 
securities issuer's lawyers, and accountants, who may become privy to inside 
information in the course of their professional responsibilities. Nonetheless, there were 
major differences between the FSMA 2000 and the CJA 1993 concerning the definition 
of insider dealing. The FSMA 2000 required that inside information be obtained by 
insiders‘ activities, as it refers to ‗his exercise or activities‘ through the services 
provided, while the CJA 1993 under Section 57 requires that the information in question 
be obtained only ‗as a result of his position‘.  This difference indicates that the CJA 
1993 requires proof that the insider knew that he or she was in possession of price-
sensitive information and that he or she obtained it from an inside source, such as a 
director, employee, or shareholder of an issuer of securities.   
 
                                                 
545
 Part V of CJA 1993, Section 57(2)(a)(ii) . In the sense of criminal activities; the first time that the FSA 
launched a criminal investigation into such criminal activities was on October 31, 2007. Two men were 
investigated regarding their association with a firm called Universal Management Services (UMS) and 
were arrested by the FSA. They were accused for assisting illegal boiler room operations. See; Jason D. 
Haines, ‗Boiler room operations: legal and regulatory action: Part 2‘. (2008) Company Lawyer, 29(11), 
345. 
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Keith Wotherspoon
546
 comments that the wording of the ‗by virtue of‘ requirement 
under section 57(2)(a)(ii) might have created some difficulties. To be more specific, he 
provides an example by asking what happens if the barman working at the golf club 
overhears a conversation of two senior executives as he provides their order? Does he 
become as insider because of this action? Obviously, it would be difficult to make a 
prosecution, because there is a need to prove that this is either a business or a 
professional relationship between the person and the corporation as implied by the 
‗access by virtue‘ classification of insider under the CJA 1993. This law makes no 
mention of an issuer‘s securities. There is no doubt that it remains ambiguous whether 
there has to be a functional relation between the individual‘s employment or career and 
the corporation or the securities with which the information is connected. 
547
 
 
In contrast to the UK law, the DIFC law No. 12 of 2004, Section 45(2)(b), (c) and (d)
548
 
categorizes insiders ‗quasi-insiders‘ into four classes;  
1-  A person who is involved in an engagement or who proposes to make an 
engagement in any business with the Reporting Entity.   
2-  A person who  is engaging in professional activities with the Reporting Entity 
or on behalf of the Reporting Entity with a person who is proposing to make or 
to be involved in a takeover with the Reporting Entity.  
3- A person who is a director, officer or employee of the entity which is engaging 
in business or proposing to engage or is providing professional activities with 
the Reporting Entity. 
                                                 
546
 Wotherspoon, pp. 419-433. 
547
 Filby,  p. 363. 
548
 Markets Law, DIFC Law No.12 of 2004, Section 45(2)(b), (c) and (d):  
(b) a person that is engaging in or proposes to engage in any business or professional activity with or on 
behalf of the Reporting Entity or with or on behalf of a person described in Article 45(2) (a)(ii) or (iii); 
(c) a person that is a director, officer or employee of the entity described in Article 45(2)(b); 
(d) a person that learned of the material information with respect to the Reporting Entity while the person 
came within Article 45(2)(a), (b) or (c);… 
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4- A person who knew of the material information regarding the Reporting Entity 
while providing professional activities or being a director, officer or employee 
of the Reporting Entity. 
 
As discussed earlier, the DIFC law No.12 of 2004 provides a significantly broad 
regulatory regime for financial services in the DIFC Market. It attempts as much as 
possible to prevent all individuals from misusing inside information. This includes 
those individuals who have access to the Reporting Entity by means of any business or 
professional activities, such as lawyers, auditors and financial advisers. The phrase 
‗propose to engage in‘ might mean that the criminal project has already begun but not 
been completed to completion. Nevertheless, such a project is considered as an aiding 
and abetting offence or part of a conspiracy to commit an offence. Thus, the regulator 
aims to prevent a criminal action before it occurs by deeming an attempt to commit 
insider dealing itself to be an offence. 
 
The category of individuals who are engaged in business relationships with the 
companies, such as professionals in the fields of law and finance and those in advisory 
positions, have the benefit of substantial right of entry to inside information. These 
professionals are aware of facts about the Reporting Entity or about a particular 
business. They also have sufficient familiarity with the securities markets to use the 
information without difficulty. 
 
Shareholders, however, have been omitted by the DIFC law No.12 of 2004 from the 
category of specific insiders, contrary to the UK law. Nevertheless, shareholders may be 
caught under a secondary insider category. The omission from the DIFC law No.12 of 
2004 can raise a question related to the position of institutional or controlling 
shareholders who often have an overall information benefit considering their importance 
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to the issuer, their close relationship with the company board and, in relation to 
institutions that invest large sums of money, their relationship with fund managers and 
analysts. However, the reasonable explanation behind this lies in the fact that 
shareholders are not connected with a company as are its directors and members of the 
Board, whose liability is based upon the theory of breach of fiduciary duty. Barry Rider 
et.al state that, ‗in the vast majority of legal systems, the relationship between a 
shareholder and his company is purely contractual and does not involve obligations of a 
fiduciary or confidential character‘.549 
 
On some occasions, inside information is received either directly or indirectly by other 
parties who are categorized as secondary insiders. Such parties obtain inside 
information not as a result of such a special relationship with the company but from 
other sources. The following subsection attempts to define this group of insiders.  
 
 
3.5.2 Secondary insider 
 
 Secondary insiders, or so-called ‗tippees,.‘ directly or indirectly receive inside 
information from a primary source. Secondary insiders have a similar status as primary 
insiders in being restricted from exploiting inside information. In this regard, it is 
assumed that a person who is regarded as an insider in this category obtains relevant and 
unpublished price-sensitive information even though he or she does not have direct 
access to the issuer. 
 
According to UK laws, the definition of secondary insider is found under both the CJA 
1993 and the FSMA 2000.Section 57(2)(b) of the CJA 1993 stipulates that ‗…a person 
has information from an inside source if and only if (b) the direct or indirect source of 
his/her information is a person within paragraph (a).‘ (as covered above) within 
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 Rider, et.al. Market Abuse and Insider Dealing (2002),p. 16  
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paragraph (a)The CJA 1993 reference to ‗direct or indirect‘ means  it has extended 
coverage to catch illegal behaviour by persons who are not connected with an issuer, 
but, on the other hand, have obtained price-sensitive information from another source 
regarding issuers‘ securities.  
According to Section 57(2)(b) of the CJA 1993, then, secondary insiders might be held 
responsible if they received inside information directly or indirectly from a director, an 
employee, a shareholder or other insider of the issuer. However, it is difficult to know 
the extent to which the receiver would know the true identity of the source and the 
degree to which he or she must purely be conscious of the announcement approached 
from a primary source. In fact, two circumstances worth noting usually occur. First, the 
inside information is disclosed by the primary insider through illegitimate behaviour; 
second, the secondary insider keenly requires the inside information. There are two 
conditions under which an individual becomes responsible for committing a secondary 
insider. It must be proven that the person was aware that the information came from an 
inside source and that this information came from primary insiders or someone who 
had access to non-public, price-sensitive information. Yet, the CJA 1993 clearly stated 
that secondary insider responsibility may be imposed even though the receiver of the 
information accessed it passively and did not act actively possess it.
550
 Thus, legal 
responsibility is widened to protect information accessed from both insiders and those 
who have a connection with the company. Accordingly, an individual who passes 
material information as a ‗tip‘ and has no relationship with the theme of the tip, such as 
an analyst, will now also commit an offence.
 551
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551
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In the case of R v McQuoid, 
552
 the defendant was a lawyer, who fell into the primary 
insider category, because he had access to an inside source by the services that he 
provided as a lawyer. He was formerly the General Counsellor for TTP 
Communications Plc (TTP). In May, 2006, he became aware of sensitive non-public 
information of a proposed takeover of TTP by Motorola Plc. He was found guilty for 
having passed that information to James Melbourne, his father-in-law. Melbourne 
bought 153,824 shares of the company at 13 pence per share on 30 May 2006. On the 1
st
 
June, the takeover offer bid was disclosed to the market with an approved price of 45 
pence per share. Melbourne profited by approximately £48,919.20 from the shares that 
he bought. On the 1
st
 September, 2006, Melbourne gave the defendant a cheque for 50 
per cent of the profit made from trading in TTP shares. Both men were afterward taken 
into custody and accused of insider dealing in violation of s 52(1) of the CJA 1993. 
However, this issue could be partially criticized as the defendant was a lawyer involved 
in a takeover, who passed inside information on to his father-in-law. Based on this, it 
can be argued that the defendant could have been charged as a tippee, subject to the 
disclosure offence as well, and that, therefore, he would be subject to Section 52(2) of 
CJA 1993. Instead, he was charged with the insider dealing offence in violation of 
Section 52(1). 
 
Section 118B(e) of the FSMA 2000 states that ‗…an insider is any person who has 
inside information- (e) which he has obtained by other means and which he knows, or 
could reasonably be expected to know, is inside information‘. This shows the similar 
outcome as the Market Abuse Directive terms, in view of the fact that both primary and 
                                                 
552
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secondary insiders are bound by the same proscriptions in Articles 2 and 3 Market 
Abuse Directive whether dealing, disclosing or recommending.
 553
  
 
In the DIFC market, the definition of secondary insider is derived from Section (45) of 
DIFC law No. 12 of 2004. The secondary insider is described  ‗(d) a person that learned 
of the material information with respect to the Reporting Entity while the person came 
within Article 45(2)(a), (b) or (c); or (e) a person that learned of material information 
with respect to the Reporting Entity from any other person described in Article 45(2)(a), 
(b), (c) or (d) and knows or ought reasonably to have known that the other person is in 
such a relationship‘. It is clear that any person is a secondary insider if he or she learned 
of such material information regarding the Reporting Entity through any other person 
described under the law in question, such as a director, an officer, an employee, or a 
person engaged in or who proposes to engage in any business or professional activity 
with or on behalf of the Reporting Entity. 
 
The DIFC Market law and the UK under FSMA 2000 use different terms regarding who 
is considered to be a secondary insider. The DIFC Market law uses the word ‗learned,‘ 
stating that ‗a person that learned of the material information,‘ whereas the FSMA 2000 
employed the term ‗obtained,‘ stating that ‗she/he has obtained by others.‘ However, it 
is not clear whether these two terms have different meanings.  Does the use of the term 
learned or obtained embrace passive or active acquisition of such information?  
 
The definition of ‗obtained‘ came into the central issue surrounding the acquittal in the 
R v Fisher
554
 case. The debate was on the basis of actus reus by raising an issue that an 
                                                 
553
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action could only be committed by a person who obtained the information which 
resulted in the securities transaction by his own ‗effort or action‘. The Court of Appeal 
concluded that the groups of individuals classified as secondary insiders or tippees have 
been broadened not because of the way in which they reached the price-sensitive 
information (the issue of obtaining) but because of the way in which such information 
was employed, regardless of how it was received, even though there was no method to 
keep that information from being disclosed. 
555
  
 
Using the term ‗learned‘ in the DIFC law No.12 of 2004  is better than using ‗obtained‘, 
which is still used in the UK under the FSMA 2000.
556
 It could be argued that there is 
no distinction in the sense of the meaning between the legal interpretations of the terms 
‗learned‘ or ‗obtained.‘ This concept is based on the above decision of the Court of 
Appeal,
557
 which held that how such information is received does not matter and that 
what matters most is the way in which that information is used.   
 
There is also a different requirement of the type of knowledge in relation to inside 
information under both jurisdictions in question, even though the definition of insiders, 
whether primary or secondary, is slightly comparable. Under the FSMA 2000, the 
knowledge required relates to the status of the information, while, under the DIFC law 
No.12 of 2004 , the knowledge required relates to the status of the tipper. On the other 
hand, there is no requirement under the CJA 1993 in terms of a relationship between the 
tippee and the insider source.
 558
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3.6 Lack of insider definition in the ESCA Law 2000  
 
Article 39(1) of the ESCA Law 2000 defines an insider as ‗any person‘ and states that ‗It 
shall not be permitted for any person to deal in securities on the basis of unpublicised or 
undisclosed information s/he acquired by virtue of his/her position.‘ Under this Article, 
several issues could be raised based upon the comparative study discussed above.  The 
Article mentions ‗any person,‘ but which types of persons are covered? As mentioned 
earlier, is it a legal or a natural person .Does it include primary and secondary insiders? 
Could a taxi driver or a waiter in a restaurant who obtained inside information from a 
fragment of overheard dialogue be considered an insider? In the UAE law, it is difficult 
to categorise the taxi driver or a waiter in a restaurant, who overheard a conversation, 
under an insider classification. Moreover, even an insider‘s friend or neighbour,559whom 
he or she talks to about inside information, will not be responsible. There is still a 
shortage in the UAE law.
560
 This is contrary to the UK law, which provides that, to raise 
the responsibility against them, they must know that such information is inside 
information.  
  
Furthermore, using the phrase ‗by virtue of his/her position,‘ it is meant that a 
requirement exists that unpublicised information must be obtained as a result of ‗his/her 
position‘ in order to be considered as an insider. Therefore, he or she is not an insider if 
he or she gains the inside information not by virtue of his or her position. Still, who falls 
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within the term of ‗position‘? The question may therefore be raised as to what the 
regulator meant by the term ‗his/her position.‘ Does it include all employees as issuers? 
The following is an attempt to examine these issues more clearly. 
 
There is a vital need to define the term ‗insider‘. The Legal Consultant at SCA makes 
clear that ‗no definition [of insider] exist[s] in current legislation.‘561 There are various 
other opinions as well about the term insider. One interviewee made the comment that 
the UAE legislator has done well in not defining insider dealing, because, if the 
legislator provided the definition, this would narrow the scope and ties the responsibility 
to the insider for the action that he or she commits.
562
 Another interviewee added that 
usually definitions are used in the law to avoid the repetition of the word or the term and 
thus there is no need for a definition of insider.  A different interviewee said that the 
ESCA Law 2000 provisions confirm that the insider is the person who has access to 
inside information.
563
 
 
However, as mentioned above, the ESCA Law 2000 defines an insider by using the 
term ‗any person.‘ At first glance, this appears to cover either a legal or natural person. 
In addition, it can refer to any director, employee or shareholder of an issuer or those 
engaged in professional activities, such as professional advisers, lawyers, auditors and 
financial advisers. In other words, it generally prohibits all individuals possessing inside 
information from trading on such information. That encompasses primary and 
secondary insiders, although secondary insiders might be caught under the exploitation 
of inside information offence under this law in question.  
                                                 
561
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Nevertheless, the ESCA Law 2000 limited the scope of Article 39(1)
564
 by providing 
that ‗any person‘ must obtain the inside information by virtue of his or her position. The 
Article states: ‗It shall not be permitted for any person to deal in Securities on the basis 
of unpublicized or undisclosed information he acquired by virtue of his position.‘ 
Accordingly, does a cleaner, who is emptying confidential papers in an office and 
acquires inside information by virtue of his or her service, or a printer, who is printing 
documents bearing the terms of a tender, offers documents which are being prepared for 
takeover bidders, acquire the undisclosed information in violation of this Article? 
 
It is important to note that the term ‗position‘ has a special meaning in the UAE culture 
as referring to one who is usually on the top of the hierarchy in entities. It is difficult to 
say, for example, that the office boy is in Mans‘ab565 (he is in the position). This term of 
position has a different meaning in Arabic than it has in English. It could be argued that 
this is a complex issue. In light of this, all employees and staff of the entities who do not 
enjoy a leadership position cannot be held under this Article. Farghaly agrees that the 
expression ‗by virtue of his/her position‘ does not include everyone who is aware of 
information through his or her job and not just ‗by virtue of his/her position‘.566 
Therefore, the previous examples of a cleaner and a printer do not fall within the Article 
and thus can be excluded from criminal liability. They may however be guilty with 
regard to exploitation of undisclosed information,  under Article 37 of the ESCA Law 
2000, if proven. Neither the ESCA Law 2000 nor any judicial decision clarifies what 
constitutes the term ‗his/her position.‘ This creates a loophole in the legislation which 
may reflect the impracticality of successful prosecution. Simply put, the UAE regulator 
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has not provided an adequate and comprehensive definition of ‗insider.‘ In contrast, the 
UK laws and DIFC Market law defined an insider clearly as seen above.  
 
 3. 7 Criminal Offences of Insider Dealing 
 
The aforementioned sections have attempted to identify individuals who are considered 
insiders. Individuals who have inside information are either primary or secondary 
insiders and thus are subject to criminal punishment under all comparative legislations 
(in the UK law and the DIFC Law). Consequently, a primary insider, a secondary 
insider or both could engage in the activities which amount to insider dealing provided 
that they have intentionally acquired such information (directly or indirectly).
567
 
Therefore, highlighting this issue under counterpart jurisdictions might be useful in 
approaching the purpose of the current study. However, the forms of criminal offence 
involves insiders who are dealing by selling or buying securities based upon inside 
information or encouraging another to deal and disclose inside information to another 
party while performing their duties or functions, or both, as discussed below.  
 
(a) The Dealing Offence   
It is an offence if a person deals in securities, the price of which has been effected by 
insider information.
568
 If an insider has inside information, he or she is required not to 
deal in the securities to which that information is relevant. The definition of dealing 
includes ‗acquisition‘ or ‗disposals‘ and whether they are constructed by an individual 
as principal or as agent.
569
 In the UK case of Neil Rollins,
570
 who had inside information 
relating to PM Group plc, the defendant was charged at the City of Westminster 
                                                 
567 
See Attorney-General's Reference (No. 1 of 1988), House of Lords  [1989] 2 W.L.R. 729.  
568
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Magistrates‘ Court with four counts of insider dealing. One of them was related to 
discussing the dealing offence, in which he disposed of 83,989 shares during 2006. The 
dealing offence was the disposal of shares in violation of Section 52(1) of the CJA 
1993. 
 
However, the CJA 1993 defines the dealing offence in securities more widely.
571 
Transactions in shares, debentures, options and contracts for differences are all covered 
by the dealing offence.
572
 Every transaction of securities should take place on a 
regulated market or by means of a professional intermediary.
573
 The transaction will be 
caught by the CJA 1993 whether it includes an Over-the-Counter (OTC) trade directed 
by or through a professional intermediary or not. Regulated Markets are places where 
exchanges occur among those who legitimately list or permit dealing in the pertinent 
securities upon their securities or derivatives.
 The meaning of ‗professional 
intermediaries‘ is most likely to be broad enough to capture legal practitioners and 
accountants instructing securities dealings as a representative of their customers. 
However, Section 59(3) showed that there is a significant qualification which eliminates 
the application of the dealing offence to those who act as professional intermediaries if 
they take action ‗incidentally‘ or ‗occasionally‘. 574 
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       (a) who carries on a business consisting of an activity mentioned in subsection (2) and who holds   
        himself  out to the public or any section of the public (including a section of the public constituted by   
         persons  such as himself) as willing to engage in any such business; or  
      (b) who is employed by a person falling within paragraph (a) to carry out any such activity.  
(2) The activities referred to in subsection (1) are –  
       (a) acquiring or disposing of securities (whether as principal or agent); or  
       (b) acting as an intermediary between persons taking part in any dealing in securities.‘  
574
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The relevant time is important, as it takes into account whether or not an act has been 
perpetrated at the time of the agreement to obtain or dispose of the security. An offence, 
positively, would be committed by the person if he had inside information about these 
securities at that time. Nevertheless, liability will not be raised if a person received 
inside information merely after setting up an agreement, because he or she will probably 
not have violated the provision on condition that he or she completes the deal and really 
obtains or disposes of the securities. In contrast, if the person had the inside information 
at the time when he or she decided to obtain or dispose of the securities, it would appear 
that he or she will have committed an offence, even if he or she did not make the 
bargain.
 575
 Therefore,
 
it can be argued that making the bargain or benefit is not the main 
component in the structure of the dealing offence. This is different from the UAE law, 
which stipulates that accomplishing the benefit is an element of the dealing offence. 
This issue will be discussed below. 
 
Dealing also includes ‗procuring‘ another person to deal in such securities. The 
procuring offence is found in Section 55 of the CJA 1993, which states that a person 
may procure someone else to deal with insider information. A violation of this section 
may occur when the securities are acquired or disposed of by a principal or agent or by 
his nominee or an individual performing at his direction in relation to the acquisition or 
disposal. This feature of the definition of dealing in securities is intended to cover all 
dealing circumstances where an individual learns inside information without personally 
buying or selling the securities – hence the action of referring to transactions by an 
agent or a nominee.
576 
On the other hand, the liability does not arise if an insider who 
acts as a principal gets an innocent agent, whether he or she is an expert trader or 
basically a friend or a relative, to trade for the principal. In this case, the innocent agent 
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is not responsible if he or she does do not have any inside information. However, the 
principal continues to be responsible, because he or she has procured the acquisition or 
disposal regardless of not dealing personally. In the case of R v Goodman,
577
 the insider 
was a company chairman, who gave his girlfriend inside information of important 
losses, after which she disposed of her shares. In this way, he was considered to have 
procured the dealing by another individual performing under his direction.
578
 If this 
case had taken place in the UAE, there are no provisions under the ESCA law 2000 that 
would have been able to deal with it. Thus, both the chairman and his girlfriends would 
have had impunity. While under DIFC law No.12 of 2004 , the two individuals would 
have committed an illegal act and would have been punished under Article 43 of DIFC 
law No.12 of 2004 . 
 
 (b)The Encouragement Offence  
Encouragement is an offence under the CJA 1993, which prohibits any individual with 
inside information from encouraging another person to deal in securities. Section 
52(2)(a) of the CJA 1993 provides that a person who has information as an insider is 
guilty if he or she ‗encourages another person to deal in securities that are (whether or 
not that other knows it) price-affected securities in relation to the information, knowing 
or having reasonable cause to believe that the dealing would take place in the 
circumstances mentioned in subsection (3)‘.579  
 
This clause, then prohibits any person who has inside information, which, if it were 
disclosed in the marketplace, would be likely to have a significant effect on the price of 
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securities, and would to encourage another party to deal in such securities in 
circumstances covered by the dealing offence.
580
 An example of the encouragement 
offence was when the FSA accused Neil Rollins
581
 of encouraging Louisa Rollins to 
deal in shares of PM Group plc on or before 4th September 2006. Neil Rollins had 
inside information related to PM Group plc, and he gave a tip to Louisa Rollins, which 
violated Section 52(2) of the CJA 1993. Nevertheless, it is important to point out the 
difference between the action of procuring and that of encouraging another person to 
deal. Procuring someone to deal is for the sake of the insider‘s personal gain, whereas 
encouraging someone is done to achieve a profit for the person who is encouraged to 
deal.  The DIFC law No.12 of 2004 uses two terms to define these types of actions, 
inducing or encouraging. However, in the UAE, the ESCA law 2000 has omitted 
criminalising inducing or encouraging as an offence.   
 
In the DIFC law No.12 of 2004 , there are two principal types of offences that prohibit 
insider behaviours: (1) dealing in investment,
582 
and (2) providing inside information.
583
 
The former prohibits the insider from dealing either by buying or selling securities 
(acquisition or disposals) on the basis of inside information. The latter encompasses two 
types of offences: informing
584
 another person of material information that is not 
generally available in the market and procuring
585
 another person to deal. However, the 
procurement offence
586
 takes place illegally when a person induces or encourages 
another, whether directly or indirectly, by all means. Therefore, it could be deduced that 
the prohibited activities in question, broadly defined under the DIFC law No.12 of 2004 
, could be identified as illegal behaviours that may amount to insider dealing. The 
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FSMA 2000 and the CJA 1993 use ‗disclose,‘587 while the DIFC law No.12 of 2004  
uses ‗inform‘ to refer to illegal behaviours. Whether an insider discloses or informs 
inside information to another person, the result will be similar. Thus, the law has 
fulfilled its aim by using any of the aforementioned terms. 
 
However, the encouraging offence is not simply applied to the person who has 
information as an insider and who passes the information to another party. It requires a 
party to know that the securities which the party is encouraged to purchase are price-
affected securities. The unlawful act concerns the classic circumstances in which a tip is 
given by another to sell
588
 or buy. As Clare Bennett
589
 pointed out, ‗advice on buying 
and selling could refer to advice encouraging others to buy and sell.‘ The 
encouragement offence may occur whether or not the person encouraged to deal does 
determine to deal at all. 
590
 Furthermore, primary insiders or tippees could commit the 
offence of encouragement, and it applies to encouraging any party.  Thus, a violator will 
include any official, possessor, or manager leading a company to insider deal.
591
 
 
(c)The Disclosure Offence 
The last offence is disclosing the inside information to another party. This is prohibited 
by Section 52(2)(b) of the CJA 1993, which specifies that any person with inside 
information who discloses that information to another person is guilty, because this does 
not comply with the proper performance of the functions of his or her employment, 
office or profession.  
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It is clear that the way that the offence is framed makes it possible that there will be 
instances of disclosing inside information, when it is completely correct in the 
performance of an employment, office or profession to disclose inside information.
592
 It 
is important to understand that disclosing by itself and without meeting regulatory rules 
is an offence, if it is not made in the right performance of the roles of employment, 
office or profession, such as the case of a regulatory body or the company's bankers or 
stockbrokers. Specifically, committing a disclosure offence can occur whether the 
receiver trades or not.
593
  
 
The case of R v Titheridge
594
 in the UK is an example of committing a disclosure 
offence. The information was subject to a takeover bid, which had been obtained by the 
defendant, who was in the position of a secretary to the chairman of the merchant 
banker. She disclosed that information to her husband in the improper performance of 
her duties. 
 
The ESCA Law 2000 does not criminalize the leaking of inside information. This is 
another shortcoming in the UAE law. For example, if an insider leaks inside 
information to his relative or friends without taking any material advantage himself, it is 
unclear whether he will be held responsible. In other words, is the leaking of inside 
information considered exploitation? Answering these two questions, The Legal 
Consultant
595
 at the SCA is of the opinion that the mere leaking of inside information is 
not exploitation, because the exploitation offence under the ESCA Law 2000 is 
defined
596
 as benefiting from taking advantage of such information. Therefore, the 
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leaking of the unpublicised information to friends or others in a way that will not benefit 
or advantage the person leaking the information does not give rise to an exploitation 
offence.  Therefore, this text suffers from a shortcoming by not criminalizing the act of 
leaking insider information. This shortcoming in legislation must be modified, because 
the penalty must be imposed upon both the person who leaked the information and 
those who exploited it. 
 
3.8 Looking at the ‘exploitation’ offence under ESCA Law 2000 
 
Exploitation of information is comparable to the term ‗misuse of information‘ in the UK 
law under the FSMA 2000. The term ‗exploitation‘ refers in fact to the act of taking 
advantage of something or taking unjust advantage of another for one‘s own benefit.597 
Arguably, without achieving this point, it is difficult to allege that the action is 
‗exploitation.‘ Article 37 of the ESCA Law 2000 prohibits the exploitation of inside 
information by stating: ‗The exploitation of undisclosed information which could affect 
prices of Securities in order to achieve personal benefits shall not be permitted.‘ Thus, 
the exploitation of inside information is defined as benefiting from such confidential 
information by the insider or the person that has the information in his or her 
possession, profiting personal benefit, or gaining self-advantage.
598
  
 
The ESCA Law 2000 prohibits the exploitation of undisclosed information by a 
company‘s directors and officers, usually referred to as insiders. They are in a good 
position to use superior information for their trading and to assess their firm‘s affairs. 
According to a study by a Domestic Financial Market in the National Bank of Abu 
Dhabi, the gains achieved by insiders who are exploiting inside information in the 
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securities market as a result of having access to inside source in some companies before 
they were officially announced total approximately 20 billion dirhams in one year. This 
is a period which has seen an increase in share prices and the recovery of the market. 
The ESCA Law 2000 prohibits the exploitation of undisclosed information by a 
company‘s directors, officers, and large shareholders, usually referred to as insiders. 
They are in a good position to use superior information for their trading and to assess 
their firm‘s affairs. According to a study by a Domestic Financial Market in the 
National Bank of Abu Dhabi, the gains achieved by insiders who are exploiting inside 
information in the securities market as a result of having access to inside source in some 
companies before they were officially announced total approximately 20 billion dirhams 
in one year. This is a period which has seen an increase in share prices and the recovery 
of the market.  
 
The legislator must criminalise the action of using inside information without requiring 
that personal benefit occur or take place, because, as soon as the action is executed, it is 
against the rule of equality and fairness between the investors with regard to access to 
inside information. Since the UK legislator has criminalised the action without requiring 
the benefit, its position is wiser than the position of the UAE Legislator counterpart.  
 
The exploitation conduct under Article 37 of the ESCA Law 2000 is related to 
undisclosed information, likely to affect prices of securities if it is made public.  To be 
an exploited information offence, three conditions must be met:  
(1) The information must be ‗inside information.‘ 
(2) The information could affect prices of securities if made public (sensitive 
information).  
(3) The perpetrator must achieve personal benefits. 
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The first and second conditions are definitions of inside information that can be 
exploited. The criticism that may be raised against the third condition is narrowed by 
the capacity of the Article by providing that the ‗actor‘ must achieve personal benefits 
to be considered as having committed a criminal offence. Otherwise, such conduct will 
not be under this Article. For instance, assume that X as an employee purchased shares 
of company Z based upon inside information that is not generally available, intending to 
achieve personal benefits.  Company Z made an official announcement regarding such 
information on which X based his exploitation. The shares of company Z dropped down 
because of unforeseen events, and X did not get any benefit. Is X liable under the 
Article in question? It can be argued that X is not liable, because the requirement of 
achieving personal benefits was not fulfilled. With regard to this issue, the Legal 
Consultant at the SCA has said the following: 
I see that a person shall be held responsible whether he or she has 
benefited or not, but the legal text [ESCA law 2000] suffers from a 
shortage and does not include that, because it is against the concept 
of equality. The French legislation penalises the person even if the 
benefits are not being executed in full. The Egyptian legislation, 
similar to the legislation of the UAE, requires the benefit to be fully 
executed as a matter of fact, so I tend to accuse the person even if 
he or she has not achieved any benefit.
599
  
 
Under Article 39(2) of the ESCA Law 2000, the chairman and members of any 
company‘s management or its employees are prohibited from exploiting inside 
information regarding the company in the purchase or sale of shares. This provision 
limits the transaction in scope of the company‘s shares whether for sale or purchase in 
terms of inside information. If it is found that an employee exploits inside information 
regarding a target company that accepted a takeover offer from the company for which 
he or she works, it is difficult to claim that the provision in question prohibits his or her 
                                                 
599
 Mazhar Farghaly Ali (PhD in law) Legal Consultant at the Securities & Commodities Authority, 
Interview conducted  in May 2010  , Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates. 
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transaction, because the shares of the target company do not relate to his or her 
company. Therefore, the provision does not apply.   
 
Article 38 of the ESCA Law 2000 provides a restriction for any transactions conducted 
by employees of companies whose securities are listed in the market. The employees of 
a company under this Article encompass the chairman, the members of the board of 
directors, its general manager, and any of its employees. Nevertheless, this transaction 
is subject to disclosure through the market and specific information must be disclosed as 
to the purchase or sale transaction, the quantities and prices therein, and any other 
information required by the market. The question remains whether an employee who 
deals on the basis of inside information and meets the entire requirements outlined 
above will be legally responsible. The vagueness of the legislation allows the 
perpetrator to disclaim responsibility or to blame the regulator for not providing 
sufficient clarification. 
 
3.9 Conclusion  
 
This chapter has endeavoured to examine the regulation of insider dealing under the 
ESCA Law 2000. It provides an argument over the issue of regulation of insider dealing 
which is between two camps; those in favour of prohibiting insiders and those against it. 
The discussion, of course, has been a valuable tool in aiding the understanding of the 
foundations for its regulation.  
 
The chapter looked at the regulation of insider dealing. The ESCA Law 2000 has been 
studied by comparing the counterpart laws that apply to the regulation of insider dealing 
in the UK and the DIFC market to find out the deficiency of the ESCA Law.  The 
comparison, certainly, has showed that the regulatory system may be deficient in some 
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areas. The definition of inside information, for example, under the ESCA Law is not 
clear. There is an absence of a requirement that inside information should be precise or 
relevant to particular securities or to an issuer of securities. In contrast, these 
requirements are provided by the UK laws and the DIFC law.  
 
In addition, the ESCA law 2000 did not provide a clear a definition of the actor of 
insider dealing. It limited the scope of insider by providing that ‗any person‘ must 
obtain the inside information by virtue of his or her position. The ‗position‘ as a term 
made for a shortage of the law by not including secondary insiders and because it is 
based on the meaning of Arabic rather than it in English.  
 
Finally, this chapter showed that the ESCA Law 2000 suffers from a deficiency for not 
making illegal improper activities such as ‗leaking of inside information‘ and 
‗procuring‘ or ‗encouraging‘ another person to deal, which is dissimilar to the UK law 
and the DIFC law which have criminalised these behaviours. The ESCA Law 2000 
prohibits only the exploitation of inside information, although it does not clarify what 
amounts to the exploitation of inside information. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
REGULATION OF MARKET MANIPULATION 
 
4.1 Introduction 
  
Market manipulation
600
 is a type of financial crime that is covered by the term ‗market 
abuse.‘ Following the insider dealing chapter, the issue of market manipulation is the 
second main topic of this thesis. Market manipulation is different from insider dealing.  
The practice of insider dealing is based on taking advantage of inside information, while 
market manipulation involves conduct which creates a misleading impression about the 
market. There is no doubt that both insider dealing and manipulative behaviour are 
damaging the efficiency and integrity of the marketplace and are eroding investor 
confidence.  
 
A body of laws worldwide seeks to protect the financial market and control the 
injurious effects of manipulation. Many countries have adopted regulations to protect 
against market manipulation. Even though legislation fails to provide a definition of 
manipulation, scholars have debated extensively in order to put forward a definition of 
market manipulation.  Market manipulation refers to various forms of practices and 
techniques that a manipulator uses to perpetrate his/her manipulative schemes. For this 
reason, legislators have long endeavoured to promulgate laws in order to prevent and 
limit such practices. 
 
This chapter aims to examine the regulation of market manipulation in the law of the 
UAE. This will be explored by means of a comparative study with the Financial 
                                                 
600
 The phrase ‗market manipulation‘ is also known as price manipulation. Market manipulation is 
preferred by the European Commission and used in Nordic and German law. See Hanson, , pp.256-257 
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Services and Markets Act 2000 (FSMA 2000), in the UK, and the Dubai International 
Financial Centre Law No.12 of 2004.  The opinions and attitudes of legal experts 
toward the Emirates Securities & Commodities Authority and Market Law 2000 (ESCA 
Law 2000), will also be presented and analysed. Thus, the main questions that will be 
raised in this chapter are to what extent the regulation of market manipulation under the 
UAE jurisdiction is efficient, and how has it been implemented and enforced in order to 
prevent damaging market integrity, to protect investors from manipulative schemes and 
to safeguard investors‘ confidence. 
 
In order to understand these questions and the aforementioned issues, this chapter will 
be divided into several main sections. These sections will look at the issue of market 
manipulation. The section on the definition of market manipulation will discuss whether 
market manipulation is a type of fraud or not, and forms of market manipulation under 
ESCA Law 2000. The discussion illustrates inadequacies in areas where they arise.  The 
last two sections look at market power manipulation with the case of the Dubai Islamic 
Bank as an example of market manipulation practices. 
 
4.2 Market manipulation 
 
As an illegal activity, market manipulation has been regulated for a long time due to its 
negative impact on market efficiency and investors' confidence in the market.
601
 
However, manipulations in modern financial markets are often carried out in concealed 
ways that are not easily detectable. Manipulation practices are still inadequately 
controlled, particularly in most emerging markets where market regulations are not 
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 Hui Huang, 'Redefining Market Manipulation in Australia: The Role of an Implied Intent Element', 
(2009) 27 Company and Securities Law Journal, p. 8.  
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strong enough.
602
  The UAE stock market is considered to be one such emerging market 
seeking to prevent manipulation. The draft of the ESCA Law 2000 provides evidence 
that the legislators believed there was a direct link between excessive speculation and 
the stock market crash of 1998.   
 
Examining the status quo of diversified regulatory regimes in many jurisdictions shows 
that it has been very challenging to adequately control the whole range of market 
manipulation.
603
 In spite of the fact that this is a longstanding issue as well as an 
influential factor in the early years of financial markets, it cannot be said that market 
manipulation is no longer important.
604
  
 
Generally, the term 'market manipulation' is used to refer to a number of practices 
deemed damaging to the capital markets. Market manipulation may refer to conduct in 
active trading or perhaps simply to circulating information about a particular security or 
company.
605
 Any discussion about the topic of manipulating securities must first deal 
with the problem of defining market manipulation.
606
  Finding a definition of market 
manipulation is an extremely difficult issue, particularly in a legal context.  
 
Market manipulation has been defined in various ways. First, in the case of Ernst & 
Ernst v. Hochfelder in the USA defined manipulation as ‗virtually a term of art when 
used in connection with securities markets.‘607 Second, Goldwasser admitted that 
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working Paper, April 7, 2004, New York University, p 4.   Available at  
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 Mei et al.  
605
 WJ Carroll, 'Market Manipulation: An International Comparison‘, (2002) 9 Journal of Financial 
Crime 4, p 300- 307. 
606
 Vivien Goldwasser, Stock Market Manipulation and Short Selling (Melbourne: Centre for Corporate 
Law and Securities Regulation, 1999), p. 99. 
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 Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976). Available at 
:http://supreme.justia.com/us/425/185/case.html . Accessed (18/09/2010).     
 206 
 
‗manipulation is difficult to define, but manipulative practices and schemes are usually 
readily identifiable‘.608 Moreover, the Court of Appeal in the US defined market 
manipulation as ‗the creation of an artificial price by planned action‘.609 An artificial 
price means that prices do not ‗reflect basic forces of supply and demand‘.610 In 
addition, Cox makes clear that market manipulation refers to ‗classic forms of 
manipulation [which] are behaviour that have the effect of artificially distorting the 
market price of the stock in question, typically by appeals to the speculative impulses of 
other investors‘.611 According to Thel, manipulative practices are ‗those that undermine 
the proper functioning of securities markets‘. 612  They relate to the dishonest means of 
conduct that persuade people to trade in securities or forcefully push their price to the 
point of artificiality.
613
 In the same context, Wright alleged that market manipulation is 
a form of fraud by stating that ‗market manipulation is just one aspect of commercial 
fraud. Many cases of market manipulation are criminal only in the most technical 
sense‘.614  
 
There is a large degree of consensus that the definition of market manipulation should 
be suitable for and capable of encapsulating all intelligent offences which feature 
‗ingenious and innovative schemes‘615 that might yet take place in the market. 
Therefore, the definition of manipulation must be very flexible. In fact, there are two 
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 Goldwasser, p. 154. 
609
 General Foods Corp. v. Brannan, 17 F.2d 220 (7
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 Cir., 1048), p 231  
610
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 Lomnicka, Preventing and Controlling the Manipulation of Financial Markets, p. 298. 
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major attempts to solve the problem of defining manipulation, as Lomnicka observes;
616
 
firstly identifying and classifying the known cases of manipulation in the market, and 
secondly, attempting to extract the basic features of market manipulation with the 
intention of capturing all possible forms of manipulation within an all-purpose 
definition. The same author considers that the majority of legal authorities have chosen 
the first approach, as it tries to meet two ‗opposing imperatives of flexibility‘ in two 
ways.  The first one does so by catching all forms of market manipulation and the 
second one clearly provides the most common forms of manipulation in the market. The 
difficulty in finding a precise and flexible definition is not new, but there are particular 
difficulties in defining the term in such a way that it will give equal weight to both. 
Therefore, the following section attempts to define market manipulation.  
 
4.3 Market Manipulation Defined 
 
Defining market manipulation is, as has been stated, a very complicated issue. 
Nevertheless, a workable definition of market manipulation that can describe exactly 
which practices are illegal is required, before it can be effectively regulated.  
 
In fact, manipulation refers to activities that intentionally ‗mislead investors‘ by means 
of creating artificial market activities, through ‗wash sales, matched orders, or rigged 
prices,‘617 and other practices that constitute market manipulation. These practices 
interfere with the operation of the normal market forces of supply and demand. As 
                                                 
616
 Ibid., pp 297-304. 
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Lomnicka
618
 points out, the problem lies in differentiating between legitimate market 
activities, which are ‗commercially motivated‘ activities, and illegitimate activities that 
are often referred to as ‗manipulative‘ conduct. Thus, it is not always easy to distinguish 
between practices that are acceptable and those which are not.
 619
  
 
   
On the other hand, the US Securities Exchange Act 1934 (SEA 1934) which prohibits 
market manipulation failed to define the term 'market manipulation' precisely.
620
 It is 
obvious that the purpose of securities legislation is ‗to give a greater degree of 
definiteness to the concept of manipulation and to supply an enforcement and 
preventive mechanism.‘621 Indeed, neither the Federal Law No. 4 of 2000 concerning 
the ESCA Law 2000, nor FSMA 2000 mentioned the practice of market manipulation 
by name, whereas the DIFC law No.12 of 2004  introduced this term by addressing 
‗fraud and market manipulation,‘ followed by the phrase ‗prohibits manipulation 
practices‘ in section 36.622 Again, the ESCA Law 2000 has failed to define market 
abuse precisely by name, as the Legal Consultant at the Securities and Commodities 
Authority (SCA) makes clear:   
The current legislation does not identify market abuse by name, 
instead it included rules and provisions included the 
incrimination of base actions, thus these actions can be extracted 
from the original incrimination texts, the incrimination 
provisions number 40, 41, 42, 43 [ of ESCA Law 2000] are all 
punitive provisions, and everything incriminated in these four 
provisions are considered market abuse, and therefore, all of the 
legislations do not define the market abuse… and maybe there is 
a shortage in some provisions, or lack of precisions in the 
                                                 
618
 Eva Lomnicka, ‗Preventing and Controlling the Manipulation of Financial Markets: Towards a 
Definition of 'Market Manipulation',(2001)  8 Journal of Financial Crime 4, pp. 297-304 (hereinafter, 
Eva Lomnicka, Preventing and Controlling the Manipulation of Financial Markets). 
619
 Ibid.  
620
 Vivien Goldwasser, ‗Regulating Manipulation in Securities Markets: Historical Perspectives and 
Policy Rationales‘, (1999) 5 Australian Journal of Legal History, pp.149-200. 
621
 Loss and Seligman,  p. 1125. 
622
 Section 36 of DIFC law No.12 of 2004. 
 209 
 
picture of every crime, giving an impression that there is no 
provisions covering market abuse actions.
 623 
  
 
 
 
In addition, EC Market Abuse Directive also introduced market manipulation by 
name.
624
 However, in general it is rare for legislative language to define or even refer to 
manipulation practices by name.
625
 Nevertheless, the primary objective of all legislation 
in question is to prohibit the practice of manipulation in the marketplace. It is therefore 
alleged that due to this failure to explicitly define manipulation in legislation, the task of 
defining this term is effectively left entirely to the law courts and governing regulatory 
agencies.
626 
As Judge Ayssor, who was interviewed, noted:  
Definitions are important, but being heavily involved in giving 
definitions will deviate the Law from the good legislative 
formulae. For example, I cannot define the crime of illegal 
manipulation due to its flexible nature that changes to take 
new forms. In other words, I might give an incomplete 
definition that does not cover all the manipulation market 
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behaviours as illegal actions. Therefore, I think that this issue 
should be left to the judicial interpretation.
627
 
 
Nevertheless, various judicial authorities rely on different systems. This dispute leads to 
different approaches to essential concepts, such as providing definitions of market 
manipulation and the types of sanctions imposed.
628
 Alternatively, the report of the 
International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) motivates governments 
individually to formulate laws that ‗proscribe manipulation with sufficient clarity and 
flexibility to allow prosecution of novel manipulative schemes‘.629 
 
However, before turning to the discussion of market of manipulation practices below, it 
is necessary to provide elements or characteristics of constituting market manipulation. 
These characteristics have been used by courts, regulatory statutes and commentators
630
 
in an attempt to define market manipulation.  This will be addressed in the following 
section in more detail. 
 
4.4 Elements constituting market manipulation 
 
The difficulty surrounding the issue of whether particular behaviour is manipulation or 
not has created an academic debate.
 
A number of legal academics have sought to define 
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the essential elements of market manipulation and have suggested various solutions to 
this problem. For example, Fischel and Ross provided a vital element in the definition 
of market manipulation. They argue that manipulative conduct tries to: ‗(i) interfere 
with the free play of supply and demand; (ii) induce people to trade; or (iii) force a 
security price to an artificial level.‘631  However, having discussed these characteristics 
in detail, they concluded that none of them is directly related to a practical definition of 
what constitutes market manipulation.  As illustrated by Fischel and Ross, defining 
market manipulation is a subjective process and not an objective one. In other words, 
they allege that it is impracticable to obtain objective evidence to distinguish 
conclusively between manipulative and non-manipulative transactions.
632
 This 
distinction rests on whether the manipulator has a dishonest intent to effect a change in 
prices of securities. Consequently, market manipulation could be defined as profitable 
transactions which include ‗bad‘ intent.633 Thus, if behaviour satisfies the following 
three conditions, it should count as manipulative conduct: ‗(1) the trading is intended to 
move prices in a certain direction; (2) the trader has no belief that the prices would 
move in this direction but for the trade; and (3) the resulting profit comes solely from 
the trader‘s ability to move prices‘.634 However, after providing a discussion of the 
regulation of market manipulation, Fischel and Ross concluded that market 
manipulation is ‗[r]elated to the field of fraud - but not altogether a part of it as a matter 
of legal analysis‘.635  
 
There are elements and requirements for defining market manipulation. These help to 
identify behaviour which constitutes market manipulation. Accordingly, Avgouleas
636
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defined market manipulation on the basis of economic theory and analysed the 
definition of market manipulation, dividing it into four elements. The first element is an 
effects-based approach which pays attention to the creation of artificial prices or false 
and/or misleading impressions. This approach identifies activities that amount to market 
manipulation. The second is the intent –based approach which focuses upon the 
manipulator‘s intent. The requisite intent for market manipulation is subjective rather 
than objective.
637
 The third element combines the first two, thus requiring analysis of 
the effects of price artificiality or/and misleading impressions, as well as the 
manipulator‘s intent. This third approach has been followed by the SEA of 1934 and US 
decisional law and also requires proof that others have been induced to trade. The last 
approach is the manipulating market power approach, 
638
 which refers to the exercise of 
an individual‘s or group's ability to control the market, which is categorized as a 
‗corner‘ or ‗squeeze‘. 639  This section will focus on the first two elements, due to the 
belief that these are consistent with the actus reus and mens rea, respectively, of the 
offence of market manipulation, which are considered to be the necessary constituents 
of a crime under the UAE law system. For further explanation on this subject see 
Chapter Two.  
  
(1) An effect-based approach 
 
The effect-based approach is assumed to refer to the creation of artificial prices or false 
and/or misleading impressions. These activities prohibited under section 118 of FSMA 
2000. It is also adopted by the DIFC law No.12 of 2004, as prohibitive behaviour which 
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leads to price artificiality or/and misleading appearance.
 640
 Therefore, creating an 
artificial price and creating a misleading impression will be examined in turn.  
  
(i) Creating an artificial price  
 
An artificial price plays a vital role in any case of market manipulation
641 
since it is 
considered that market manipulation is involved in creating an artificial price in a 
securities market.
642
 The conception of an artificial price refers to a price that is not 
obtained by reasonable forces of supply and demand.
643
 It is therefore a ‗non-
equilibrium price‘ in the terminology of economics.644  In the US case of Great 
Western Distributors, Inc v Brannan, it was held that an artificial price is ‗a price 
which would be different if the price-influencing efforts were absent‘.645 An artificial 
price does not mirror the forces of supply and demand in the market place.   
 
The FSMA 2000 does not explicitly mention artificial prices, but instead refers to any 
conduct leading to misleading, false or deceptive investors in the market place.
646
 The 
DIFC law No.12 of 2004 , on the other hand, cites the term ‗an artificial price‘ in 
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section 36, when discussing prohibited behaviour which leads to price artificiality by a 
person‘s conduct that ‗results in or contributes to, or may result in or contribute to an 
artificial price‘.647 The ESCA Law 2000 does not explicitly refer to an artificial price as 
a term, but mentions fictitious transactions instead.
648
  However, using the term 
‗artificial price‘ is not in itself significant, as long as behaviour which causes artificial 
prices is prohibited.  
 
The IOSCO provides clarity for the definition of price artificiality by highlighting ‗the 
divergence of price from the legitimate forces of supply and demand‘.649 In order to 
show beyond reasonable doubt that an artificial price has been created, evidence should 
be gathered to show that ‗prices did not follow legitimate economic forces‘.650 The 
IOSCO text states:   
One way to do this is to establish what the level of price or 
price relationships would have been, or should have been, had 
the suspected manipulator not illegitimately interfered with 
the normal process of price formation. In establishing 
normative levels or price relationships, it is important to 
identify as many relevant market forces as possible and to 
ascertain their effect. 
651
  
 
In reality, distinguishing between artificial and non-artificial prices is still a difficult 
issue and neither literature nor case law has brought forth a satisfactory solution. 
Fischel and Ross
652
 argue that the concept of artificial price ‗does not distinguish 
manipulative trades from legitimate trades‘. Easterbrook653 also strongly criticises the 
definition of manipulation and argues that artificial price is impossible to distinguish. 
                                                 
647
 See; Section 36 under Chapter 1 of DIFC law No.12 of 2004. 
648
  Article 26/2 of ESCA law 2000, it is directly addressing to intermediaries and their representatives by 
abstain them from any conducts which lead to ‗…any fictitious transactions not conducive to a true 
transfer of the Securities or funds which are the subject of the dealing.‘ 
649
 IOSCO, Market Manipulation,, p. 13. 
650
 IOSCO, Market Manipulation,,p 13 ; this has been pointed by Avgouleas, The Mechanics and 
Regulation of Market Abuse,, p. 109. 
651
 Ibid. 
652
 Fischel and Ross, Should the Law Prohibit Manipulation,, p.507. 
653
 See F.H. Easterbrook, ‗Monopoly, Manipulation, and the Regulation of Futures Markets‘ (1986) 59 
the Journal of Business, pp. S103-S127 
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(ii) Misleading  Impressions 
 
Misleading impressions are formed when a course of conduct creates false appearances 
in respect of demand for, or the supply of, the investment in question. For example, if a 
person purchases a company's share and then he/she disseminates false information 
which pushes up the price of the relevant shares, his/her act produced a misleading 
impression by disseminating false information.  Afterwards, he/she is able to sell the 
shares at a profit. This course of conduct is known as ‗pump and dump‘.654 Proving that 
a misleading impression has been created is easier than proving that an artificial price 
has been created.
655
  The test for whether this offence has been committed or not is the 
so-called reasonable person or regular user test.
656
 In order to test whether any person‘s 
course of conduct has created a misleading impression, a certain condition must apply. 
If the person‘s conduct has not met acceptable standards of behaviour which are likely 
to be expected from a regular user of the market, then this represents market abuse.
657
 
The issue of ‗regular user‘ was analysed more extensively in section 2.5.2 (c) in Chapter 
two, where market abuse in the UK jurisdiction was discussed.   
 
A real example of a false or misleading impression in the UK occurred in a case 
involving the Shell, the oil company.
 
On August 24, 2004 in the UK, a Final Notice was 
issued by Financial Services Authority (FSA), against Shell.
 658
 Shell had produced false 
and misleading information about its hydrocarbon reserves from 1998 to 2000. When it 
was eventually admitted that the information was misleading, Shell's share price 
                                                 
654
 Alexander ,‘Insider Dealing and Market Abuse: The Financial Services and Markets Act 2000‘, pp. 
24-25. 
655 
Avgouleas, The Mechanics and Regulation of Market Abuse,, p.108. 
656
 A definition of regular user is under Section 118 (10) of FSMA 2000, a regular user is as ‗in relation to 
a particular market, a reasonable person who regularly deals on that market in investments of the kind in 
question‘. 
657
 Alexander, ‗Insider Dealing and Market Abuse: The Financial Services and Markets Act 2000‘, 
p. 25. 
658
 Financial Services Authority (FSA), Final Notice, The ―Shell‖ Transporting and Trading Company, 
p.l.c. (―STT‖) and The Royal Dutch Petroleum Company NV (―RDP‖), 24 August 2004, Available at 
www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/final/shell_24aug04.pdf . Accessed (19/09/2010). 
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collapsed by 7.5 %.  Shell‘s market capitalisation decreased by approximately £2.9 
billion. Shell‘s conduct was caught by section 118(2)(b) of FSMA 2000 because it was  
likely to have given a regular market user a false or misleading impression as to the 
supply of, or demand for, or as to the price or value of, investments of the kind in 
question.
659
  Therefore, the FSA imposed a £17 million financial penalty on Shell for 
market abuse.
 660
  
 
As mentioned earlier, DIFC Law No.12 of 2004 prohibits behaviour which produces a 
‗misleading appearance‘.661 This corresponds, to some degree, to section 118(2)(b) of 
FSMA 2000,
662
 particularly in terms of creating a false or misleading impression in 
order to induce others to trade.  ESCA Law 2000 includes a provision
663
 in relation to 
misleading information or statements.  Misleading information must affect a security‘s 
price and an investor's decision to invest; otherwise the perpetrator would not be 
considered to have violated the provision. This issue will be examined further in the 
subsection headed information based manipulation, below.  
  
(2) The intent –based approach 
 
Intent is undeniably an important condition for criminal courts to impose penalties for 
market manipulation. If a ‗manipulator‘ did not show any intention to manipulate 
                                                 
659
  Bennett,, pp.180-185. 
660
 Financial Services Authority (FSA), Final Notice, The ―Shell‖ Transporting and Trading Company, 
p.l.c. (―STT‖) and The Royal Dutch Petroleum Company NV (―RDP‖), 24 August 2004. Available at 
www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/final/shell_24aug04.pdf.  Accessed (19/09/2010). 
661
 Section 36 under Chapter 1 of DIFC law No.12 of 2004 states that ‗A person shall not, in the DIFC or 
elsewhere, directly or indirectly, engage or participate in any act, practice or course of conduct relating to 
Investments that the person knows or reasonably ought to know: 
(a) results in or contributes to, or may result in or contribute to, a misleading appearance of trading 
activity in, or an artificial price for, Investments; or 
(b) ……….‘ 
662
 Section 118 (2) (b) of FSMA 2000 states ‗…(b) the behaviour is likely to give a regular user of the 
market a false or misleading impression as to the supply of, or demand for, or as to the price or value of, 
investments of the kind in question; …‘ 
663
 See Article 36 of ESCA law 2000 which states that ‗The furnishing of false information, statements or 
data such as to affect the market value of Securities and an investor's decision to invest or otherwise shall 
not be permitted.‘ 
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securities markets, he/she will be acquitted due to the absence of any intention to 
commit market manipulation.
 664
 It is not easy, however, to establish any direct evidence 
of intent to manipulate a certain transaction unless the manipulator admits to this, which 
is of course unlikely. Such evidence might be inferred from a succession of 
circumstances that have been established prima facie
665
 whereby it may be assumed that 
the individuals accused of market abuse must have acted ‗with the intent that their 
combined acquisitions would cause an artificial price increase and enable them by 
pressure to unjustly liquidate their holdings at a profit‘.666 Most legal definitions of 
market manipulation require strong proof which shows that manipulators either had the 
intention to cause changes in the price of securities, or to persuade market users to trade 
in the securities affected by the manipulative scheme.  Many attempts have been made 
by academic researchers to provide a clear definition of market control manipulation 
that focuses on the traders‘ conduct or intent more than the impact on prices of 
securities.
667
   
 
There is broad agreement that the defendant must not only have known that the price of 
the relevant securities would be affected as a result of his/her actions, but also that the 
defendant acted with the intention of creating an artificial price.
668
 However, it is not 
always feasible to show intent to create a misleading impression, despite proving intent 
to create an artificial price.   
 
 
 
                                                 
664 
See in this sense at Avgouleas, The Mechanics and Regulation of Market Abuse,, p. 111- 112. 
665
 Jerry W Markham, ‗Manipulation of Commodity Futures Prices—The Unprosecutable Crime‘, (1991) 
8 Yale Journal on Regulation 2, pp. 281-390. 
666
 This is quoted by Markham, pp 281-390. Markham referred  to the case of  G.H. Miller & Co. v. 
United States, 260 F.2d 286 (7th Cir. 1958). 
667  
Avgouleas, The Mechanics and Regulation of Market Abuse,, p. 111- 112. 
668
 Perdue, ‗Manipulation of Futures Markets: Redefining the Offence‘,,  p. 375. 
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4.5 Market manipulation: Is it a type of fraud?   
 
The nature of the relationship between market manipulation and fraud must now be 
examined. Both of these offences involve conduct which induces another party into 
believing something that is false. In other words, the link between fraud and 
manipulation is that they have similar techniques and purposes. This similarity can be 
seen by considering an example of a person who opens a number of accounts with 
several brokers and then effects transactions in which he/she  simultaneously plays the 
role of a buyer and a seller of the same securities. He/she artificially causes the price of 
the securities to increase by this series of trades, thus inducing other investors to believe 
that there has been an increase in activity related to the securities, contrary to the truth. 
This behaviour therefore involves dishonest methods and could be considered to be both 
a form of fraud and manipulation simultaneously. In fact, both fraud and manipulation 
lead to the same consequence of creating a misleading impression so as to induce others 
to trade. 
 
According to Fischel and Ross, the difference/similarity between manipulation and 
fraud is not clear,
669
 though other commentators have insisted that manipulation comes 
under the scope of fraud, but it is 'not altogether a part of it as a matter of legal 
analysis‘.670  In R v De Berenger,671 in the UK, practices of market abuse were found to 
refer to fraudulent schemes, as Lord Ellenborough C.J noted: 
The purpose itself is mischievous, it strikes at the price of a 
vendible commodity in the market, and if it gives it a fictitious 
price, by means of false rumours, it is a fraud levelled against all 
the public, for it is against all such as may possibly have anything 
to do with the funds on that particular day.
 672
   
 
                                                 
669
 Fischel and Ross, , pp. 503-547. 
670
  Loss and Seligman, p. 1119. 
671
 R v De Berenger (1814) 3 M&S 67 (KB)1105 Eng Rep 536. 
672
 Ibid. 
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In the context of fraud as a crime, the UK imposed the Prevention of Fraud (Investment) 
Act of 1939, which was replaced and to some extent amended by the Prevention of 
Fraud (Investment) Act of 1958. This law regarded a false statement offence to induce 
an investment trade as a serious crime, regardless of whether it was committed 
dishonestly or recklessly, or by dishonestly concealing a material fact.
 
The Financial 
Services Act 1986 re-enacted this provision to a certain extent under section 47(1).
 
FSMA 2000, which replaced it, largely reformulates the same principles in section 
397,
673
 although section 397 distinguishes between misleading statements and practices 
and misleading conduct. The purpose of this distinction clarifies the intention of the 
British Parliament to extend the scope of responsibility, so that the offence is wide 
enough to catch conduct which would be classed as market abuse but might not 
otherwise attract legal responsibility under the wider fraud framework.
674
 FSMA 2000 
thus gives a wide interpretation to the fraudulent nature of market manipulation. This 
tendency contrasts with the DIFC law as well as the ESCA Law 2000.    
 
In the UAE, fraud as a crime refers to the use of fraudulent means. The criminal offence 
of fraud can be found under Article 339/1 of Federal Criminal Law No 3 of 1987. It is 
committed by using fraudulent means which would defraud the victim and lead him/her 
to consent. This provision against general fraud covers practices such as fraudulent acts. 
Nevertheless, the UAE‘s regulator has limited the definition of fraudulent means.675 
Therefore, if the action does not fall into one of these fraudulent means, no crime of 
fraud will be committed. Furthermore, the intention to commit fraud is required. It can 
                                                 
673
Rider, et al., Market Abuse and Insider Dealing  (2002), p. 123. 
674
 Avgouleas, The Mechanics and Regulation of Market Abuse, ,p. 115. 
675
The technique of fraud, under Article 339/1 of Federal Criminal Law No 3 of 1987, is considered an 
element in crime, and fraudulent processes can include such activities as disposing of the money of others 
and taking a false name or a non-valid identity. These methods of fraud are, as a whole, fraud against an 
aggrieved party. In exercising these techniques, the offender has the very specific aim of obtaining 
money. While the criminal law has identified methods of fraud, the provisions of the Federal Criminal 
Law are inadequate in countering all fraudulent techniques.  
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therefore be argued that this law is limited in its ambit and will not cover some offences 
concerning securities transactions in the marketplace.  
 
The ESCA Law 2000 does not explicitly refer to fraud. This may perhaps indicate that 
the UAE‘s regulator does not consider that any offence committed in the securities 
market reaches the degree of fraud. The regulator did, however prohibit any practices 
leading to artificial transactions or creation of misleading information. In contrast, the 
DIFC law No.12 of 2004  used ‗fraud and market manipulation‘ as a title in section 36 
and prohibited fraud in clause (b). This might lead to the conclusion that the DIFC law 
No.12 of 2004  can distinguish between fraud and market manipulation. However, the 
problem here  is the lack of an explicit standard as there is no guidance as to what kind 
of activities are considered to be fraudulent under the DIFC law No.12 of 2004 . In spite 
of this problem, nonetheless, broadening the limit of liability for abusive market 
practices such as fraudulent behaviour and other forms of misconduct does mean that 
the DIFC‘s regulator is more restrictive than the ESCA regulator.  
 
 4.6 The Forms of Market Manipulation  
 
Market manipulation, as mentioned earlier, refers to the ‗illegal practice of raising or 
lowering a security's price by creating the appearance of active trading‘.676 The purpose 
of manipulators involved in market manipulation is to change the price of securities and 
then take advantage from these changes, in a manner which involves creating a 
misleading impression at the expense of others.
677
 Increasing the shares price is the 
purpose of most manipulation practices, rather than decreasing it. This is because 
                                                 
676
 See:  Garner, Black‘s Law Dictionary. 
677
 Iain Macneil , ‗market manipulation‘ , The New Oxford Companion to Law, by Peter Cane and Joanne 
Conaghan. Oxford University Press. Available 
at http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t287.e1400   Accessed (2 
/11/ 2009).  
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restrictions on short-selling make it hard to benefit from a decrease in price.
678
   The 
various forms of manipulation will be considered in the following sections, in order to 
determine how relevant laws deal with these illegal practices and where there are 
shortcomings. This will assist our understanding of how these manipulation practices 
work and how they are committed. In reality, market manipulation practices take 
numerous forms and it is therefore difficult to list them all. Legislators cannot define all 
these illegal practices because they are diverse and innovative.  
 
To achieve the aims of the current study, the three categories of market manipulation 
practices identified by academics will be examined: information-based manipulation, 
artificial transactions and price manipulations. 
 
 
4.6.1 Information-based manipulation 
 
Information-based manipulation practices are known to have two forms: pump and 
dump, and trash and cash. The former consists of disseminating misleading positive 
information, whereas the latter consists of disseminating misleading negative 
information.
679 
Allen & Gale defined information–based manipulation as ‗releasing 
false information or spreading false rumours‘.680 The different forms of information-
based manipulation practices include the provision of misleading statements in the form 
of advice or recommendations. Thus, information–based manipulation could primarily 
be committed by financial advisers, brokers,
681
 and those who instruct others to release 
false information about their companies which misleads the marketplace. According to 
                                                 
678
 Rajesh K. Aggarwal and Guojun Wu, ‗Stock Market Manipulation - Theory and Evidence‘ (March 11, 
2003) Working paper, Univ. of Michigan, p 2. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=474582 or 
doi:10.2139/ssrn.474582 Accessed (19/09/2010). 
679
 .Swan, Market Abuse Regulation, p 98. 
680
 F. Allen, And D.Gale,, ‗Stock-price manipulation‘, (1992) 5 The Review of Financial Studies, pp. 503–
529.They categorised market manipulation into three types; information-based manipulation, action-based 
manipulation and trade-based manipulation. 
681
 Avgouleas, The Mechanics and Regulation of Market Abuse, p. 119. 
 222 
 
this view, information-based manipulation is divided into two categories; disseminating 
incorrect statements of material facts and spreading false rumours. They are discussed 
in turn. 
 
(i) Disseminating false statements of material facts  
 
The first category of information-based manipulation is the dissemination of false 
statements which include misleading information relating to a legal entity (issuers). 
Financial analysts or other market professionals, such as brokers, may give out 
misleading recommendations and guidance in order to increase the value of their own 
investment profits, or fail to disclose various conflicts of interests.
682
 The UAE case,  
An interviewee who is a specialist broker said:     
What are the broker‘s responsibilities, roles and rules that he/she  
should follow? In other words, what kind of information does 
he/she  have to provide and retain? This does not exist as you will 
find people who  give information based on his/her mind‘s work 
seeking nothing but his/her personal benefits...30% of Mediation 
companies in the marketplace do this by providing misleading 
pieces of information and advice to the client. He/she  might be 
either telling lies, giving incorrect pieces of information for a 
personal interest or pretends to be omniscient. In doing so, one 
has been told an incorrect piece of information which might 
conflict with the regulating bodies that call for disclosure and 
transparency.
683
  
  
Another anonymous interviewee, who works as a specialist in the Dubai Financial 
Market said that it is illegal for a broker to give any tips. He stated:  
A broker should not give advice to the investor and if it is 
revealed that the broker gave the investor incorrect tips or 
information, he/she will be legally responsible and punished. 
This may be detected by a complaint from the investor. 
684
 
 
                                                 
682
 ibid.  
683
 Anonymous (Broker) Lari Financial Services Company, Interview conducted, May 2010, Abu Dhabi, 
United Arab Emirates. 
684
Anonymous 3, Dubai Financial Market, Interview conducted, April 2010, Dubai, United Arab 
Emirates. 
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False statements or information can be provided verbally, in writing or by any other 
means. The perpetrators also often resort to the media for publicity. The legislator in the 
UAE has not determined any specific person who may provide such information. As a 
result, any person who provides such information or statements may be held legally 
responsible under the criminal offence of market abuse. However, UAE financial 
advisers and analysts often take advantage of media coverage of their pronouncements 
and financial analyses. The problem here is that these people are in a sensitive place 
where it is easy to influence investors by passing on misleading recommendations or 
suggesting investment strategies. Such conduct, of course, involves manipulating the 
prices of securities. For example, in the UAE, TV companies often invite financial 
advisers to analyse and comment on the securities market, and this could include a 
discussion of a company‘s shares and the (positive) trend of securities. It is possible that 
they own that company‘s securities or avoid reference to conflicting interests. If the 
financial analyst makes untrue statements or gives out information that affects the 
market value of securities and an investor‘s decision to invest, this is considered a 
criminal offence, which constitutes market manipulation in accordance with Article 36 
of the ESCA law 2000. This Article states that ‗the furnishing of false information, 
statements or data ...to affect the market value of Securities and an investor's decision to 
invest‘ is not permitted. Such action also violates Article 14 of SCA Decision No (48/R) 
of 2008 concerning the Financial Consultation and Financial Analysis.
685
 This Article 
sets out 14 obligations regarding financial analysis that should be followed. Clause 11 
of this Article forbids financial analysts ‗to publish or promote any false statements or 
information in connection with the position of the companies whose securities are listed 
in the market‘.   
                                                 
685
 See Article 16 (2) of ESCA Decision No (48/R) of 2008 concerning the Financial Consultation and 
Financial Analysis, prohibits any financial consultation and financial analysis ‗to do an act intended, 
whether directly or indirectly, to mislead the traders, or disseminate or promote any false statements or 
information on the conditions of the market or the traders therein issued‘.  
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A flaw in this Article is crucial. If a financial analyst fails to take proper care over the 
information or statement he/she provides, or he/she does not know to what extent that 
information or statement is true, it is not clear whether he/she will be considered to be 
criminally responsible. Moreover, if a director or issuer recklessly makes a misleading 
statement to the marketplace in relation to his/her profits market, it is clear that is he/she  
is not liable under ESCA Law 2000, because the ESCA Law 2000 requires the intention 
(i.e dishonesty) to induce investors. If there is no intention, he/she will not be guilty. 
Farghaly
686
 uses the argument that he/she can be held responsible managerially if the 
disclosure violated professional disclosure regulations. Nevertheless, he admits that the 
ESCA Law 2000 does not criminalise such reckless misleading statements.  This issue 
is not regulated in the ESCA Law 2000. The fact that the ESCA Law 2000 does not 
criminalise reckless action contrasts with FSMA 2000 in the UK. Judge Al Hammadi 
commented in an interview: 
As a general rule, the Federal criminal law penalises any person 
who commits a reckless or deliberate action. Even if deliberate 
action has not been explicitly stated in any of the law article, 
perpetrator has legal responsibility towards his/her actions, be 
they intentional or reckless.  In the ESCA Law 2000, however, it 
is different because crimes and offences must be committed 
intentionally so if he/she  discloses information as a result of 
his/her neglect and recklessness, he/she  will not be punished 
criminally as long as the legislator does not mention it in the law 
because he/she  did not commit it intentionally. 
687
   
 
In the UK law, the criminal offence of making a misleading and reckless statement 
concerning the stock market is found under section 397(1)(c) of FSMA 2000, when a 
person carries out a reckless act in the form of a misleading, false or deceptive statement 
                                                 
686
 Mazhar Farghaly Ali (PhD in law) Legal Consultant at the Securities & Commodities Authority, 
Interview conducted  in May 2010  , Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates. 
687
 Judge Hassan Al Hammadi,(PhD in Law)  Former Chairman of the Appeals panel in the Federal Court 
of Appeal. Currently he is a Head of Technical office in the Federal Supreme Court, Interview conducted, 
June 2010, Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates. 
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(dishonestly or otherwise) or a promise or a forecast. Section 397(1) of  FSMA 2000 
deals with three offences of making misleading statements which will be committed if a 
person does one of the following: first, if he makes a statement, promise or forecast,  
knowing it to be misleading, false or deceptive to a material extent; second, when a 
person conceals any material facts in a dishonest manner, whether or not in connection 
with a statement, promise or forecast made by him or her; and finally, when a person 
makes a misleading, false or deceptive statement to a material extent as a result of a 
reckless action.
688
 
 
 The DIFC law No.12 of 2004  follows UK law to a certain extent, in relation to 
criminalising reckless conduct. Section 41(1) (a) of DIFC law No.12 of 2004   states 
that a ‗person shall not in the DIFC or elsewhere, induce another person to deal in 
Investments: (a) by making or publishing a statement, promise or forecast if this person 
knows, or is reckless as to whether the statement is misleading, false or deceptive‘. This 
is therefore similar to FSMA 2000, as in both cases, a person may be liable for reckless 
action dishonestly or otherwise.   
 
An example of recklessness in the UK is the case of R v Rigby and Bailey,
689
 in 2005, 
where two directors were prosecuted for making reckless statements to the marketplace 
that misled investors. Rigby & Bailey were directors of the AIT Group plc (AIT), a 
                                                 
688
 397(1) of the FSMA 2000 prohibits a person to ‗(a) makes a statement, promise or forecast which he 
knows to be misleading, false or deceptive in a material particular;  
(b) dishonestly conceals any material facts whether in connection with a statement, promise or forecast 
made by him or otherwise; or 
(c) recklessly makes (dishonestly or otherwise) a statement, promise or forecast which is misleading, false 
or deceptive in a material particular‘. 
689
  R v. Rigby and Bailey, FSA/PN/091/2005 18 August 2005 , sentence hearing, 7 October 2005, see 
also comments regarding this case ; S. Hatt & R. Burger, ‗ ―If in doubt count it out!‖: a review of the AIT 
criminal trial‘  (2007) 15 Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance 1, pp. 108-115; Available at  
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/Library/Communication/PR/2005/091.shtml  Accessed (20/09/2010). 
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company whose shares were listed on the AIM 
690
 of the London Stock Exchange.  
Rigby and Bailey, as directors, made an announcement on 2
nd
 May 2002 by means of a 
Regulatory News Service of the London Stock Exchange. The announcement stated that 
AIT‘s turnover and profits were in line with market expectations. This statement 
increased confidence in the marketplace and therefore a number of investors bought 
AIT shares. This caused the share price to rise from 472.5 to 492.5 pence.
691
  
 
The announcement of profits included the expected revenue from three contracts.  At 
the end of the same month as this announcement was made, a statement was issued to 
update the marketplace. This stated that the previous announcement of 2
nd
 May 2002 
regarding the expectation of profits was no longer considered to be accurate 
information. One of the contracts could not be confirmed and nor, therefore, could the 
projected revenue be confirmed. This caused revenue and profits to fall to £1.1m, and 
the share price fell from 492.5p to 96.5p. In August 2005, after four months of trial by 
jury, the directors were found guilty of recklessly making a statement, promise or 
forecast which was misleading, false or deceptive to a material extent, in violation of 
section 397(1)(c) of FSMA 2000. Therefore, Rigby and Bailey were sentenced to 42 
months' and 18 months' imprisonment respectively. The sentence was reduced by the 
Court of Appeal to 18 and 9 months' imprisonment respectively.
692
   
 
 
 
                                                 
690
 The Alternative Investment Market (AIM) is a sub-market of the London Stock Exchange, allowing 
smaller companies to float shares with a more flexible regulatory system than is applicable to the main 
market.  Available at http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/alternative-investment-market-
AIM.html  Accessed (20/09/2010). 
691
 R v. Rigby and Bailey, FSA/PN/091/2005 18 August 2005 , Available at 
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/Library/Communication/PR/2005/091.shtml   Accessed (20/09/2010). 
692
 S. Hatt & R. Burger, ‗ ―If in doubt count it out!‖: a review of the AIT criminal trial‘  (2007) 15 
Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance 1, pp 108-115. 
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(ii) Spreading false rumours 
 
A rumour plays a major role in influencing securities prices traded in the market by 
creating a false impression. Consequently, this may affect the integrity of the market 
and harm investors‘ funds.  Most legislation relating to financial markets attempts to 
prevent this by criminalising such acts and imposing punishments. Spreading a false 
rumour is another form of information-based manipulation of the market place. It is a 
criminal offence under both FSMA 2000
693
 and the DIFC law No.12 of 2004 .
694
  
Despite this, these laws do not refer to this offence as spreading false ‗rumours‘. This is 
different from the ESCA Law 2000, which explicitly does so.  
 
As Avgouleas points out, the dissemination of false rumours takes the form of market 
rigging.  Market rigging includes spreading false information which is a ‗rumour‘ and 
artificial transactions behaviour. Both of these behaviours intend to create a false 
impression with regard to supply and/or demand of the relevant financial 
instrument.
695
The oldest and best known example of dissemination of false information 
as rumours in the UK was in the case of R v De Berenger. 
696
The manipulative scheme 
in this case was based on spreading false information by a group of individuals during 
the Napoleonic Wars. The rumour was about the death of Napoleon and peace between 
England and France. It was a conspiracy which aimed to affect the price of public funds 
and securities.
697
 This case well supports the argument in favour of prohibiting rumours 
                                                 
693
 Section 397 (3) of the FSMA 2000. 
694
 Section 36 (a) of DIFC law No.12 of 2004.  
695
 See Avgouleas, The Mechanics and Regulation of Market Abuse,, pp. 121, 122. Avgouleas states that 
‗Market rigging is a very old form of market manipulation. The dissemination of false information 
('rumours') might refer to political or economic affairs in general, or to the status of an issuer, and aims to 
manipulate the market price of the relevant security.   
696
 R v De Berenger (1814) 3 M&S 67 (KB)1105 Eng Rep 536. 
697
 Nathan Rothschild and De Berenger conspired in dividing their role, the former disseminated false 
news while he knew that the England was losing and the latter who was spreading rumours about death‘s 
Napoleon. see R v De Berenger (1814) 105 ER 536. 
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that are based on false information. As a result, spreading a rumour might consist of 
either disseminating false information, or creating a rumour from nothing.  
 
In the UAE, the ESCA law 2000 distinguishes between false information and rumour. It 
prohibits spreading rumour and false information in different provisions.
698
 This begs 
the question as to whether there any difference between spreading a rumour and 
disseminating false information. A legal expert in the UAE argued in an interview that 
these two concepts are in fact different.  He said:    
The difference [between the rumour and false information] has 
its own justifications because text laws differ from each other. It 
is known that data and information have a limited scope.... 
whereas the rumour is marked by being general and unrelated to 
a specific person. In Article 36 [of ESCA law 2000] the 
information is limited by its effect on the market value... while a 
rumour is more or less general in nature; a general state that 
can erode the confidence in market... . Therefore, the legislator 
addresses two different issues which he imagines may occur in 
practice: first, if the information given is  not valuable and 
doesn‘t affect the market value or the investor‘s decision, there 
is no crime; second, a rumour in itself constitutes a different 
reality to which the market could be exposed. Therefore, the 
legislator addressed it strictly because it could make the market 
lose its confidence among its investors.
 699 
   
Similarly, the spreading of false information involves rumours and vice versa. However, 
most interviewees distinguish between false information and rumour.  For example 
Farghaly defines a rumour as follows:  
A rumour is known to involve an incorrect piece of information, 
but not every piece of incorrect information is a rumour. There 
is a similarity between them. In the reviewed literature of Law, 
there is a large consensus that says that a rumour is to make up 
an incorrect piece of news/information and spread it to the 
public. This does not mean that you have created the 
information totally, but rather the information exists and you 
have changed its content.
700
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A rumour is usually circulated amongst a group of people, but it is difficult to allege that 
spreading true information is a rumour because it is just circulating this among others. 
False information should be distinguished from the circulation of true information and it 
is usually spread by insiders relating to a specific subject. 
701
  
 
As mentioned earlier, an act that creates a false impression in the UK  is a criminal 
offence under section 397(3) of FSMA 2000, which states that an offence is committed 
by  ‗any course of conduct which creates a false or misleading impression as to the 
market, price or value of any investment‘. This practice is also prohibited by section 36 
of the DIFC law No.12 of 2004 . It states that any person ‗shall not, in the DIFC or 
elsewhere, directly or indirectly, engage or participate in any act, practice or course of 
conduct [that]... (a) results in or contributes to... a misleading appearance of trading 
activity ...‘.702 Both aforementioned laws prohibit such activity without explicitly 
mentioning rumours, making the actions illegal in another way by forbidding any 
conduct which creates a false or misleading impression. This therefore may include 
rumours or any conduct which leads to a similar result.  
 
Article 39(2) of the ESCA Law 2000 prohibits spreading false rumours by stating that 
‗it shall not be permitted for any person to spread rumours regarding the selling or 
buying of shares‘. In order to reflect this provision, the Securities & Commodities 
Authority (SCA) issued Decision No. (3/R) of 2000
703
 (SCA Decision No 3 of 2000) 
that includes Article 37/C which prohibits any behaviour which ‗spreads tendentious 
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rumours regarding the selling or buying of shares‘.704 Therefore, it prohibits any person 
engaging in spreading rumours tendentiously – that is, with a definite purpose. 
However, precisely why Article 37/C of SCA Decision No 3 of 2000 should ban 
behaviour already caught by Article 39(2) of ESCA Law 2000 is not completely 
understandable. The repetition of some articles of the ESCA Law 2000, as one 
interviewee said, is confusing the investors in the market.
705
 The ESCA Law 2000 is 
nonetheless designed in general to catch all types of rumours related to selling or 
purchasing shares, regardless of its shortcomings.  
 
The limitation of the scope that legislators provide in Article 39(2) of ESCA law 2000 
creates another problem. Spreading false information (rumours) does not always have to 
be about selling or buying securities, but might instead refer to an economic crisis or 
political problem, which will certainly affect the market place and then negatively 
influence investors‘ decisions in relation to their investments. There might be rumours 
concerning financial matters related to an issuer intending to manipulate the market 
price of relevant securities. This raises a question;  if a person spreads false rumours 
about a fictitious impending financial crisis or economic and political problems in the 
securities market, is this provision sufficient to establish his/her liability?  In fact, the 
legislature limits this provision‘s scope as it applies solely to rumours relating to the 
purchase or sale of shares. Thus, it is difficult to convict a manipulator who spreads 
rumours of a wider nature.  The Article, therefore, appears flawed and needs reform. An 
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interviewee who practices as a legal consultant at SCA supported this allegation. When 
asked whether this Article had any shortcomings, he stated:  
Yes, I see that there is a flaw in the legislation. There is what is 
called commitment to sale and purchase which is another crime 
of manipulation. Influencing the price or the rumour is also 
considered manipulation. This legal text is flawed as everything 
that changes or affects the value, the securities market or the 
investor‘s investment plan should be criminalised. In other 
words, limiting the crime to the process of sales and purchase is 
incomplete which signifies a flawed law.
 706 
   
  
Article 34 of the ESCA Law 2000 obliges companies whose securities have been listed 
in the market to inform it (the market) of and publish any information which affects the 
value of securities.
707
 It may be argued that this is a measure designed to prevent market 
rumours. This Article puts the burden on issuers to disclose explanatory information. 
For example, if there is any information underlying a market rumour relating to an 
issuer, then the issuer will have to notify the market. In other words, if there are any 
ambiguous circumstances or activities relating to the issuer‘s operation, then the issuer 
is responsible for publishing explanatory information when required. Farghaly
708
 states 
that companies which have been listed in the market are required by disclosure rules to 
respond to rumours in a limited time, either to deny or to confirm the information that is 
being circulated in the marketplace.
 
However, Abdullah Alnimay,
709
 who is a specialist 
and occupies the position of manager of market surveillance in market operations, 
argues that companies have the right to delay disclosure of sensitive information for a 
considerable period of time. He points out that ‗the law is flawed as it gives the 
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company the right to respond in 10 or 18 days‘. 710 This constitutes a problem. The 
interviewee raised the question as to ‗why the company does not tell us that there is a 
circulated piece of information [in the market]‘.He added that ‗legally, we cannot 
compel the company to disclose this‘. 711  He provided an example of a practice which 
often takes place in the UAE financial market: There was a rumour relating to Arabatec 
Holding and Aabar Investment. This rumour about a possible takeover bid by Arabatec 
for Aabar circulated in the market for a long time. He added that ‗today Arabtec has 
confirmed that there is a rumour in the market stating that Arabtec has taken over 
Aabar‘. 712 
 
The UAE market actually depends on rumours. As Al Jarkass points out,
713
 ‗...investors 
in the UAE generally rely on rumours rather than on educated investment advice, which 
cause the wild gyrations in local stock markets...‘. Therefore, if there is any rumour 
disseminated in the securities marketplace in relation to a company‘s activities or 
circumstances, the company should be obliged to respond to these rumours by giving 
explanatory details to the marketplace and to investors. For example, the value of 
Amlak Finance and Real Estate Company‘s shares had risen due to rumours about an 
intended rights issue. Even though the company formally denied that it had plans to 
increase its capital, a week later the market rumours were proved to be true by an 
official announcement. Huge sums of money were made by those who possessed the 
advantageous information and pursued the market rumours. Neither SCA nor the 
company took action against the source of the information. The Company denied the 
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rumours at first, then went ahead with the issue.
714 
What is needed to combat this 
problem is to reverse this trend; the SCA must take definite action on this issue by 
obliging companies to disclose proper information which is relevant to any rumours 
which occur. A free flow of information through disclosure and transparency rules 
would prevent such rumours, which amount to market manipulation.  
 
In the modern era, the Internet has many features of a tool that facilitates market 
manipulation, particularly by spreading rumours through e-mails, chat rooms and 
bulletin boards.
715
 The ESCA Law 2000 and the Regulations market (SCA decisions) do 
not specify any method for spreading a rumour.  Therefore it may occur by any means, 
including via the Internet, as long as it relates to selling or buying shares.  
 
The ESCA Law 2000 does not require that rumours must influence the market value of 
securities, an investor‘s decision or for the achievement of personal benefits. This is 
contrary to Articles 36 and 37 which state that making false statements or exploiting 
inside information should create personal benefit and therefore will raise liability 
against the actor. This creates another problem as it raises the question as to whether 
anyone who has heard the rumour and then conveyed it to others will be held criminally 
responsible, or whether criminal liability will be limited to the person who started the 
rumour.  In addition, it is often difficult to follow a rumour back to its source.   
 
Information-based manipulation must involve false information or spreading 
rumours. These forms of information-based manipulation depend on information 
relating to issuers, either false information or rumour. These practices create a 
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false impression toward investors as well as harming market integrity and its 
value. However, the following form of manipulation is quite different, because it 
is based on a fictitious transaction. This sends an incorrect signal to investors.  
 
4.6.2 A fictitious transaction  
 
This is another main type of market manipulation. It also creates a false and misleading 
impression. According to Avgouleas, this form of manipulation is similar to 
information-based manipulation as both convey false information regarding the state of 
supply and demand for a particular security. However, the difference is that 
manipulation by creating a fictitious transaction involves the creation of a specific 
action which creates false signs of a transaction. Thus, it is not the same as 
disseminating false information or rumours as in the case of information based 
manipulation.
716
 The fictitious transaction intends to mislead investors in the market by 
making them believe that there is supply or demand in specific securities, due to 
evidence of transactions in those securities, whilst in fact no transactions have been 
taking place.
717
 Section 118 (6) of FSMA 2000 defines fictitious transactions as 
‗effecting transactions or orders to trade which employ fictitious devices or any other 
form of deception or contrivance‘.718 The DIFC law No.12 of 2004  states that a ‗person 
shall not, in the DIFC or elsewhere, directly or indirectly, engage or participate in any 
act, practice or course of conduct [which]... (a) results in or contributes to, or may result 
in or contribute to... an artificial price for Investments'.
719
  The DIFC law No.12 of 2004 
, then, does not prohibit artificial transactions explicitly in a particular provision, but 
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includes this in the same provision that prohibits any act or course of conduct which 
results in artificial prices, even if the artificial price is not its direct effect.       
 
The ESCA Law 2000 prohibits brokers and their representatives from engaging in two 
activities, firstly engaging in any fictitious transaction that does not intend the genuine 
transfer of securities or funds which are the subject of the dealing, and secondly taking 
any action that may bring harm to the reputation of the market, its members or investors 
in the market.
720
  It should be noted that this prohibition applies only to licensed brokers 
and their representatives because the law requires that trading in securities should be 
carried out exclusively through brokers.
721
 However, if it is supposed that the investor is 
the one who is creating a fictitious transaction by placing his/her order to a broker, and a 
broker executes the transaction with bona fide intent, this raises the question as to who 
would be responsible under 26(2) of ESCA Law 2000 – the broker, investors or both. In 
an interview, questions were raised concerning this issue, specifically relating to an 
Article 26(2) of ESCA Law 2000. The interviewee (Judge Ayssor) argues that the 
regulator should provide us with a clear provision, thus avoiding these difficult 
questions of interpretation:       
My opinion is that there should have been a precise and 
comprehensive article in Law [ESCA law 2000] in relation to 
illegal manipulation to include everything so as not to make the 
interpretation difficult for us and interpret the law text in 
different ways.
 722
     
  
This left unclear as to whether the provision applies to brokers only or to both investors 
and brokers. This is means that Article 26(2) of ESCA Law 2000 has a flaw as it only 
raises the criminal responsibility against a broker whereas other investors would have 
impunity. Another problem is that it is unclear how to distinguish between fictitious 
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transactions and transactions which have been executed in a proper manner. In fact, it is 
difficult to determine which transactions are legitimate or not and academics have 
concerned themselves with this issue. If prices move in according with proper trading of 
shares, it is hard to say that the shares' price is the result of an artificial transaction, 
unless the trading has been proved somehow to be illegitimate.
723
 However, market 
manipulation that is based on a fictitious transaction may take many forms, particularly 
for the purpose of conveying a false impression and misleading investors in the 
marketplace. There are various examples of fictitious transaction practices including, 
but not limited to, wash trading, matched orders, painting the ticker tape and spoofing. 
Each of these will be defined in turn, below. 
 
(1) Wash trading 
 
Wash trading is a form of artificial transactions.
724
 This form of manipulation occurs 
when a person plays the role of a buyer and a seller of the same securities 
simultaneously or within a short period of time. The manipulator does not intend to 
transfer ownership of the securities by means of this act, which is merely used to create 
a misleading appearance of active trading in that security.
725
 The manipulator will cause 
the price of the securities in question to rise artificially by a series of transactions that 
are shown on public display, in order to give the impression of activity or price 
movement. This will usually be done in order to convince other investors that there is 
increased activity in these securities, perhaps making them a more attractive 
investment.
726
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(2) Matched orders 
This kind of practice takes place when two parties conspire
727
 to create an untrue 
appearance of renewed interest in shares, in order to induce investors in the marketplace 
to purchase the shares. This occurs when a person places a sale or purchase order at a 
specific price and the other party who is aware of that order places an identical sale or 
purchase order, relating to the same number of shares for the same price.
728
 As a result, 
the manipulators will be able to sell the shares and make a large profit. A matched order 
practice took place in the Dubai Islamic Bank shares case. The orders were matching 
between two parties. This will be discussed under the section ‗the case of the Dubai 
Islamic Bank as an example of market manipulation practices‘, below. 
 
There are both similarities and differences between matched orders and wash trades. 
Both wash trades and matched orders are intended to generate a false impression of 
interest in and trading of a particular security, when in fact there is no desire to sell or 
purchase the security.
729
 Wash trades and matched orders are also used to maintain or 
even create a price for securities in the market and therefore ensure market activity.
730
 
The difference between these two is that in wash trading, the beneficial ownership of 
the securities does not change whereas in a matched order, it does. 
731
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(3)Painting the ticker tape 
 
 This practice was defined in the US case SEC v Choset,
732
 which identified activities 
that engage in entering large orders just before the close of the market in an attempt to 
alter the closing price as  so-called ‗painting the ticker tape‘.733 The transaction shown 
on the ticker tape is entirely false since it does not represent any change of beneficial 
ownership of the securities,
734
 by either the purchase or sale of securities.
735
 This 
practice seems similar to marking the close behaviour, which is defined in the price 
manipulation subsection below.  
 
(4)Spoofing 
Another technique used to manipulate the securities market, is when a manipulator puts 
trades on share order books (bid or asks) for a large number of shares at a lower or 
higher price than their current market price, through an electronic system. This practice 
is called either layering or spoofing.
736
 The manipulator places orders without any 
intention to trade and then withdraws his or her orders before they are executed, thus 
creating a misleading impression.
737
 This action would immediately influence the price 
of shares either positively or negatively, depending on the price in the order, giving a 
false impression of high demand and attracting others to buy the shares in question. This 
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behaviour is prohibited under section 118(5) and (8) of FSMA 2000.
738
  In the UAE, the 
law relating to entering a purchase or sale order or orders for a particular security, 
before amending or even cancelling the order was not prohibited under ESCA law 2000. 
To fill this gap, however, Article 16(2) of SCA decision No (2/R) of 2001 concerning 
the Regulation as to Trading, Clearing, Settlement, Transfer of Ownership and Custody 
of Securities 
739
 was amended according to Decision No 69/R of 2007. This decision 
prohibits any person amending or withdrawing his/her order. These practices often take 
place in the UAE securities market. In the case
740
 of Methaq Takaful Insurance 
Company‘s Shares741 for example, the SCA observed, that during the period 12/6/2008 
– 14/8/2008 that the  price of Methaq Takaful Insurance Company‘s shares on the Abu 
Dhabi Securities Exchange increased in a short period of time from 3.92 Dirham (£0.69) 
to 8 Dirham, (£1.40) without any justifying cause. A manipulator was accused of five 
charges by a bill of indictment. One of the charges was that he was manipulating the 
price of the shares in question by placing orders for them, and later amending or even 
cancelling the orders. The defendant confessed that he had taken these actions with the 
intent to create an artificial transaction, in order to induce others to trade. 
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4.6.3 Price manipulation 
 
This form of manipulation is classified under the Code of Market Conduct, issued by 
the Financial Services Authority (FSA), as an example of market manipulation.
742
 Price 
manipulation is caught by sections 118(2),(b) and (c),
743
 and section 397(3)
744
 of FSMA 
2000.
 
It covers all practices that run in parallel with activities that are likely to give a 
regular user of the market a false or misleading impression concerning the supply or 
demand for the price or value of investments, or distort the investment market are 
illegal.
745
  
 
Price manipulation is also proscribed under section 36(a) and 38 of the DIFC law No.12 
of 2004 .  Laws in the UAE initially omitted to forbid such practices but the SCA 
realised that such behaviour was detrimental to investors and the market in general and 
therefore prohibited it in Article (16) of decision No (2/R) of 2001.
746
 As Judge Al-
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Hammadi
747
 indicated in the interview conducted in the UAE, the ESCA Law 2000 
refers to rules and regulations which are promulgated by the Chairman of the Board of 
the SCA, that will cover the deficiencies which existed in the ESCA Law 2000.   
 
Price manipulation is behaviour that intends to mislead investors regarding the value or 
trading volume of securities.
748
 As Avgouleas noted, price manipulation is behaviour 
that is directly harmful to the integrity and value of the market.
749
 This practice, as well 
as other manipulative behaviour discussed above, aims to drive the price of shares up or 
down through illegal practices. There are many forms and methods of market 
manipulation which have led to various terminologies being employed to describe them. 
Therefore, this section will consider two examples of price manipulation, which are 
known as ‗pool operations‘ and ‗marking the close‘. However, these are not the only 
forms of price manipulation that exist. 
 
(i) Pool Operations 
 
 This practice takes place when ‗a group of persons combine their resources and co-
ordinate the trading of the securities among themselves in order to manipulate the price 
of a security‘.750  Therefore, pool operations involve both real and fabricated trades in 
order to show market activity and to generate increases in the price of securities that 
would stimulate public trading. The manipulator achieves his/her purpose by either 
offloading his/her position at high or decreasing prices at a profit. There are several 
reasons why those who invest in the market react to vigorous trading and price hikes. 
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One reason is that the public may assume that those individuals who engage in trading 
have important information relating to the shares, or they assume that bull pools have 
been created and wish to share in the profit from these bull pools, just as the organisers 
of the bull pools do, before share prices fall. At the time of the crash of 1929, for 
example, pool operations and other similar practices were taking place in the bull 
market. Those who were not market insiders, followed the market closely and acted 
based on what they saw others doing. They could therefore be viewed as collaborators 
with the pool operators, as their actions were also significant in changing the prices of 
securities.
751
 It was even fairly common in the 1930‘s to find support and protection for 
the ‗speculative pools‘ from various groups. Whilst observers at the time agreed that the 
use of the pool operations was not acceptable in an open market, pool operations were 
deemed acceptable if the markets already had insiders that were trading.
752
 In the UK, 
this practice is illegal. It is prohibited under the FSMA section of market manipulation 
and seems to have been outlawed under sections 397(3) and 118(5) of the FSMA 2000. 
 
(ii) Marking the close 
 
Marking the close is also known as ‗trading at the end of the day.‘ It involves buying or 
selling a security on the market at the end of the day‘s trading. This specifically is done 
in order to change the securities‘ closing price. A typical sign of this is when there is a 
tiny amount of trading done right before the closing time.
753
  
 
Marking the close will occur for instance when an abuser of the market can gain a 
benefit by moving the closing price of securities a little, thus adding to their ostensible 
                                                 
751
 S. Thel, ‗Regulation of Manipulation under S. 10(b): Security Prices and the Text of the SEA 1934‘, 
(1988) Columbia Business Law Review 359 , p. 411. 
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worth by guaranteeing that the final trade of the day is a buy. In some cases this will 
attract value to a short position, thus benefitting holders of such a position. A small 
change in price can create large and significant returns for someone who is extensively 
involved in manipulation schemes. For a market abuser, the trade need not be large, 
because even a small amount of trading could be enough to change the value between 
the bidding and asking prices. Indeed some brokers could wait until closing to place 
their trade and then to get an advantageous price.
754
  
 
This kind of trading may not always be done out of malicious intent, as it may simply 
be necessary for the traders and investors to trade at the end of the day, for example if 
policy changes or serious trading issues mean that the trader can only trade at the end of 
the day. However, there are indicators that market abuse has occurred, for example 
when there are signs such as trade contracts, financial sponsorship or cross-market 
positions that do indeed influence the price at closing.
755
  
 
The case of Shuaa Capital International Limited
756
 gives an example of such activities 
taking place in the DIFC market. On 31 March 2008, marking the close activities were 
committed by Shuaa Capital International Limited.  The Dubai Financial Services 
Authority (DFSA)
757
 announced that suspicious trading was carried out by Shuaa 
Capital.  The trading was in shares of DP World Limited
758
 on the Dubai International 
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Financial Exchange (DIFX) at the end of March 2008. The DFSA determined that 
Shuaa Capital intentionally started to push up the closing price of DP World shares on 
31 March 2008. The last trade in shares of DP World was at USD 0.87 and occurred 
exactly 2 minutes and 20 seconds before the close of trading.  During this remaining 2 
minutes and 20 seconds, twelve separate bids had been entered by Shuaa Capital in 
order to buy 1,000,000 shares at prices between USD 0.89 and USD 0.98 per share. By 
the time continuous trading on the DIFX had closed 2 minutes and 20 seconds later, 
Shuaa Capital had bought, for its proprietary portfolio, 12,000,000 DP World shares, at 
prices between USD 0.88 and USD 0.97. Before closing on 31 March 2008, Shuaa 
Capital purchased an additional 3,000,000 DP World shares for its proprietary portfolio. 
The final price of DP World shares at the close of the market on 31 March 2008 was 
USD 0.95. The price of USD 0.95 per DP World share represented an increase of 9.2% 
on the last traded price, so it could raise the worth of the proprietary portfolio for 
accounting reasons. This occurred during the last few minutes of trading when the 
bidding prices for DP World shares were higher than earlier in the day. Shuaa Capital 
was sanctioned for alleged market manipulation and received penalties of USD 950,000 
and other remedial action agreed to by Shuaa Capital pursuant to an Enforceable 
Undertaking made with the DFSA.
759
 Shuaa Capital‘s behaviour amounted to market 
manipulation which was contrary to section 36(a) of the DIFC law No.12 of 2004 .  
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4.7 Market power manipulation 
 
Market power manipulation has brought misery and concern to the financial world and 
is the most important type of manipulation dealt with today.
760
 An understanding of 
market power manipulation developed with the introduction of anti-trust laws, which 
looked at the exploitation of a dominant market position.
761
 In addition, terms have been 
developed to classify forms of market power manipulation according to the outcome of 
the exploitation; these are ‗corner‘ and ‗squeeze‘.762 Both ‗corner‘ and ‗squeeze‘ refer to 
the exercise of market power and the ability to settle contracts in this manner. While 
these terms have different meanings, they are both categorised as types of market power 
manipulation. As Kozinn notes, the ‗courts and certain commentators have 
distinguished between these terms. They are intended to, and do, result in the same 
outcome of the extrapolation of a high price from shorts in order to settle their contracts 
with the long‘.763  
 
‗Cornering‘ is a practice of keeping a commodity for a long time, therefore withholding 
‗the deliverable supply‘ from the marketplace. On the other hand, ‗squeezing‘ is a 
practice in which the demand created by future contracts is in excess of ‗the deliverable 
supply‘.764 Accordingly, a ‗squeeze‘ occurs when the holder of a large amount of a 
particular commodity decides to venture into the futures market. The holder then 
purchases futures contracts that will necessitate people to deliver the commodity at a 
particular value. This can prove to be difficult, and it can create a rise in price of the 
commodity. The holder of the commodity will then disclose a high price for it, and then 
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it will be sold back at a lower price than had been agreed on the futures market 
earlier.
765
 For the ‗squeeze‘ to be successful, due to the higher prices decided by the 
long positions, the short trades will have to counterbalance at least part of the position 
in the derivatives market.
766 
The ‗squeeze‘ – which developed due to the manipulator 
covertly gaining control over the market – may allow the manipulator to trade at a much 
higher price than the original purchase price.
767
  
 
The FSA makes a distinction between ‗natural squeezes‘ and ‗manipulative ones‘ in 
which the trader has actually ‗used his controlling position in the cash market and his 
exchange positions together to dictate arbitrarily the prices in the market‘.768 The basic 
motivation for making this kind of action illegal is that the trader was in a position of 
power and his actions were not affected by the forces of the market. Therefore, ‗he is 
able to ensure that he always wins his bets‘.769 The FSA‘s Code of Market Conduct 
defines how natural and abusive squeezes can be distinguished from one another.
 770
 
 
In the UAE, the SCA prohibits any conduct or course of business, or the use of any 
device, scheme or artifice to defraud others. This prohibition includes but is not limited 
to any of acting or attempting to act in a fashion which might bring about or permit a 
potential ‗corner‘ or ‗squeeze,‘ for the purpose of manipulation of prices of any 
commodity or commodity contract traded on the market.
771
 Despite the fact that the 
SCA prohibits ‗corners‘ and ‗squeezes‘ in the commodity field, neither the ESCA Law 
2000, nor the SCA prohibits ‗corners‘ or ‗squeezes‘ in the securities market, and thus it 
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does not limit or prevent such practices in this marketplace. This is another deficiency 
in ESCA law 2000 and SCA Authority.  
 
Market power manipulation usually takes place in the commodities market, but it can 
also occur in the securities market. In the securities market, the manipulator usually 
turns to specific types of shares in order to have access to and power over a public 
company‘s shares.772  A simple example of using market power manipulation in the 
securities market is when a manipulator purchases a huge amount of a particular 
company‘s shares and holds them until the supply of these shares in market is reduced. 
He/she then slowly leaks the shares by offering them at any price he/she desires. This 
practice is called a squeeze. Alternatively, a corner might be perpetrated by a member of 
a company. However, in the UAE this is unlikely as a consequence of the obligation on 
listed companies, required by the SCA, to disclose information about any member of the 
board of directors as regards how many shares they and close relatives own, including 
the names of those whose holdings (in addition to those of their minor children) amount 
to 5% or more of the shares of the company.
773
 The reason for imposing an obligation of 
disclosure on a person or group who holds 5% or more of the shares of the company is 
to limit or prevent such practices in the securities market.  Even though this provision 
indirectly prevents such corner practices, it is not enough. The ESCA law 2000 is still 
inadequate in the prohibition of market power manipulation practices.   
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4.8 The case of the Dubai Islamic Bank as an example of market manipulation 
practices  
 
There is no doubt that the ESCA Law 2000 includes provisions against market 
manipulation practices, but abiding by these provisions is not yet common practice. 
Countless cases have been brought before the national courts, but even this has not been 
enough to reduce the prevalence of these practices and to ensure that the provisions of 
the ESCA Law 200 are applied. The first such case is the well-known ‗Dubai Islamic 
Bank case‘. This was the straw that broke the camel's back in terms of investor 
confidence and the trust in the financial market in general. It occurred in 2005 and is the 
most famous case that has been brought since the ESCA Law was passed in 2000. 
Despite the small number of cases presented to the courts, the SCA announced that 
between 2007 and 2009, it detected approximately 721 cases of market manipulation.
774
 
The SCA ordered administrative and punitive sanctions against those that were found to 
have engaged in insider dealing, market manipulation and some violations of the terms 
of the market regime. All of these punishments involved either sending a warning 
and/or imposing a fine, which did not exceed 100,000 Dirhams.  
 
 However, in the case relating to the shares of the Dubai Islamic Bank, in addition to 
market manipulation, some related broker offences had also been committed. Moreover, 
there were six people accused of criminal behaviour. Thus, in this example, we shall 
focus primarily on market manipulation and the two parties (persons A and B) who 
were initially accused of such wrongdoing.  
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 4.8.1 The facts of the case 
775
   
 
On 27
th
 August 2005, the supervisors at the Dubai Financial Market (DFM) observed 
that trades in shares of the Dubai Islamic Bank (DIB) were occurring at the maximum 
allowed rate for that particular day.  The trades were taking place between two parties 
(persons A and B), who were colluding in their trading, with the help of a third party, 
playing the role of facilitator (broker).  
 
The first party (person A) offered 20 million shares for sale, and 17.7 million shares 
were purchased by the second party (person B), who was originally seeking the 
purchase of 25.2 million shares. This caused the share price to rise from Dh 28 (£4.91) 
to Dh 33.40 (£5.85). 
 
On the next day, 28
th
 August 2005, trading of the DIB‘s shares was repeated in the same 
fashion, with absolutely no justifying cause. This time, the first party (person A) offered 
15 million shares, and 13. 3 million shares were sold to person B. Again, these 
exchanges took place with the help of the broker. This behaviour raised suspicions 
because again, the maximum amount of shares allowed were sold, causing the share 
value to be intentionally manipulated, raising the share value to Dh 37.30 (£6.54) – the 
maximum allowed value for that particular day. 
 
Thereafter, the second party (person B) conducted a sale of 51.9 million shares to the 
first party (person A) with the help of the same broker. These shares were sold with an 
average price of Dh35 (£6.12). To guarantee the continued elevation of the share price, 
the third defendant (the broker) informed the Information Systems Manager in the DFM 
that the first defendant is the Seller (person A), and the government is the Buyer (person 
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B). This would make the defendants' transactions to be able to reach a high range of 
movement in price and shares numbers. Therefore, similar, large transactions occurred 
in a repetitive fashion for the purpose of maintaining the record high share prices that 
were achieved by the trading. 
   
The trading reached 90% of the entire market‘s transactions, and the two persons, A and 
B, assumed full control of the trading of these shares. The number of transactions 
relating to these shares during trading on 28
th
 August 2005 alone reached 7,844 
transactions, and related to 268,236,034 shares. Thus, this intentionally caused the value 
transactions relating to the Bank‘s shares to increase, until the trade value reached Dh 
9.3 billion. At this time, the third party (broker) claimed that ‗the transactions were 
occurring in the government‘s interest‘,776 which meant that such a high level of trading 
was initially permitted.  
 
The sale of the shares by the second defendant (person B) caused a decrease in the share 
price, but the first defendant (person A) was buying in return, so the net effect of the 
transactions was a rise in share price, allowing the second defendant (person B) to sell 
the shares at elevated levels. In July 2005 the daily transactions of shares was only 188. 
While the above mentioned activities took place was only a month later on 27th and 
28th August 2005. This illustrates the extent of the unusually high trading activity. In 
addition the average number of shares traded each day was only 330,598 shares which 
corresponded to a value of Dh 64,266,063 (£11,237,530).  
 
4.8.2 Market manipulation practices  
 
The fictitious transactions which had been perpetrated by persons A and B were 
intended to mislead the DFM by making investors believe that there was a high level of 
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supply and demand in DIB‘s shares. Therefore, according to the facts mentioned above, 
persons A and B committed three types of market manipulation. 
 
The first type of market manipulation was a matched order, in which person A offered 
twenty millions of DIB‘s shares for sale and person B, who was aware of that order, 
asked for 25.2 million shares of DIB. When person B purchased 17.7 million shares, he 
therefore matched the order with his associate. They carried out their manipulation by 
frequently buying and selling shares by means of a successive symmetric matching 
technique. The impression of massive supply and demand for DIB‘s shares created an 
extensive misleading impression for investors in the market. The practice of this 
manipulation caused the price of DIB‘s shares to increase from Dh28 (£4.91) to 
Dh33.40 (£5.85).  
 
The second type of market manipulation was a corner action. The same activities were 
repeated on the second day in relation to 51.9 million DIB shares. In addition to a 
matched order, they used their power in the market, gained from controlling a large 
number of DIB shares, to manipulate it. They were involved in 90% of the total number 
of transactions in the market that day. This caused a sharp increase in the value of DIB 
shares, which closed at Dh 37.30 (£6.54). This affected the share price by giving a false 
impression of high demand that therefore attracted others in order to buy the shares in 
question. 
 
The last practice of market manipulation was providing false information. The third 
party (broker) informed the Manager of the Information System that the transactions 
were taking place in the government‘s interest. This action misled the Manager of the 
Information System, who had authorized such a high volume of trading on the basis of 
this claim. The broker intervened deliberately to influence supply and demand, in order 
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to induce investors to buy the shares by creating the impression of high demand for the 
shares in question.   
 
 4.8.3 Legal analysis of this behaviour 
 
It should be mentioned here that the ESCA Law 2000 does not prohibit some of the 
behaviour in question, which was discussed earlier in section ‗The Forms of Market 
Manipulation‘. However, the actions of person A, person B and the broker constituted 
market manipulation under Articles 36 and 43 of the ESCA Law 2000 and Article16 of 
decision No (2/R) of 2001. 
 
Articles 36 and 43 of the ESCA Law 2000 prohibit a person from providing false 
information, and penalties are prescribed for any person who contravenes the ESCA 
Law 2000, the regulations or any other provision issued pursuant to these laws or 
regulations. Article 16 of decision No (2/R) of 2001 was issued pursuant to the ESCA 
Law 2000, and it has been amended according to Decision No (69\R) of 2007, and thus 
it also applies to this case. Article 16 was not amended until after the DIB shares case 
occurred. The amendment remedies the previous version of this Article, and fills the 
gaps that the ESCA Law 2000 left. Article 16 prohibits any person, whether alone or in 
collusion with others, from deceiving or misleading investors by executing transactions 
in relation to a particular security with the aim of deluding the investing public as to the 
existence of an active market for such security, or with the aim of affecting its price 
(including increases, decreases and stabilization of the price) or the volume of trading in 
the market, or with the aim of affecting investors‘ investment decisions.  
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4.8.4 Court of First Instance
777
  
 
The Dubai Court  of  First  Instance  considered  the  case  and delivered  a verdict 
against  the  defendants. They were each sentenced to three years of imprisonment and 
fined 1,000,000 Dirhams.  
 
The decision depended upon documents which were used to prove the facts of the case. 
These were inspected by members of a committee, which was formed specifically to 
examine the trading and transactions executed by the defendants. The Court‘s decision 
was also established by testimonial evidence provided by the Public Prosecution 
service, obtained by questioning professionals in the Dubai Financial Market. The court 
concluded that there was sufficient evidence to find the accused guilty of engaging in 
and concealing manipulation of the price of DIB‘s shares by a scheme involving a large 
number of artificial transactions, aiming to create the false impression that the shares in 
question were being actively traded in the market on 27
th
 and 28
th
 August 2005. The 
value of these transactions carried out by the defendants reached Dh9.34 billion.  
 
These practices violated the provisions of Law No. 4 of 2000 and the regulations issued 
pursuant to this statute.  However, the defendants appealed against the Court‘s ruling to 
the Dubai Court of Appeal.  
 
4.8.5 Court of Appeal 
778
 
 
The Appeal Court
779
 accepted the appeal, before ruling on the subject. They assigned a 
board of three members, from the department of the Secretary (Diwan) of his Highness 
the Governor. The board consisted of members who were experienced in the securities 
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market, and had the task of checking the documentation and papers put forward as 
evidence in the case, as well as auditing the transactions that took place in relation to 
DIB shares between the defendants. They were also asked to confirm whether these 
transactions complied with legitimate market practice and speculation, and decide 
whether the defendants had committed any action that could adversely affect the normal 
performance of the market in relation to supply and demand, or whether they had 
caused an increase or decrease in prices due to the creation of fictitious transactions, 
thus taking this action out of the context of legitimate speculation.  
  
On 18
th
 June 2007, the Court of Appeal ruled that the defendants were not guilty of the 
charges, based on the board‘s expert report, ruling that innocence by default is a basic, 
non-negotiable fundamental in the penal system.  The Court stated that the innocence of 
the defendants was reflected by the facts. They ruled that an allegation should not be 
regarded as a matter of fact without proving evidence beyond the shadow of a doubt. 
Anything less than this should not lead to the court finding the defendants guilty. 
 
The Court was satisfied with the overall conclusion of the expert report, which 
demonstrated that all transactions effected on 27
th
 and 28
th
 August 2005 were in 
compliance with instructions and rules set forth by the regulatory authorities of the 
Dubai Financial Market, and there was insufficient evidence to convince the court that 
the transactions were fictitious or nominal, or were intended to influence the value of 
DIB shares. 
 
Moreover, the court ruled that the documents and papers did not show any proof or 
evidence that the defendants offered incorrect data entries to the Dubai Financial Market 
during the alleged transactions. Also, the expert report proved that the transactions were 
one-way transactions from the first defendant (the seller) to the second defendant (the 
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buyer), and that these transactions were not later reversed, which would indicate 
fictitiousness.  
 
It indicated that all transactions took place via the trading screens in the Dubai Financial 
Market, under the supervision of monitoring staff in the market, and that the market had 
allowed the transactions on both the 27
th
 and the 28
th 
August 2005. The report showed 
that the transactions were suspicious because they took place in a speedy fashion, but 
the report states that the transactions nevertheless complied with all instructions and 
rules, and that there was no regulation which either restricted the time period between 
an investor‘s order to buy or sell, and the next order initiated by the same investor, or 
placed any restriction on the maximum number of transactions allowed. 
  
The Court of Appeal also added that, as the subject court involved, it had full freedom 
to decide upon the weight that should be attached to the expert report. It therefore came 
to the conclusion that it felt comfortable with the report, and denounced all other 
evidence. Based on this reasoning, the court ruled to acquit the defendants. 
 
The Public Prosecution service appealed this ruling, claiming that it was based solely on 
the expert report. They stated that the papers proved that the expert report contradicted 
the facts established by the documents used as evidence in the case. In addition, the 
report did not establish whether these transactions were market manipulation and 
therefore whether they were legally authorized or not.    
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4.8.6 Court of Cassation
780
 
 
The Court of Cassation
781
 ruled that the right to evaluate the worth of opinions of 
experts and their reports with the subject court (the Court of Appeal). The subject court 
has the authority to evaluate expert reports, along with evidence that it may use to prove 
or deny the existence of fictitious trading, and that the court‘s decisions are not 
supervised, as long as the evidence used is legally accepted, and leads logically to the 
court‘s ruling. 
 
The expert report that the Court of Appeal based its judgement on agreed with the 
testimonies of witnesses, particularly regarding the fact that the transactions that took 
place complied with the instructions and rules set down by the Dubai Financial Market. 
They also agreed that there were no special instructions regarding the time frame 
between transactions for a given investor, or regarding the maximum number of 
transactions that an investor could make. Therefore, they ruled that there was 
insufficient convincing evidence to prove that any of the defendants committed the 
offences that they had been accused of. 
 
 4.8.7 Observations relating to this case  
 
The case of the DIB‘s shares raises several important issues about the justice system in 
relation to market manipulation under the ESCA Law 2000.  
 
First, the judgment of the Court of First Instance came to a justified decision which was 
legally acceptable, even though it was rescinded by the Court of Appeal.  The Court of 
First Instance arrived at this decision after considering the facts and legal issues, 
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according to the testimony of witnesses who declared their knowledge of the facts along 
with the commission‘s report. 
 
Second, the Court of Appeal commissioned a Board of three members, who were 
experts in the financial market, in order to investigate and examine documentation 
relating to the case and review the defendants‘ trading operations and transactions, in 
order to conclude whether market manipulation practices had been committed or not by 
the defendants. The Board members prepared a report that was submitted to the Court. 
The Court heavily relied on the experts' report, which significantly altered the Court's 
opinion. Therefore, the Court of Appeal acquitted the defendants from the charges of 
market manipulation on the basis of the expert report alone. The Court heavily relied on 
the expert report, which raised the important issue of the influence of specialist courts or 
judges. This supports the opinion that creating specialist judges for crimes relating to 
the financial market is necessary because regular judges are unable to understand 
technical matters relating to securities transactions.
 782
 The lack of the judges‘ expertise 
gives a reasonable explanation as to why the Court leaned so heavily upon on the 
technical expertise of the expert report and why the Court of Appeal acquitted the 
defendants from the charge of market manipulation.  
 
Third, the judgments of the Court of Appeal raised the issue that criminal prosecution 
and conviction requires a high burden of proof and thus, if the defendants are to be 
found guilty, the court must be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the defendants 
are in fact guilty. This was the main reason as to why the prosecution was unsuccessful 
in this case.  
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Fourth, the authorization from the Dubai Financial Market of the suspicious transactions 
which had taken place on 27
th
 and 28
th
 August confirmed that the trading and 
transactions undertaken by the defendants was legitimate. This was given as the main 
reason for the Court of Appeal finding the defendants not guilty.  
 
Finally, the absence of any provision to limit the maximum frequency of an investor‘s 
trades or to specify a maximum number of transactions in a particular trading day is the 
main reason why the SCA amended Article 16 of decision No (2/R) of 2001
783
 to 
regulate transactions in a particular security, with the aim of affecting its price, and the 
volume of trading in the market.
784
 The amendment was issued in the same year as the 
Court of Appeal‘s decision.  
 
In fact, this case showed the deficiencies in the ESAC law 2000 for not encompassing 
provisions applied to market manipulation such matched order and corner practices. 
Even though there is an Article 26 in this law which prohibit any fictitious transactions 
not conducive to a true transfer of the securities and could be applied, this Article is 
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particularly for just licensed brokers and their representatives. Therefore, it will not be 
applied to investors who not under the term of brokers.  
 
The rules which were issued by SCA may cover some practices of market manipulation 
or fill any gap left by ESCA law 2000. However, these rules are powerless and will not 
be considered legally binding. The other flaw this case revealed was the DFM weakness 
of supervision for watching over market trading and transactions. The question as to 
why the DFM authorized defendants to trade at the maximum rate of trading, while 
monitoring staff noticed that the transactions were suspicious is also raised by this case. 
In fact, the market (DFM) allowed transactions on 27th and 28th August 2005, which 
involved techniques that were used to artificially move prices by way of fictitious 
transactions. As the Khaleej Times News showed, the total value of the transactions that 
took place on 27th and 28th August 2005 was Dh9.34 billion, which is 55% greater than 
any market turnover in the UAE as well as being one of the maximum daily turnovers in 
the world market. 
 
4.9 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has considered various definitions of market manipulation in order to gain 
an understanding of the offence of market manipulation practices. In fact, it is a 
complex offence, and includes diverse behaviour, making it difficult to comprehend 
fully. Many judicial authorities rely on different systems, which lead to different 
approaches towards essential concepts that are used to provide definitions of market 
manipulation and the types of sanctions imposed. Most existing definitions present 
market manipulation as an unclear and ambiguous concept. However, manipulation 
refers to any activities that mislead participants by creating artificial trading and 
transactions in the marketplace. In other words, it depends on two important factors: the 
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manipulator‘s intent (mens rea) and action (actus reus) – in other words, manipulation 
involves dishonest actions that create an artificial price or false and/or misleading 
impression. Although, the UK and UAE jurisprudence fail to provide a definition of 
manipulation, the DIFC law No.12 of 2004  pays attention to such illegal practices and 
provides a definition of market manipulation. This indicates that the DIFC 
jurisprudence does aim to approach the high standard of regulation which should exist 
in a global financial hub. 
  
Market manipulation practices take various forms and are often innovative and diverse. 
Thus, it is difficult for regulators to determine and define all illegal practices of market 
manipulation in advance. The provisions that prohibit market manipulation in the UAE 
law have been studied by comparing them with counterpart provisions in the laws of the 
UK and the DIFC. The comparison, certainly, has shown that the ESCA Law 2000 is 
deficient in some areas. The UK and the DIFC jurisdictions have used different 
approaches for prohibiting market manipulation. Both of the laws use specific wording 
to cover a wide range of illegal practices of market manipulation.  They prohibit any 
course of conduct that leads to deception of investors or actions that create an artificial 
impression, or cause the creation of an improper appearance relating to demand or the 
supply of, or the value of an investment. The UAE laws are obviously lacking in terms 
of the extent of their prohibitions against some practices related to market manipulation, 
for example the regulator‘s limits on the scope of the provision relating to the spreading 
of rumours. This limitation provides that only rumours connected to the purchase or the 
selling of shares are prohibited and the regulator does not prohibit other rumours that 
could influence the market value of securities. Even if the SCA attempts to remedy 
these deficiencies by issuing further rules and regulations, the sanctions imposed by the 
rules, and regulations are not sufficiently severe for deterrence of these crimes.  
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With regards to fraud and manipulation, as we have seen, these schemes have some 
similarities as they both intend to mislead people. However, they are different in terms 
of their legal analysis under the UAE law. The regulator in the UAE requires that every 
fraudulent act should fall under its particular framework of fraud.  Although the FSMA 
2000 characterises fraudulent acts as a subcategory of market manipulation, this is in 
contrast to both the DIFC law No.12 of 2004 and the ESCA Law 2000.  
  
The case of the DIB‘s shares showed the deficiencies in the ESAC law 2000 for not 
encompassing provisions applied to market manipulation such matched order and 
corner practices. However, there is no effective method to prevent the scandal of market 
manipulation from taking place in the financial markets. It is also difficult to prove 
whether transactions and trading in the market are manipulative or not. The main 
protection for investors and the market from such practices should be provided by the 
supervisory authority of the SCA. Even if the SCA attempts to remedy these 
deficiencies by issuing further rules and regulations, the sanctions imposed by the rules, 
and regulations are not sufficiently severe for deterrence of these crimes.   
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CHAPTER FIVE 
APPLIED STUDY 
MARKET ABUSE FROM THE PERSPECTIVES OF LEGAL EXPERTS, 
OTHER SPECIALISTS AND INVESTORS TOWARDS LEGAL REGULATION 
OF SECURITIES MARKETS IN THE UAE  
 
5.1 Introduction  
 
The preceding chapters have covered various aspects of market abuse regulation based 
on a descriptive and comparative legal study, particularly in insider dealing and market 
manipulation. However, those chapters left unclear some dimensions of practical 
experiences, and this needs further investigation.  The research tools of social science 
research will be used, employing quantitative and qualitative methods through applied 
study.  The researcher seeks to accomplish the goals set and to provide a new 
understanding of the issues through presenting the viewpoints of legal experts, other 
specialists and investors who are frequently in direct contact with the UAE financial 
markets.  
 
In reference to the data collection instruments, a questionnaire and a semi-structured 
interview were designed by the researcher. The first part of this chapter sheds light on 
the research methodology and research methods used.  The second part presents the 
statistical results of the questionnaire and the analysis of interview findings. Finally, the 
third part draws conclusions from the applied study. 
 
 5.2 The research methodology 
 
Methodology is defined as ‗the strategy, plan of action, process or design lying behind 
the choice and use of particular methods, linking the choice and use of the methods to 
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the desired outcomes‘.785 The methodology therefore, determines the methods and the 
techniques to gather information connected to the research question or hypothesis.
786
  In 
this thesis, legal and social theory informs the research initiative.  
 
 In academic legal research, most researchers explore legislation in order to digest 
‗what‘ the law is and ‗how‘ it applies to a particular area. For instance, this study has 
investigated market abuse as an illegal practice. As a result, the researcher in the legal 
field often focuses on analysing and reading relevant primary sources such as legislation 
and legal cases. This is followed by gathering data from secondary materials such as 
journal articles, textbooks, case digests and other commentaries which have been 
written on the legislation. The main purpose in this thesis has been to examine the 
problems and shortcomings of market abuse regulations under Federal Law No. 4 of 
2000 concerning the Emirates Securities & Commodities Authority and Market (ESCA 
Law 2000) and how the law in question deals with such illegal practices. This has 
required an analysis of the law to show how it has developed vis-à-vis judicial 
reasoning and legislative enactment.
787
 Surprisingly, none of the available texts of law 
research discuss how empirical research could contribute to legal studies.   
 
In spite of that, many legal researchers have strongly recommended lawyers to use 
social sciences research techniques as an instrument to develop the legal system and its 
administration; and to guide law reform.
788
  
 
                                                 
785
 Crotty, Michael. The foundations of social research: meaning and perspective in the research process 
(Thousand Oaks, Calif. ; London : SAGE, 2003) p3 
786
 Crotty, Michael. The foundations of social research: meaning and perspective in the research process 
(Thousand Oaks, Calif. ; London : SAGE, 2003) p3 
787
 Ian Dobinson and Francis Johns, ‗Qualitative Legal Research‘ Research Methods for Law by Mike 
McConville and Wing. Hong Chui (eds), ( Edinburgh University press : 2007)  p 18, 19 
788
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and Wing Hong Chui. ( Edinburgh University press : 2007)  p 47 
 264 
 
Combining social methodology with legal methodology means that the researcher 
identifies a legal problem and then uses social science methodology in studying 
individuals‘ opinions and attitudes towards a particular area of law such as the one in 
question. Epstein & King argue that applying quantitative and qualitative research in 
legal studies could enhance the legal field, observing that: 
A methodologist  is an academic-in  the field of law, a  law professor-who  
focuses  on, contributes  to  the  field  of,  and  applies quantitative  and  
qualitative legal methodology . Because  statistics and  research  design  are  
not  "merely  technical,"  as  is, say, plumbing, ―staff statistician" positions 
generally do  not work  in this context. Law schools  need  creativity  in 
methods, not  a  technician  who  merely  applies  existing techniques  by 
rote  to legal  scholarship – a path that generally  leads to  the use of 
methods  that do not comport with the needs of researchers. Just as in any 
other field, methodology is a creative endeavour and cannot be delegated to 
anyone other than another scholar. 
789
 
 
Generally, the methodologies employed in social science research can be classified into 
quantitative and qualitative. 
790
  Quantitative and qualitative research are methods to 
interpret the mechanism of social, cultural, and legal operations. 
791
 These 
methodologies have different objectives; qualitative research seeks to find answer to 
questions of ‗why‘ and ‗how‘ while quantitative research examines hypotheses in order 
to investigate  the ‗what‘, ‗where‘ and ‗when‘ of the research issue.792  
 
The methodology of this chapter is of an exploratory nature where the researcher 
thoroughly probes the phenomenon under investigation. This provides insights into and 
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comprehension of market abuse practices in the UAE securities markets and the 
interpretive methodology attempts to justify why the participants hold different views. 
 
Questionnaire and interview methodology were based on random and purposive 
sampling respectively, and adapted on the basis of a pilot study. Following the latter, six 
questionnaire items were removed and one open-ended question was added to give more 
space to the participants to express their views. All these changes have informed the 
questions and reshaped them. Questionnaire participants were randomly selected from 
the two markets: Abu Dhabi Securities Exchange (ADX) and Dubai Financial Market 
(DFM). Interviewees selection was based on a purposive technique. These processes 
have been laid out in more detail in sections 5.3.1 and 5.3.2 below. 
 
5.3 Research Methods 
 
This chapter employs a mixed methods approach to collect and analyse data. Combining 
mixed methods research ‗is becoming increasingly articulated and recognized as the 
third major research approach or research paradigm, along with qualitative research and 
quantitative research‘.793 Mixing methods is known in social science as data 
triangulation, as discussed by Olsen. Olsen adds that mixing methods such as using 
‗survey data and interview‘ is a deep type of triangulation.  
 
The researcher believes that combining questionnaires and interviews in collecting data 
will enable him to interpret the complex issues of the topic under investigation, creating 
a picture of institutional behaviours of market abuse. Research methods are defined as 
‗the techniques or procedures used to gather and collect data related to some research 
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question or hypothesis‘. 794 Accordingly, to examine the market abuse regime and to 
answer the research questions, two data collection methods were used; a questionnaire 
and a semi-structured interview. The questionnaire was administered to 125 investors to 
explore their views and attitudes towards market abuse regulation, while the interview 
was conducted with 13 legal experts to investigate their views and perceptions about the 
UAE securities markets.  
 
 
5.3.1 Questionnaire Considerations 
The questionnaire is one of the most widely used and useful instruments for collecting 
data. It is easy to construct, versatile and uniquely capable of gathering large 
information quickly in a processable form.
795
 The questionnaire was the quantitative 
data collection instrument; whereas the interview represented the qualitative data 
collection instrument used in the applied study chapter. A draft of the questionnaire was 
mainly based on questions originating from the pertinent literature. The questions 
needed to be related to the study objectives. The researcher also picked up important 
questions from previous chapters, which constitute the main argument in the current 
study.  In short, the questions targeted investors who experienced the securities market 
on a daily basis. It aimed at probing into the UAE financial markets regulation for 
measuring investors‘ opinions and beliefs, and collecting data about the extent that 
ESCA law 2000 is sufficient for combating market abuse in the UAE securities market. 
In addition, it seeks to investigate how properly and efficiently this law has been 
implemented. For this, applying a questionnaire was considered a research tool 
consistent and suitable with the aims of the study. As Brace points out ‗[t]he role of the 
questionnaire is to elicit the information that is required to enable the researcher to 
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answer the objectives of the survey‘. 796 Most questionnaires aim to measure 
individual‘s attitude towards a particular issue, defined as a ‗state of readiness, a 
tendency to act or react in a certain manner when confronted with certain stimuli‘. 797 
 
On the other hand, the open-ended questions are designed to obtain qualitative data 
through the respondents‘ written responses.798 These open-ended items can offer 
illustrative quotes that can lead to the identification of some issues not previously 
expected.
 799
 In open-ended questions no response options were offered, but rather a 
blank space to be filled in by the respondents.
800
 One example of an open-ended 
question asked of the respondents was ‗Do you have any other views in relation to the 
legal protection of investors? If so, please write them below.‘ 
 
All the sections and sub-sections of the questionnaire have been logically sequenced 
according to the research constructs, questions and aims. The sequence started with the 
legal protection of investors in financial markets, moving smoothly to consider the 
operational problems in the UAE financial markets and finally, criminal punishments 
and another alternative solution instrument as a determent of market abuse activities in 
the UAE financial markets. 
 
At the end of the questionnaire, the researcher asked the respondents to provide some 
personal data such as name, e-mail address, and mobile number. This personal data was 
not placed at the beginning of the questionnaire because the researcher did not want the 
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participants to feel that their privacy is violated which could affect their responses to the 
questionnaire as suggested by Dornyei.
801
 However, the participants who filled in the 
entire questionnaire, and were willing to be interviewed have been asked to fill in their 
personal data voluntarily. The purpose of this demographic data was to contact only 
those participants, who met the pre-set criteria as the basis for the sampling strategy, 
and to set a convenient date, time and place for the interview. 
 
The questionnaire consisted of 33 closed –ended items and no open-ended question. 
After that, six closed –ended items have been removed and one ended question has been 
asked. It was divided into three sections. The first section consists of 11 statements 
asking the respondents‘ opinions and views about legal protection, and the extent to 
which the financial market regulations and law are provided to protect the market from 
any abusive practices. The second section includes 12 statements asking the 
respondents‘ views about the operational problems in the UAE financial market. The 
final section asked the respondents four questions relating to their views on deterring 
market abuse activities in the financial market. In other words, it wanted to explore how 
far they agree to the adequacy of punishment in terms of offences committed as market 
abuse.   
 
The participants‘ responses to the close-ended questions of the questionnaire were 
coded using numbers 1-5.  An Excel file was established on the computer to carry out 
the data entry process. This file was created to facilitate the access to the numerical data 
and to keep a safe copy. After that, an SPSS file was set up to perform the different 
statistical treatments of data. Then, all numerical data was copied from the Excel file 
and was pasted into the SPSS file. Frequencies and percentages were calculated for each 
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category in the questionnaire and the data was presented visually with tables, as shown 
in the data analysis section. Responses to the open-ended questions placed at the end of 
each section in the questionnaire were analysed qualitatively. This made it easy for the 
researcher to fit participants‘ responses into the different themes and sub-themes as 
illuminated by the interview analysis.   
 
Before conducting the questionnaire, some steps were taken. Practically, most 
questionnaire inquiries can be prepared under the subject of the pilot study
802
 to assess 
reliability and validity. A questionnaire is viewed as valid or not when it measures what 
it is supposed to measure.
 803
 Therefore, the pilot study is an important aspect of the 
design of any research study. It does not guarantee success in the main study, but it 
helps increase the probability of success.
804
  
 
As an important process, the questionnaire was piloted by following an academic 
process. All the items of the questionnaire were clearly and simply worded. Content 
validity was checked by giving the questionnaire to five legal consultants to check the 
content of the questionnaire items. Following comments from the latter, the following 
modifications were made. First, the open-ended questions were added as they were not 
included in the preliminary form of the questionnaire. Second, the Arabic version of the 
questionnaire was modified to be easily understood by the respondents.   
 
Having modified the questionnaire according to the consultants‘ views, the researcher 
went to the trading floor of the Abu Dhabi Securities Exchange to test how long it takes 
to answer the questionnaire. The draft of the questionnaire was attached with a brief and 
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comprehensive overview of the main points of study. Second it was checked for clarity 
of questionnaire context and items. Finally, the researcher listened to the participants‘ 
questions and general comments.
805
 According to the results of the piloting, the 
researcher modified the questionnaire and started administering it to the main sample of 
the study. In reference to the reliability, the researcher used Cronbach Alpha‘s reliability 
scale in SPSS to measure the questionnaire reliability. The result proved that the 
questionnaire was reliable at (0.689). 
 
In reference to the completion rate, 62.5% of respondents completed the questionnaire. 
The reason behind this is that administering the questionnaire to the main management 
offices and following it up was a lengthy and complicated process. In other words, the 
researcher did not see the questionnaire respondents face to face.  
 
Sampling is an essential step in any research. Therefore, selection of an appropriate 
sampling strategy is very important. The probability sampling strategy was used while 
collecting the questionnaire data from 125 investors. These participants were randomly 
selected from the two markets: Abu Dhabi Securities Exchange (ADX) and Dubai 
Financial Market (DFM).  
 
The population of the current study are in two markets: the ADX, whose number of 
registered investors is 887,787
806
, and the DFM with 552,069.
807
 Thus, the total 
numbers of investors in both markets as a target population is 1,439,856. There would 
have been no way of contacting a cross-section of investors so the researcher proceeded 
by approaching the two markets‘ administrations. He asked them to help distribute the 
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questionnaire 
808
 because they had a database of registered investors in each securities 
market. Both markets were willing to help the researcher in questionnaire distribution 
on the trading floor and in any other appropriate way. Therefore, the researcher relied 
on administrative staff assistance in both markets. The researcher asked the 
administrative staff to give out the questionnaire to the respondents. Two hundred 
questionnaires were distributed and one hundred twenty five were given back to the 
researcher. 
 
5.3.2 Interview Considerations  
 
Interviews and questionnaires are essential types of survey methods.
809
 Conducting an 
interview; however, offers a larger amount of knowledge and information than a 
questionnaire might offer.
810
 An interview is defined as ‗a conversation that has a 
structure and a purpose. It goes beyond the spontaneous exchange of views in everyday 
conversations, and involves a careful questioning and listening approach with the 
purpose of obtaining thoroughly tested knowledge‘.811 Thus, the interview method is 
regarded as an essential method employed in case study research.
812
  
Interviews can provide important, even vital information.
813
  Interviewing has been 
considered the most extensively used research method.
 814
 While conducting an 
interview, the interviewer should be able to read the nonverbal messages and understand 
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how the setting for the interview can affect the interview. The interviewer must also 
become attuned to the way he/she communicates with the interviewee.
 815
  
 
Interviews can sharpen the outcomes of questionnaires, where interviewees present 
deeper opinions regarding the issues. Gathering in-depth information, opinions and 
attitudes regarding the subject via questions in face-to-face interviews is appropriate in 
order to probe into the issues of market abuse, the alleged explanations behind the 
promulgation of law and the regulations of financial markets. If the researcher were to 
just use a solitary questionnaire, this could prove to be of limited value. The use of the 
interview method has been of an additional insight and benefits in the current study. 
 
The aims of the current study are to probe into (1) the problems and shortcomings of the 
ESCA law 2000, (2) the legal protection of investors, and (3) the operational problems 
in the UAE financial markets. Legal experts and specialists‘ perspectives are considered 
crucial as they provided the current study with important insights and implications. The 
experts and specialists were found among a group of people who are in academic 
positions, and have knowledge and expertise, so-called ‗elite‘ people.  As Gillham 
states, an ‗elite‘ person is someone ‗who is in a privileged position as far as knowledge 
is concerned. These are often people in positions of authority, with considerable 
personal power... they are just particularly expert or authoritative and so they are 
members of an ‗elite‘ in that sense‘. 816 In this regard, interviewing such people plays a 
vital role in the development of research, and the selection of interviewees is a serious 
matter. This may mean that the researcher may arrange for interviews with influential 
people who are in authority and in sensitive positions such as judges, legal consultants 
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and as well as other officials. The selection of interviewees in this research was done on 
this basis. 
 
For the interview process, as Robson argues, ‗there are three main types of interviews; 
the fully structured interview, the semi-structured interview and the unstructured 
interview‘.817 The similarity between the structured and semi-structured interviews is 
that they both have pre-determined questions. However, they are different in other 
aspects. For example, the semi-structured interview is more flexible as it allows the 
order of questions to be modified according to the researcher‘s views of what is most 
important, wording to be changed, particular questions to be omitted because of their 
inappropriateness, or additional ones included. The semi-structured interview was 
deemed suitable for this study because the interviewer wanted to ask the same important 
questions to each interviewee, but also to be free to adapt the order and follow-up of 
questions in order to investigate further for additional information.  
 
The interviewer made sure that the interviewees could cover the questions at their pace 
so that they could answer the questions appropriately.
818
The procedure of the semi-
structured interview was based on the main ideas of the research. The questions were 
related to the market abuse regulations, including issues related to market manipulation 
and insider dealing. In short, the semi-structured interview aimed to investigate the 
problems and shortages of the ESCA law 2000 which, have already been raised in this 
study. 
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In terms of interviewing elite interviewees, it is suitable to use non-probability sampling 
techniques.  In this study, selecting interviewees was based on a purposive technique. 
The purposive sampling technique focuses on what the researcher needs to understand 
and what useful, credible information he can gather from the subject, as well as what 
information can be gathered depending on the available time and resources.
819
 In this 
case, the interviewees were limited to a small amount of essential people whom the 
researcher thought would be necessary to interview. There were only a small number of 
experts available to be interviewed.  
 
Thus, the researcher purposively selected thirteen participants to be interviewed at the 
time when the study was being conducted and he interviewed three legal experts in the 
SCA. One of them is a legal consultant to the SCA and is considered as the key amongst 
these legal experts, because he had the greatest knowledge of the regulations governing 
the securities market and the manipulative practices. He provides consultations for the 
Authority of the SCA and deals with the ESCA law 2000 on a daily basis. In addition, 
three other interviewees had been interviewed. Two of them are judges and one is a 
legal consultant to Abu Dhabi‘s Executive Council. The latter was a member of the 
Commission which framed ESCA law 2000. In the Abu Dhabi Securities Exchange and 
the Dubai Financial Market, four specialists and officials were interviewed.  Interviews 
were also conducted with some legal experts and specialists from outside the SCA and 
Abu Dhabi and Dubai securities markets. Thus, the researcher arranged interviews with 
two lawyers and one broker. All of them provided valuable information and raised 
critical issues relating to market abuse and ESCA law 2000.  
 
                                                 
819
 Patton, M. Q. Qualitative research & evaluation methods. ( 3rd ed.) Thousand Oaks, (SAGE 
Publications: 2002) p 244. 
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Prior to conducting the interview, the researcher first met or phoned the interviewees to 
agree a specific date and time that was convenient for them. The interview time ranged 
from 25-60 minutes. The interviews were recorded using a digital voice recorder that 
facilitated keeping the recorded files on the computer. Ten interviews were recorded 
with permission from the interviewees while three did not agree to be recorded. The 
interviews were carried out in Arabic so the interviewees could best convey their 
message clearly and fluently. All the interview questions and their responses had been 
translated into English. To carry out member checking for credibility purposes, three 
translation specialists reviewed them and the researcher agreed that the translation is 
accurate.  
 
The interview questions were designed using the main sections of the questionnaire. 
They covered, for example, the following the topics: lack of definition of market abuse 
such as insider dealing, inside information, market manipulation practices and the 
deficiencies contained in ESCA law 2000 relating to market abuse issues such as 
spreading rumours. They also raised several issues such as establishing a specialist court 
for financial market in the UAE, concepts of criminal reconciliation, the feasibility of 
criminal punishment contained in the ESCA law 2000 in deterring illegal practices, 
proposals of imposing proportional fines and accused names releases in the media. The 
interviews provided information and raised issues that is  used here to support the 
argumentation of the findings, and results and of the thesis. 
 
5.6 Results and analysis of the applied study 
5.6.1 The questionnaire 
The questionnaire of the current study is a mixed survey instrument containing both 
close and open-ended items. The closed-ended questions are easily coded and tabulated 
quantitatively, leaving no room for rater subjectivity. The closed-ended items used in 
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the first two sections of the questionnaire required the respondents to put a tick (√) in 
one of five responses in a Likert scale that best suits their views. The third/last section 
asked the respondents to rank the items from (1) to (5) according to their views.  
  
Three response scales to the close-ended questionnaire were used: a scale of frequency, 
a scale of agreement and a scale of ranking. The scale of agreement was designed to 
know how far the respondents agreed with the items in the legal protection of investors 
in financial markets. The scale of agreement was designed in the form of a 5 point 
Likert scale. Each of the five response options was assigned a number from 1 to 5 for 
scoring purposes. The response options and their assigned numbers are as follows: 
strongly agree (5), agree (4), unsure (3), disagree (2) and strongly disagree (1). The 
scale of frequency was designed to discover how frequently operational problems in the 
UAE financial market occurred. The response options and their assigned numbers are as 
follows: always (5), usually (4), sometimes (3), rarely (2) and never (1). The final scale 
asked the respondents to insert only one number from (1) to (5) opposite each of five 
statements according to their agreement. Number (1) stands for the strongest agreement, 
and number (5) refers to the weakest agreement. 
 
The questionnaire started with an introduction informing the respondents about the aims 
of the study and how data will be handled privately and confidentially. The following 
twenty eighth questions covered in the questionnaire related to: legal protection of 
investors, the operational problems and criminal punishments and another alternative 
solution instrument as a determent of market abuse activities in the UAE financial 
markets. 
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5.6.1.1 Legal protection of investors in the UAE financial markets 
 
In the questionnaire, the sample was asked for their views on the importance of 
establishing a specialist court for the financial market.  The main objective of this 
question was to measure attitudes of investors towards establishing a specialist criminal 
court in UAE financial markets, and whether it is useful or not. Table (1) and Figure (1) 
show the result of the analysis. The analysis reveals that the greater part of the 
respondents (56.8 %) ‗strongly agreed‘ that there is a need for establishing a specialist 
court. Thus, the majority of investors believe that a specialist criminal court is useful for 
the financial market. This was followed by 32.8% of the respondents who ‗agreed‘ with 
this proposal. 2.4% & 1.6% of the respondents ‗disagreed‘ and ‗strongly disagreed‘, 
respectively. Figure (1) below shows that investors believed that establishing a court for 
financial market is indeed essential. 
 
This trend is similar to what the experts and specialists who were consulted advised. In 
the interviews the view was expressed that if there is specialization, there will be more 
power given to the verdicts issued by specialist court.
820
 Some interviewees argued that 
some judges in the general court do not realise or comprehend the role of the SCA in the 
securities markets.
821
  
 
 
                                                 
820
 Anonymous1, Securities & Commodities Authority, Interview conducted, May 2010, Abu Dhabi, 
United Arab Emirates. 
821
 Abdullah Salem Al Naimi,Manager of Market Surveillance, Market Operations and Surveillance. Abu 
Dhabi Securities Exchange, Interview conducted, April 2010, Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates. 
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The need for professional judges to deal with the financial market is seen as the right 
means to combat existing market abuse. One investor said:  ‗I think it is appropriate 
now to think of establishing a specialized court for the financial markets‘. It is clearly 
revealed that   investors‘ do believe that practices of market abuse exist in the UAE 
financial markets. The results showed that (40.8%) respondents ‗agreed‘ that the abuse 
practices exist in UAE financial market, followed by (39.2%) of the respondents who 
‗strongly agreed‘. However, 17.6% of the respondents were ‗unsure‘. Insignificant 
percentages of the respondents ‗disagreed‘ (1.6%) and ‗strongly disagreed‘ (0.8 %). 
Figure (2) shows the frequency distribution of the respondents‘ perceptions. 
 
  
 
 
Strongly disagree  
1.6 %
Disagree   2.4 %
Unsure  6.4 %
Agree   32.8 %
Strongly agree  
56.8 %
Figure 1: A specialised criminal court is useful for financial markets. 
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It should be recalled that these practices may be committed whether by companies‘ 
directors or financial analysts, advisors or the brokers, whether intentionally or 
negligently. Any action or behaviour coming from, for example, companies‘ directors, 
financial analysts, advisors or brokers is important to investors due to the influence of 
their financial decision. These people are indeed in a position which allows them to be 
trusted by investors. In this context, the statement was raised to investors ‗The legal 
responsibility should be based on negligence in case of committing any mislead the 
investor in the financial market.‘ The objective behind this question was to investigate  
the perception of the sample respondents about the figures who were considered 
responsible for the abuse practices and whether this legal responsibility should be due to 
negligence that leads to committing market abuse offences against the financial market 
rules and the financial profession ethics or not.  
 
Figure 2: Market abuse practices exist in the UAE financial market. 
 
Strongly disagre  
0.8
Disagree  1.6%
Unsure   17.6
Agree  40.8
Strongly agree  
39.2
 280 
 
Responsibility based on the concept of failure to take reasonable care about providing 
information is the extent to which the disclosed information is true or not.  ‗Standard 
care‘ is measured in terms of that relevant to a ‗reasonable person‘ who is in that 
situation.  Laws or regulations can impose a higher standard care than ordinary 
negligence, and failure to adhere to a law or regulation is typically deemed to be 
negligence. 
 
However, the ESCA law 2000 does not criminalise such negligent practices. The 
participants agreed that the responsibility should follow up some important figures such 
as the directors of companies or financial analysts or advisors or the brokers. The 
analysis illustrates that the majority of the respondents (45.6 %) ‗strongly agreed‘ 
followed by 39.2 % of the respondent who ‗agreed‘. 11.2 % of the respondents are 
‗unsure‘, while only 0.8 and 3.2 % of the respondents ‗strongly disagreed‘ & ‗agreed‘ 
respectively. Figure (3) shows the frequency distribution. 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Strongly 
disagree  0.8 % Disagree   3.2 %
Unsure  11.2 %
Agree  39.2%
Strongly agree  
45.6%
Figure 3: The legal responsibility should be based on negligence in case of committing any mislead the investor in 
the financial market. 
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It is clear that insider dealing and market manipulations do come under the definition of 
market abuse. However, the ESCA law 2000 does not provide a definition of market 
abuse whether in relation to insider dealing or market manipulation. In fact, providing a 
definition of such practices may help market participants to realise what action 
constitutes insider dealing or market manipulation. Definition is needed, for example, to 
determine who is the actor? Does it include a person who connects to inside information 
only by accident or who is in a position that allows him/her to obtain this sensitive 
information? It is still vague under ESCA law 2000. Interviewees, therefore, needed to 
be asked if they pay attention to the definition of these practices or not. The analysis of 
the question (see figure (4) reveals that the majority of the respondents ‗strongly agreed‘ 
(48.0%) followed by 40.0 % of the respondents who ‗agreed‘ to the above opinion. This 
perspective was supported by the legal experts. As one interviewee said:  to ‗resolve the 
issues, the law should set a definition of insider dealing, specifying the identity of the 
person accessing inside information which leads him/her to manipulate securities 
market‘.822 Another participant answered an open-ended question saying ‗so as to 
attaching a legal liability, insider dealing should be defined by law and rules‘.823 There 
was consensus over whether market manipulation should be defined due to 
encompassing any course of conduct that misleads the market place.while only 11.2% 
and 0.8 % of the respondents are ‗unsure‘ and ‗strongly disagreed‘, respectively. Figure 
(4) below illustrates the analysis result. 
                                                 
822
 Judge Hassan Al Hammadi,(PhD in Law)  Former Chairman of the Appeals panel in the Federal Court 
of Appeal. Currently he is a Head of Technical office in the Federal Supreme Court, Interview conducted, 
June 2010, Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates. 
823
 See Appendix 2.  
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A rumour is classified under market manipulation practices. Thus, manipulators spread 
a rumour to influence the value of securities and investor decision. This issue was raised 
so as to investigate the opinion of the respondents on the effect of rumours as a means 
of market abuse in the financial marketplace.  The analysis reflects that the majority of 
the respondents ‗agreed‘ and ‗strongly agreed‘ (33.6% each) that the ESCA law 2000 
should consider rumours as means of market abuse used to influence the value of 
securities.  12% and 4.8 % of the respondents ‗disagreed‘ and ‗strongly disagreed‘ to 
this statement respectively, and 16% were ‗unsure‘. Figure (5) below shows the analysis 
result. 
 
 
Strongly 
disagree  0.8 %
Disagree 0%
Unsure  11.2 %
Agree  40%
Strongly agree     
48 %
Figure 4: The ESCA law 2000 or regulations of financial market should define market abuse 
or at least provide an example of such practices. 
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The difficulty usually facing the regulator is to catch all offences that come under 
market abuse. This is because market abuse is an ‗intelligent‘ offence and it is 
committed under schemes which are ingenious and innovative. The ESCA law 2000 
specifies limited and enumerated offences that constitute market abuse. The research 
assumes that this means that the ESCA law 2000 has a deficiency, and thus the 
legislator should prohibit any conduct that leads to creating a false or misleading 
impression, or any practices that mislead investors in the marketplace in the UAE.  
 
This issue was raised with the respondents. A total of 44.8 % investors strongly agreed 
that the regulator should criminalise any action which creates a false and misleading 
impression, while 38.4% ‗agreed‘. An insignificant percentage of the respondents 
disagreed and strongly disagreed (5.6 % and 1.6 %) respectively. Figure (6) shows the 
respondents‘ opinion in this regard. 
 
Strongly 
disagree  4.8%
Disagree   12 
%
Unsure  16 %
Agree   33.6 %
Strongly agree  
33.6 %
Figure 5: The ESCA law 2000 should state that a rumour may likely influence the 
value of the securities and investor decisions. 
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The ESCA law 2000 prohibits insider dealing that is carried out with the intention of 
achieving personal benefit. The condition of achieving personal benefit is criticised by 
the researcher, as discussed earlier in the insider dealing chapter. The analysis of the 
data shows that the majority of the respondents ‗strongly agreed‘ (40.3 %) and ‗agreed‘ 
(37.1%) to ‗The regulator should prohibit insider dealing acts regardless of 
requirements for personal benefits‘. This means that the regulator should prohibit the act 
of insider dealing, while not making the legal requirement of achieving personal benefit 
as the indicator of guilt. The exploitation of inside information at the expense of others 
should in itself be violating the principles of equality and justice. In support of this 
view, an advocator and a legal consultant said:  
The legislation [the ESCA law 2000] falls short on this matter. It 
should have criminalised the act of insider dealing without 
requiring personal benefit to have been achieved. 
824
 
 
  
                                                 
824
 Sammer Ja‘afar, Legal Consultant, Ja‘afar Alwan, Al Jaziri & Associates; Advocates & Legal 
Consultants.  Interview conducted, June 2010, Dubai, United Arab Emirates. 
Strongly 
disagree  1.6% Disagree   
5.6%
Unsure  9.6 %
Agree   38.4 %
Strongly agree  
44.6%
Figure 6 :The ESCA law 2000 should criminalise any action which creates a false 
and misleading impression. 
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However, an anonymous interviewee from the DFM agreed with the text of the existing 
ESCA law 2000.  He added:  ―I agree with the text of the law in its requirement that 
there must be a personal benefit from the crime in order to accuse the offender. There is 
no point in raising criminal responsibility against the offender if s/he does not gain 
benefit from the crime.‘‘825 This opinion was shared by only a minority of respondents:   
(0.8 %) ‗strongly disagree‘ and (4.8 %) ‗disagree‘. Figure (7) shows the result of the 
frequency analysis.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The researcher then raised a statement to the investors about specializing individuals 
who investigate for market abuse practices in financial market. The statement was ‗For 
market abuse practices to be adequately investigated on the SCA, legal experts should 
be appointed, who possess high financial, economic and legal skills and knowledge.‘  
                                                 
825
 Anonymous 2, Dubai Financial Market, Interview conducted, April 2010, Dubai, United Arab 
Emirates. 
 
Strongly 
disagree  0.8 %
Disagree   
4.8%
Unsure  16.9%
Agree   37.1%
Strongly agree  
40.3 %
Figure 7:The regulator should prohibit insider dealing acts regardless of requirements 
for personal benefits . 
 286 
 
The analysis shows that the vast majority of the respondents (64.0 %) strongly agreed 
with the above statement followed by 29.6% of the respondents who ‗agreed‘. The total 
of those who ‗strongly agreed‘ and ‗agreed‘ was 93.6%.  This question aims at the 
importance of having specialized individuals who possess high financial, economic and 
legal skills and knowledge in order to investigate the abuse practices in the financial 
market. One participant commented ‗[SCA] should have experts specialised in the 
financial market who specialise in detecting manipulators…‘.826 No respondents 
‗disagreed‘ or ‗strongly disagreed‘ with the statement and only a small percentage (6.4 
%) of the respondents were ‗unsure‘. Figure (8) shows the frequency of the 
respondents‘ opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Failure to define insider dealing under ESCA law 2000 has been discussed earlier. The 
researcher believes that achieving protection for investors from insider dealing can be 
approached by prohibiting insider dealing generally. The survey investigated whether 
                                                 
826
 See Appendix 3. 
Strongly 
disagree  0%
Disagree 0%
Unsure  6.4%
Agree  29.6%
Strongly agree     
64%
Figure 8 : For market abuse practices to be adequately investigated on the SCA, legal 
experts should be appointed, who possess high financial, economic and legal skills and 
knowledge. 
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the respondents agreed or disagreed to restrict the definition of insider only to natural 
persons.  Investors were asked ‗The definition of insider should be restricted to natural 
persons as actors‘ The analysis reveals that only 42.4% of respondents ‗agreed‘ that the 
definition of the insider should be restricted to natural persons while 23.4 % of the 
respondents were ‗unsure‘. This may mean that some respondents do not have enough 
knowledge as to the laws and regulations in financial markets. Thus, it is not odd that 
some respondents were uncertain regarding the issue of defining insider dealing. This is 
justified. One investor responded saying ‗lectures and sessions should be held to help 
the investors achieve comprehensive understanding of the financial markets‘.827  
Another one commented ‗enlightenment sessions for the investors should be given even 
on their own expenses to support his/her comprehensive understanding to the right way 
of investment in the stock market…‘.828  Those who ‗strongly agreed‘ with the 
statement represent 20.0 % of respondents. The lowest percentage of the respondents 
(5.6 %) ‗strongly disagreed‘ and 9.6 % ‗disagreed‘. Figure (9) shows the frequency 
distribution of the respondents‘ opinion.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
827
 See Appendix 4. 
828
 See Appendix 5. 
Strongly 
disagree  5.6%
Disagree   9.6%
Unsure  23.4%
Agree   42.4%
Strongly agree  
20%
Figure 9 : The definition of insider should be restricted   to ‘natural persons’ as actors. 
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Another statement followed from the last one. The price of shares is affected by the 
disclosure of information, so the timing of disclosure is important. Interviewees were 
asked to respond to the statement: ‗Company insiders should be prevented from trading 
until a reasonable dissemination period has passed‘. They naturally enjoy a privileged 
status from other participants in the financial market regarding possessing sensitive 
information which is not available to the public. Their situation enables them to 
manipulate company‘s shares. Therefore, investors‘ attitude is important regarding this 
issue.  The results of the analysis revealed that the majority of respondents (41.6 %) 
‗agreed‘ to the statement followed by those (36.8%) who ‗strongly agreed‘. One of the 
investors who ‗strongly agreed‘ to this statement said ‗These laws [ESCA law 2000 and 
regulations] should include preventing the company employees from dealing with the 
period of results‘ declaration…‘.829  A small percentage of the respondents‘ ‗strongly 
disagreed‘ (1.6%) and 8.8% ‗disagreed‘. Figure (10) demonstrates this result.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
                                                 
829
 See Appendix 6. 
Strongly 
disagree  
1.6%
Disagree   
8.8%
Unsure  
11.2%
Agree   41.6%
Strongly 
agree  36.8%
Figure 10 : Company insiders should be prevented from trading until a 
reasonable dissemination period has passed. 
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Finally, an important point was raised about the stage when things began to change in 
the financial market in the UAE.  Investors were asked to voice their views about   the 
illegal practices in relation to the summer crisis in 1998 which led to fake and 
misleading share prices. The purpose of this was to investigate the opinion of the 
selected sample about the main reason for the 1998 summer crisis in the financial 
market. The result of the analysis revealed that the majority of the respondents (39.3%) 
were ‗unsure‘ as to whether illegal practices were the main reason behind the summer 
crisis in 1998 that led to fake and misleading shares prices, 29.6% ‗strongly agreed‘, 
and 28.8% ‗agreed‘. No one in the sample strongly disagreed and only an insignificant 
percentage ‗disagreed‘ (2.4%). Figure (11) below demonstrates the analysis result. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
               
 
 
 
Strongly 
disagree  0%
Disagree   
2.4%
Unsure  
39.2%
Agree   
28.8%
Strongly 
agree  29.6%
Figure 11:Illegal practices were the main reason behind the summer crisis in 
1998 which led to fake and misleading shares prices 
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5.6.1.2 The operational problems in the UAE financial markets 
 
This section starts by investigating to what extent the share prices of listed companies 
reflect the real situation of companies. The problem is the shares prices often do not 
reflect the real situation which may indicate that something unusual is occurring such as 
a manipulative scheme or any illegal activities. The opinion of the respondents about 
the statement: ‗The share prices of listed companies reflect their real situation‘ showed that the 
large part of the respondents (39.2%) believe that share prices ‗sometimes‘ reflect the 
companies‘ real situation. 24.0 % of the respondents thought that this was ‗never‘ the 
case, while 19.2 % and 12.8 % of the respondents believe that was ‗often‘ and ‗always‘ 
the case, respectively. A small percentage said ‗rarely‘ (4.8%). Figure (1) demonstrates 
the result of the analysis.  
 
 
Another problem wondering the operational effectiveness of a financial market is the 
leaking of inside information from its original source to another party. Leaking inside 
information is illegal under ESCA law 2000, as was discussed earlier. To investigate 
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19.2%
39.2 %
4.8 %
24.0%
.
Figure 1 :The share prices of listed companies reflect their real situation. 
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whether this happens in the DFM and ADX, investors were asked a question about this. 
The majority of the respondents (39.2%) believed that inside information ‗always‘ leaks 
out from its original sources, followed by (32.8%) who thought it  ‗often‘ happens. The 
total of the respondents who think ‗always‘ and ‗often‘ was 72% while a reasonably 
high percentage (22.4 %) of the respondents replied that they thought it may occur  
‗sometimes‘. One of the respondents stressed the importance of action on this issue: ‗in 
order to provide protection for the investors in local markets the protection must be 
focused on preventing inside information leaking and insider dealing transactions…‘.830 
An interviewee saw the problem as being wider than that related to UAE markets. An 
official specialist at Abu Dhabi Securities Exchange stated: ‗Are there any leaks of 
inside information in market? To be honest with you, yes there are leaks of insider 
information and this does not just exist in our market, but in the whole world‘.831 
Insignificant percentages of respondents (1.6% and 4.0%) replied ‗rarely‘ and ‗never‘. 
Figure (2) demonstrates this result. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
830
 See appendix 5. 
831
 Abdullah Salem Al Naimi,Manager of Market Surveillance, Market Operations and Surveillance. Abu 
Dhabi Securities Exchange, Interview conducted, April 2010, Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates. 
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Figure 12 :There is leaking of inside information from its original source to other investors. 
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Offenders look for legal loopholes to escape from conviction.  Therefore, the question 
arises as to whether the ESCA law 2000 and regulation of financial markets have 
loopholes or gaps through which offenders of market abuse might escape. The statement 
put to investors on this was one of the tools that was intended to investigate the 
deficiencies of the law and regulations through participants‘ opinions. The majority of 
the respondents (37.6 %) thought there are ‗sometimes‘ legal loopholes or gaps in the 
ESCA law 2000 and regulations through which offenders of market abuse might escape, 
(36.0 %) said ‗often‘ and (18.4%)  ‗always‘. One of the interviewees said ‗The actual 
practice has shown constantly that the texts of any law stand against the passing of time 
particularly if we considered the frauds of the manipulators, and the change 
circumstances. This requires revisions of these texts [the ESCA law 2000] to fill any 
legislative gaps or loopholes‘.832 Insignificant percentages (2.4 & 5.6%) of the 
respondents replied ‗never‘ or ‗rarely‘. Figure (3) demonstrates the result of the 
analysis. 
 
                                                 
832
 Hussein Ghanaim (PhD in Law). Former lecturer in law faculty in the UAE University, he was a 
member of the legislative committee that drafted ESCA Law 2000. Currently, he is a legal counsellor, 
Interview conducted, May 2010, Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates. 
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Financial advisers, brokers or analyst investors should be trusted by investors. These 
people are proficient to provide recommendations or suggest investment strategies. 
However, the statement arises as to whether they are making misleading 
recommendations or suggestions. A statement on this was put to the respondents. The 
statement was ‗There are misleading recommendations or suggested investment 
strategies which are issued by financial advisers, brokers or investment analysts.‘ 37.6% 
of respondents believed that misleading recommendations or suggestions  ‗often‘ take 
place in the market place, followed by (32.8%) of  who said ‗always‘. 16.8% of 
respondents said ‗sometimes‘ and 11.2 % and 1.6 % said  ‗rarely‘  and ‗never‘ 
respectively. The overall percentage of the respondents in the  ‗often‘ and ‗always‘ 
categories comes to 70.4% which is a significant percentage compared to only 12.8% 
who  believed ‗rarely‘ and ‗never‘. One participant commented on the need for 
protection: ‗Investors should be protected [by the SCA and financial markets] from 
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Figure 13: There are loopholes or gaps in the ESCA law 2000 and regulation of financial market 
through which offenders of market abuse might escape. 
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manipulators in the financial market whether from brokers, financial advisors or 
executive managers‘. 833  Figure (4) demonstrates the result of the analysis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As shown in earlier chapters, share prices can be pumped up artificially, which occurs 
by means of market abuse activities.  It could be one main trigger for a financial market 
crisis. Therefore, in order to investigate this issue respondents were asked the extent to 
which they believe that share prices are manipulated in the UAE financial market. The 
researcher put to them the following statement: ‗Share prices are manipulated in the 
UAE financial markets‘, and asked their reaction. 40.8 % of the respondents thought 
that ‗sometimes‘ share prices were manipulated in the UAE financial markets. 28.8  and 
21.6 percentages of respondents said ‗always‘ or ‗often‘, making  together 50.4 % who 
believed that share prices were generally manipulated in UAE financial markets. One of 
the interviewees, who is an official specialist at the SCA, was asked by the researcher 
‗How many cases have there been of insider dealing and manipulation?‘ He answered: 
                                                 
833
 See appendix  8. 
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Figure 4:There are misleading recommendations or suggested investment strategies which are 
issued by financial advisers, brokers or investment analysts. 
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‗Around 1023 cases in the year of 2009, but this is not indicated in our newsletter‘.834 
Small percentages (5.6 and 3.2%) of participants responded   ‗rarely‘ and ‗never‘, 
respectively, to the above statement. Figure (5) demonstrates the analysis result. 
 
Share prices should be determined in accordance with the supply and demand in the 
market. Market abuse practices interfere with the normal process of supply and demand. 
The statement put to the participants on this was ‗The market abuse behaviour interferes 
with the normal process of supply and demand in the local securities markets‘. The 
objective of this statement was to probe into investors' beliefs that market abuse 
involves behaviours that create a false or misleading impression about the state of 
supply and demand and the value of relevant instruments securities markets in UAE. 
The results demonstrate that the majority of respondents (47.2%) believe that that the 
supply and demand of securities in the local financial markets in UAE ‗often‘ interferes 
by market abuse behaviour and 23.2% of the respondents believe that it always 
                                                 
834
 Anonymous 2, Securities & Commodities Authority, Interview conducted, May 2010, Abu Dhabi, 
United Arab Emirates. 
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Figure 5 :Shares prices are manipulated in the UAE financial markets. 
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interferes ( i.e. with a total of 70.4 percentages). They believe that the supply and 
demand in securities generally interferes its state.  24.8% of the respondents believe that 
the supply and demand of securities ‗sometimes‘ interfere and 4.0 and 0.8% of the 
respondents responded ‗rarely‘ and ‗never‘ respectively to the above statement. Figure 
(6) demonstrates the results of the analysis.  
 
Spreading of rumours in the market is one of the main ways to manipulate the shares 
prices and influence investors‘ decisions. To probe this issue, the researcher put to the 
respondents the following statement: ‗Rumours are spread in the financial markets in 
the UAE‘ .The analysis showed that highly significant percentages of the respondents 
(42.9 and 25.4%) believed that rumours spread were ‗always‘ and ‗often‘. This result is 
supported by one of the official specialists at Abu Dhabi Securities Exchange, who put 
it also in wider perspective, ‗Yes, there are rumours and this is a problem which 
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Figure 6:The market abuse behaviour interferes with the normal process of supply and demand 
in the local securities markets. 
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encounters all world markets…‘835 However, only 25.8 % believed ‗sometimes‘ and 
4.8% ‗rarely‘.  Figure (7) shows the result. 
 
 
 
The statement, ‗The available financial market legislations and rules are adequate to 
face such market abuse‘, was put to the participants. The core purpose of the above 
statement was to investigate whether the current legislations and rules applied in the 
UAE financial markets are adequate to combat the market abuse activities. The analysis 
revealed that (37.6 and 24.0 %) of the respondents believed that legislations and rules 
are ‗rarely‘ and ‗never‘ adequate to face such market abuse in UAE markets, 
respectively. Judge Al Hammadi supported this view: ‗the current law [the ESCA law 
2000] is deficient‘.836 Another interviewee said ‗the current law [ESCA law 2000] is not 
                                                 
835
 Abdullah Salem Al Naimi,Manager of Market Surveillance, Market Operations and Surveillance. Abu 
Dhabi Securities Exchange, Interview conducted, April 2010, Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates. 
836
 Judge Hassan Al Hammadi,(PhD in Law)  Former Chairman of the Appeals panel in the Federal Court 
of Appeal. Currently he is a Head of Technical office in the Federal Supreme Court, Interview conducted, 
June 2010, Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates. 
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Figure 7:Rumours are spread in the financial markets in the UAE. 
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enough and not sufficient‘837 to compact market abuse practices. However, 28.8% of the 
respondents replied ‗sometimes‘ and small percentages (6.4 and 3.2%) replied as ‗often‘ 
and ‗always‘ respectively. Figure (8) shows the result. 
 
  
The SCA has been given by ESCA law 2000 supervisory and executive powers 
necessary to perform its functions for ensuring interaction of the forces of supply and 
demand in order to determine prices and protect investors.
838
  Local financial markets 
have also been granted a power to monitor on a daily basis the trading transactions in 
securities and commodities, so as to ensure justice between transacting parties.
839
  
Therefore, the question arises as to whether they play their supervisory role to prevent 
market abuse practices? The purpose of the aforementioned question was to investigate 
whether the SCA plays a role in combating and preventing market abuse. The majority 
of the respondents (37.6%) believed that the SCA and the local financial markets 
                                                 
837
 Anonymous1, Securities & Commodities Authority, Interview conducted, May 2010, Abu Dhabi, 
United Arab Emirates. 
838
 Article 2&3 of ESCA law 2000 
839
 Article 22 (2) of ESCA law 2000 
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Figure 8 : The available financial market legislations and rules are adequate to face such market 
abuse. 
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‗rarely‘ play their roles in preventing market abuse, 36.8 % of the respondents thought 
they ‗sometimes‘ play their role to prevent market abuse. Only 14.4% of the 
respondents believed they ‗always‘ perform their role. More than one of the respondents 
gave comments regarding this issue. One of them commented ‗The SCA should 
exercise its legal role in taking action to ensure necessary protection procedures against 
any person or institution‘.840 Another one also stated ‗The SCA should be monitoring 
decision makers [in the companies] and their comments on television as these mislead 
investors.  
841
  Only small percentages of the respondents responded ‗often‘ and ‗never‘ 
(4.8 and 6.4%).Figure (9) shows the result of the analysis. 
 
 
As was discussed earlier, Article 39 (2) of ESCA law 2000 has got a deficiency for 
limitation of its scope as it applies solely to rumours relating to the purchase or sale of 
shares. Accordingly, respondents were asked to respond to the following statement: ‗A 
rumour is not usually about selling or buying securities, but it might refer to an 
                                                 
840
 See appendix 9. 
841
 See appendix 10. 
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Figure 9:The SCA and local financial markets play their supervisory role to prevent market 
abuse practices. 
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economic crisis or issuers‘ activities which impact the financial market negatively‘. The 
aim of this statement is to investigate the respondents‘ opinion about a shortage of this 
article. The analysis of the respondents‘ opinion revealed that the majority (36.8%) 
reported that they believed that a rumour is not ‗often‘ about selling or buying securities 
and 24.0% is not ‗always‘. An equal and significant percentage of the respondents 
reported that they are ‗sometimes (36.8%). Small percentages (1.6 and 0.8%) of 
respondents reported that they believed a rumour is ‗never‘ about selling or buying 
securities and ‗rarely‘. Figure (10) illustrates the result.  
 
 
The next statement was related to listed companies. The respondents were asked to 
respond to the statement: ‗Listed companies always take action against a rumour which 
relates to their activities or securities by disclosing explanatory information.‘ 
 
The analysis of the respondents‘ opinion reveals that the majority believed that 
companies ‗sometimes‘(36.8%) take action against a rumour which relates to their 
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Figure 10:A rumour is not usually about selling or buying securities, but it might refer to 
economic crisis or issuer’s activities which impact financial market negatively. 
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activities or securities by disclosing explanatory information. It is clear that the 
percentage of those who thought that companies ‗rarely‘ and ‗never‘ disclose 
explanatory information (24.8 and 9.6 = 34.4%) exceeds  the percentage of those who 
‗often‘ and ‗always‘ believed companies do (21.6 and 7.2) respectively. It could be 
concluded that the respondents believed most companies did not take actions against a 
rumour which relates to their activities or securities. This claim is supported by one of 
the participants: ‗The SCA should punish the administrations of companies that issues 
statements or news which negatively or positively influences the value of a share and 
then deny this news or information‘.842 Figure (11) below illustrates the analysis result.  
 
 
The following statement was presented to the respondents: ‗There is a multiplicity and 
overlapping of jurisdiction between the SCA and local financial markets.‘ The analysis 
of the respondents‘ opinion showed that the majority of the respondents (52.0%) 
thought there is ‗sometimes‘ multiplicity and overlapping  of jurisdiction between the 
                                                 
842
 See appendix  11. 
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or securities by disclosing explanatory information. 
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SCA and local financial markets.  Only (22.4% and 12.0%) of the respondents believed 
this happens ‗often‘ and ‗always‘, respectively. While (10.4 and 3.2%) of the 
respondents thought a multiplicity and overlapping of jurisdiction ‗rarely‘ and ‗never‘ 
takes place between the SCA and local financial markets, respectively. Figure (12) 
demonstrates the result.  
 
This statement was raised as a question in the interview conducted by researcher as 
follows: ‗Is there any multiplicity and overlapping of jurisdiction between the SCA and 
local financial markets?‘  An anonymous answer at the SCA, said ‗there is no conflict 
or overlap, there is integration‘. 843 This was supported by another anonymous response 
at DFM, ‗both [SCA and financial markets] are complementary to each other‘.844  
However, another interviewee at Abu Dhabi Securities Exchange, said ‗the problem 
between the SCA and markets lies in what are the powers of the market and what are 
the power of the SCA in the issue of surveillance.‘845 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
843
 Anonymous 2, Securities & Commodities Authority, Interview conducted, May 2010, Abu Dhabi, 
United Arab Emirates. 
844
 Anonymous1, Dubai Financial Market, Interview conducted, May 2010, Abu Dhabi, United Arab 
Emirates. 
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5.6.1.3 Criminal punishments and another alternative instrument solution. 
 
This section started the investigation into the participants‘ opinions about whether the 
criminal punishments in the ESCA law 2000 are sufficient for deterring market abuse 
activities or not in the UAE financial markets. As was discussed earlier, the ESCA law 
2000 has provisions of criminal punishments. Articles 41- 43 concern the issue of 
punishment and other disciplinary penalties for market abuse practices. Therefore, the 
following statements focused on the punishment of those who committed market abuse 
and the concept of criminal reconciliation as an alternative to criminal prosecution. 
Criminal reconciliation is an appropriate suggestion for the market abuse problem.  
 
The analysis of the respondents‘ opinion revealed that the majority of the respondents 
(37.1%) were ‗undecided‘ in terms of believing that criminal punishments in the ESCA 
law 2000 discourage market abuse activities in the UAE financial markets. However, 
those who think that criminal punishments in the ESCA law 2000 were ‗strong‘ and ‗the 
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Figure 12:There is a multiplicity and overlapping of jurisdiction between the SCA and local 
financial markets. 
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strongest‘ to the above statement (18.5 + 21.0 = 39.5%) exceeded those who believed 
that they are ‗weak‘ and ‗the weakest‘ (9.7 and 13.7 = 32.4 %). Figure (1) shows the 
result. One of the participants stated that ‗There should be a severe punishment for 
disclosing inside information and then disclosing them promptly or after a short period 
of raising their shares‘.846 
 
  
Publishing offenders‘ names, his/her punishment and the kind of offence which s/he has 
committed in media are not common in the UAE legal system. Thus, to measure 
respondents‘ attitudes regarding this concept, the researcher offered this statement ‗To 
discourage market abuse from not taking place in financial market are offenders name, 
his/her punishment and the kind of offence which he/she has committed should be 
published in media‘. The analysis revealed that the majority of the respondents (43.2%) 
believed the statement ‗the strongest‘ while 21.0% responded ‗undecided‘.  This is 
                                                 
846
 See appendix 7.   
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
The Weakest Weak Undecided Strong The Strongest
13.7 %
9.7 %
37.1 %
18.5%
21.0 %
Figure 1 :The criminal punishments in the ESCA law 2000 are not sufficient for deterring market abuse 
activities in the UAE financial market. 
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supported by the specialist and legal experts who had been interviewed, such as Judge 
Al Hammadi
 
 who said: 
yes, [to publish offenders names] I see that whoever violates the 
rights of the investors and commits crimes that shake the trust of the 
investors and shake the national economy deserves to be defamed 
by publishing his/her name in the media or in the stock market.  
This doesn‘t represent a violation of his privacy and his person 
because he violated the rights of the whole community.
 847
 
 
 
Those who responded ‗the weakest‘ and ‗weak‘ constituted 22% (12.1 + 9.7) as 
illustrated in Figure (2) shows below.  
 
 
Another suggestion for an alternative punishment is the so-called proportional fine. 
Judge Ayssor
848
 argued that proportional fine is the recent trend which imposes a fine 
according to the profit (gain) of the offender, and he added: 
                                                 
847
 Judge Hassan Al Hammadi,(PhD in Law)  Former Chairman of the Appeals panel in the Federal Court 
of Appeal. Currently he is a Head of Technical office in the Federal Supreme Court, Interview conducted, 
June 2010, Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates. 
848
 Judge Ayssor is a Chief of the Appeals panel in the Dubai Court of Appeal, Interview conducted, May 
2010, Dubai court, United Arab Emirates. 
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Figure 2:To discourage market abuse from not taking place in financial market an offender name, 
his/her punishment and the kind of offence which he/she has committed should be published in media 
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Putting a maximum limit on the crimes originating as a result of the 
securities markets crimes is not a praiseworthy trend because the 
offender can gain a huge amount of money by violating and 
manipulating the securities market. It is better that the legislator 
puts a minimum limit for the fine and that it should not be less than 
what she/he already gained or what he/she planned to earn as a 
profit. I think this is one of the important points that should be 
covered by the legislative amendments.
 849
 
 
Judge Al Hammadi said: 
 
Yes, I agree with this punishment [proportional fine]……. when you 
punish him/her with one million Dirham. He/she may have already 
avoided the loss of ten million Dirham or he/she gained ten million 
or more.  If you punish him/her with the proportional fine, in this 
lawsuit you punish them with what they avoided as a loss or gained 
as a profit. 850 
 
Therefore, the statement had been raised to the participants ‗The estimated fine imposed 
on the offender should not be less than the expected profits to be obtained or the loss to 
be avoided‘. The analysis of the respondents‘ opinion shows that the majority of the 
respondents (46.0%) were the ‗strongest‘ in agreement. Followed by those who 
‗strongly‘ agreed (22.6%) Those who responded ‗the weakest‘ and ‗weak‘ constituted 
14.6%. While, those who responded ‗the strongest‘ and ‗strong‘ constituted 68.6 % 
(46.0 and 22.6% respectively). Only 16.9% of the respondents were ‗undecided‘. Figure 
(3) shows this result. 
                                                 
849
 Judge Ayssor is a Chief of the Appeals panel in the Dubai Court of Appeal, Interview conducted, May 
2010, Dubai court, United Arab Emirates. 
850
 Abdullah Salem Al Naimi,Manager of Market Surveillance, Market Operations and Surveillance. Abu 
Dhabi Securities Exchange, Interview conducted, April 2010, Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates. 
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As it was discussed earlier in chapter two, the concept of reconciliation as a system in 
the securities markets is useful and provided that it takes place prior to issuing a final 
decision in the case. Criminal reconciliation is an alternative solution. Raising this claim 
amongst investors measures their opinion regarding the concept of the reconciliation 
system. One of the specialist experts said: 
In principle, this is good, but we have to apply it according to the 
type of misdemeanour. It is good if it is left to be voluntary and not 
obligatory.  I see it is good because a majority of the investors do 
have not enough knowledge of the laws and regulations. They 
[investors] commit unintentional errors.
851
 
 
The respondents were given the following statement: ‗Acknowledge the reconciliation 
scheme in the securities markets provided that it takes place prior to issuing a final 
decision in the case‘. The analysis showed that 28.2% of the respondents reported 
                                                 
851
 Anonymous 3, Dubai Financial Market, Interview conducted, April 2010, Dubai, United Arab 
Emirates. 
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Figure 3:The estimated fine imposed on the offender should not be less than the expected profits to be 
obtained or the loss to be avoided. 
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‗undecided‘.  The results illustrate that 50.8% of the respondents chose ‗the strongest‘ 
and ‗strong‘   (25.8 & 25.0 respectively) in comparison with 21% of the respondents 
who chose ‗weak‘ and ‗the weakest‘ (10.5% each). Figure (4) shows the result. 
 
  
5.6.2 The interview 
 
The researcher purposively selected thirteen participants to be interviewed at the time 
when the study was being conducted. The researcher interviewed three legal experts in 
the SCA. One of them is a legal consultant to the SCA. He is considered as the key 
figure amongst these legal experts, because of his full awareness of the regulations 
governing the securities market and manipulative practices. He also provides 
consultations to the Authority of the SCA and deals with the ESCA law 2000 on a daily 
basis. In addition, there were also three other important interviewees who had been 
interviewed. Two of them are judges; one of whom is a legal consultant to Abu Dhabi‘s 
Executive Council. He was also one of the Commission Legislation for making ESCA 
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Figure 4 :Acknowledge the reconciliation scheme in the securities markets provided that it takes 
place prior to issuing a final decision in the case. 
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law 2000. In the Abu Dhabi Securities Exchange and the Dubai Financial Market, there 
were four specialists and officials who have been interviewed. The researcher believed 
that it is better if the interview is conducted with someone such as a legal expert and a 
specialist from outside the scope that the SCA and Abu Dhabi and Dubai securities 
markets. Thus, the researcher arranged an interview with two advocators and one 
broker.  In fact these were the elite interviews, as all of them provided information and 
critical issues relating to the market abuse and ESCA law 2000.  
 
Meeting first or phone the interviewees had been arranged to agree a specific date and 
time that was convenient for conducting the interview. The interview time ranged from 
25-60 minutes. The interviews were recorded using a digital voice recorder that 
facilitated keeping the recorded files on the computer, ten of them were sound recorded 
while three did not agree to be recorded.  The interviews were done in Arabic, as they 
felt that they were better able to convey the message clearly and fluently in Arabic. All 
the interview questions and their responses had been translated to English. To carry out 
member checking, three translation specialists reviewed them and the researcher agreed 
that the translation is accurate.  
 
The interview questions were designed using the main sections of the questionnaire. 
These interview questions covered for example following the topics; lack of definition 
of market abuse such as insider dealing, inside information, market manipulation 
practices and the deficiencies contained in ESCA law 2000 relating to market abuse 
issues such as spreading rumours. It raised also several issues such as establishing 
specialist court for financial market in the UAE, concept of criminal reconciliation, the 
feasibility of criminal punishment contained in the ESCA law 2000 in deterring illegal 
practices, as well as the concept of imposing proportional fines and the accused name 
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release in the media. However, the interview provided information and issues that 
would be used as an evidence for supporting the argumentation of the study along with 
the results of the questionnaire 
 
5.6 Conclusion 
 
The applied methodology has been an essential part of this thesis. Various questions 
arose throughout this thesis. This chapter tried to find answers to these questions using 
the rationale of choosing a mixed-method (quantitative and qualitative) design. The 
quantitative and qualitative results are consistent, to some extent. The two approaches 
were used to investigate market abuse practices from the perspectives of legal experts, 
other specialists and investors towards legal regulation of the securities markets in the 
UAE.  
  
The results of the applied study gives a clear image of the views of legal experts, other 
specialists and investors‘  attitudes and ideas towards legal protection of investors and 
operational problems in financial markets in the UAE or towards alternative 
suggestions. Both interviewees and participants‘ attitudes cohere with the overall thesis 
proposition. They confronted the idea that the ESCA law 2000 and the markets 
regulations are deficient and supporting the thesis arguments. This was explored in the 
previous chapters.  
 
The applied study highlighted the fact that there is a widespread agreement about the 
weaknesses of legal protection of investors in the UAE financial markets. Participants 
agreed that the ESCA law 2000 has deficiencies for not criminalising some practices of 
market abuse or defining such practices, such as who is an insider dealing actor. This 
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makes ESCA law 2000 inadequate in catching all offences that come under market 
abuse. 
 
 The operational problems existing in financial markets have been revealed in this 
study. It has shown that there are offences committed such as the leaking of inside 
information, misleading recommendations from financial advisers or brokers and the 
spreading of rumours. There has also been a lack of response against a rumour from 
listed companies. In other words, market abuses are indeed carried out in the markets. 
All of these practices interfere with the state of supply and demand in the markets. 
 
The SCA and the local financial markets rarely play their roles in preventing market 
abuse and there is a multiplicity and overlapping of jurisdiction between the SCA and 
local financial markets. The proposals that have been raised include: establishing a 
specialist court in the financial market, introducing the concept of criminal 
reconciliation, publishing offenders‘ names and proportional fines. A majority of the 
interviewees and participants agreed to these propositions.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
 
Market abuse as a phenomenon takes place in the form of insider dealing and market 
manipulation.  These have appeared in the UAE financial markets. This thesis attempted 
to investigate financial market abuse regulation in the UAE through an examination of 
the Federal Law No. 4 of 2000 concerning the Emirates Securities and Commodities 
Authority and Market (ESCA law 2000) and rules which promulgated pursuant thereto. 
The issue was also pursued by means of a comparative study between the UK and the 
DIFC laws directed at the market abuse regime. The comparison and analysis was 
conducted in a similar manner in each of the main chapters. This method of study 
highlights the flaws in the market abuse regime in the UAE. To provide further 
evidence of these shortcomings, an applied study was carried out. This used a 
questionnaire and interviews to obtain the perspectives of legal experts, other specialists 
and investors towards shortcomings in the regulation of the securities markets in the 
UAE. The study is divided into six chapters. The following will provide in brief the 
findings of each chapter.  
 
Chapter One started with an introduction to the UAE securities markets by starting 
from the absence of a formal securities market, which was the main reason for the 
summer crisis in 1998. The chapter tracked the UAE financial sectors development 
from the UAE‘s foundation on December 2, 1971 until 2000. In the year 2000 a formal 
securities market was launched by the promulgation of ESCA law 2000 and establishing 
the Securities and Commodities Authority (SCA). The chapter also provided a legal 
framework for understanding the legislative and administrative regulation of the capital 
markets: the Abu Dhabi Securities Exchange (ADX) and the Dubai Financial Market 
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(DFM) as well as the Dubai International Financial Centre (DIFC). Financial markets 
were regulated by ESCA law 2000, and regulations which were promulgated pursuant 
thereto, came to prevent and combat market abuse practices. However, the law and 
regulations were not efficient enough to fulfil the task, due to the existence of 
deficiencies.  The chapters which follow were aimed at addressing these dimensions.  
  
Chapter Two gave an overview of the regulation of market abuse in the three 
jurisdictions of the UAE, the UK and the DIFC. First, the chapter began with a general 
view of regulation of securities markets in the UAE and showed how the financial 
market is subjected to different legislation at the federal and local levels. There are also 
two separate financial frameworks, and each is regulated under a separate regulatory 
system: The UAE legal system which regulates all of the UAE financial markets and the 
Dubai International Financial Centre (DIFC), which is a financial free zone inside the 
UAE. This chapter also shed light on the fact that there are several entities regulating 
the marketplace: The Ministry of Economy (MOE), Central Bank of the UAE (CBU) 
and the SCA which is responsible in the securities markets for the three stock 
exchanges, the Abu Dhabi Securities Exchange (ADX), the Dubai Financial Market 
(DFM) and the Dubai Gold and Commodities Exchange (DGCE). These different 
regulatory systems can lead to confusion and there is some duplication of the 
responsibilities of the MOE and CBU authorities and the SCA. Accordingly, the 
research recommended that the SCA should regulate and supervise any companies that 
operate in the securities markets such as investment funds and other financial 
institutions which invest of their funds in securities markets. To avoid any duplication, 
all these aforementioned bodies, such as MOE and CBU and markets bodies, should 
work alongside the SCA.   
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The chapter also covered the reason that regulatory intervention is a main challenge for 
governmental intervention in the market, which can take place mainly to ensure that the 
market operates fairly and efficiently. It also provided theories of regulation of 
economic activities, the public interest theory and the public choice theory, which are 
the most significant theories in regulating financial activities. The public interest theory 
is the basis of UAE legislative policy.  
 
The chapter highlighted inadequacies that existed under both the Federal Criminal Law 
No. 3 of 1987 and the Federal Company Law No.8 of 1984 for dealing with market 
abuse practices. The Federal Criminal Law does not encompass cases of financial 
crimes such as market abuse. In fact, it only involves particular types of fraudulent 
procedure. The Federal Company Law provisions represent an insufficient method for 
checking up on all the acts of market abuse, particularly in the securities markets. It also 
showed that the UAE financial markets need to develop a highly structured and efficient 
financial system. This was a significant observation made by Squalli
852 
 who contends 
that there is an important link between the regulatory obligation to disclose information 
to the market and market efficiency.  
The SCA Decision No 3 of 2000
853
 obliges all issuers whose securities have been listed 
in the markets to inform the SCA and each of the markets of ‗any significant 
developments affecting the prices of such securities‘.854 But the problem is that it is not 
clear whether ‗affecting‘ is likely or definite, which left a grey area without a definite 
decision from the SCA.  Significant matters must affect the prices of securities. 
Otherwise, there is no obligation on the issuer to disclose the information.  Accordingly, 
                                                 
852
 Jay Squalli, ‗A non-parametric assessment of weak-form efficiency in the UAE financial markets‘, 
(2006) 16 Applied Financial Economics, pp. 1365–1373. 
853
 The Chairman of the Board of Directors of the SCA‘s Decision No. 3 of 2000 concerning of 
Regulations as to Disclosure and Transparency (SCA Decision No. 3 of 2000). 
854
 Article 33 of the SCA Decision No. 3 of 2000. 
 315 
 
it should be amended to be ‗any significant developments which are likely to affect the 
prices of such securities‘.  
 
The last part of this chapter attempted to shed light generally on how market abuse is 
defined under three jurisdictions: the UK, the DIFC and the UAE. In the UAE, the 
ESCA law 2000 and SCA‘s regulations do not define market abuse but they refer to 
some courses of conduct that amount to market abuse practices. The DIFC law defines 
market abuse under the term ‗market misconduct‘ instead of market abuse.  While the 
UK law did not define the term ‗market abuse‘, it provides more details of prohibited 
market abuse practices instead. This chapter also suggested establishing a specialist 
court and criminal reconciliation system under the UAE judicial system. It 
demonstrated how these two concepts are important and workable for the UAE 
financial market. At the end of the chapter, it provided ideas for criminal responsibility 
and punishments of market abuse as well as the idea of publishing the offender‘s name 
and imposing a proportional fine. All of these propositions are supported by the applied 
study in Chapter Five.  
 
Chapter Three was devoted mainly to examining the regulation of insider dealing 
under the UAE legal framework. It provided the argument for regulating insider dealing 
between those who believed that insider dealing should be prohibited and others who 
believed it should not be.  It also covered the definition of inside information as it is a 
subject of insider dealing, and followed by focusing on who is the actor of insider 
dealing and his/her offences. It showed how his/her offences may be caught by ESCA 
law 2000. This revealed that the ESCA law 2000 suffers from deficiencies. These 
deficiencies are in the following: 
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 Article 37 and Article 39(1) of ESCA law 2000 have prohibited exploiting 
inside information but did not characterise this information. There is no 
particular requirement that inside information should be specific or precise. The 
ESCA Law 2000 also did not require that inside information should to be 
relevant to particular securities or to an issuer of securities. Both of these 
requirements (precise and relevant to) are omitted by the UAE law, which 
contrast to the UK laws and DIFC law. Hence, it is strongly recommended by 
the research to amend this Article to add the requirement that inside information 
should be specific or precise and relevant to particular securities or to an issuer 
of securities.  
 The ESCA law 2000 did not define who is an insider.  Although, Article 39(1) 
855
 of the ESCA Law 2000 defines an insider as ‗any person‘, the ESCA Law 
2000 limited the scope of this Article by providing that ‗any person‘ must obtain 
the inside information by virtue of his or her position. In this sense the ESCA 
Law 2000 did not include secondary insiders under this Article.  The term 
‗position‘ has a special meaning in the UAE culture as referring to one who is 
usually on the top of the hierarchy in entities. In fact, it is a different meaning in 
Arabic than it is in English. This creates a loophole in the legislation which may 
reflect the impracticality of successful prosecution.  The UAE regulator has not 
provided an adequate and comprehensive definition of ‗insider‘. In contrast, the 
UK laws and DIFC Market law defined an insider clearly, as seen in Chapter 
Three.  The UAE legislature should define who is an insider and include the 
category of those who have access to the inside information by virtue of their 
employment, profession or activities.  
                                                 
855
 Article 39 (1) of ESCA Law 2000 states that ‗It shall not be permitted for any person to deal in 
Securities on the basis of unpublicized or undisclosed information he acquired by virtue of his position‘. 
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 The ESCA Law 2000 also did not criminalise three behaviours: ‗leaking of 
inside information‘ to friends or others, ‗procuring‘ or ‗encouraging‘ another 
person to deal. Therefore, the ESCA Law 2000 suffers from an inadequacy by 
not criminalising these behaviours. The legislation of ESCA law 2000 must be 
modified, because the penalty must be imposed upon both the person who is  
‗procuring‘ or ‗encouraging‘ others to deal and who has been procured or 
encouraged by insiders, and also who leaks inside information and who has  
received it if s/he used the information.  
 The ESCA law 2000 must criminalise the action of using inside information 
without requiring that the person should benefit from his/her action. As soon as 
the action is executed a crime has occurred and it is against the rule of equality 
and fairness between the investors with regard to access to inside information. It 
is opposed to the UK legislation which has criminalised the action without 
requiring the benefit. Accordingly, the UAE legislature should criminalise the 
use of inside information without requiring ‗personal benefit‘.   
 
Chapter Four was focused on market manipulation regulation in the UAE. Market 
manipulation in the UAE law has been studied by comparing it with its counterpart laws 
in the UK and the DIFC. The chapter began with various definitions of market 
manipulation in order to comprehend its complexity. Many judicial authorities rely on 
different legal systems, which lead to different approaches towards essential concepts 
that are used to provide definitions of market manipulation and the types of sanctions 
imposed. The UK jurisprudence, for example, failed to provide a market manipulation 
definition but it focused on behaviours which may amount to market manipulation 
practices. The DIFC law provides a definition of market manipulation and prohibiting 
practices that constitute market manipulation, while ESCA law 2000 has a lack of 
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definition of such an offence and failed to wholly pay attention to its illegal practices.  
Obviously, the ESCA law 2000 has shortcomings in terms of prohibiting some practices 
related to market manipulation. These shortcomings can be provided in the following:  
 The ESCA Law 2000 did not criminalise market manipulation such as matched 
order, wash trading and such practices that lead to misleading investors. It 
criminalises actions with fictitious transactions under Article 26(2) of ESCA 
Law 2000 only if it is committed by brokers. This has raised a flaw for making 
the criminal responsibility only against a broker whereas other market 
participants would be dealt with without punishment. This deficiency should be 
remedied by criminalising any course of conduct that may constitute or create 
an artificial price through a false or misleading impression.  
  The UAE legislature also limits the scope of the Article 39(2) of ESCA law 
2000 which just relates to the spreading of rumours. The limitation prohibits 
only rumours that relate to the purchase or the selling of shares. If the rumour is 
not about the purchase or selling of shares, it would not be prohibited.  This 
creates another problem because the spreading rumour does not always have to 
be about selling or buying securities. It may instead, for example, relate to an 
economic crisis, company financial matters or political problem, which will 
certainly affect the market place and then negatively influence investors‘ 
decisions.  Another problem in regard to rumours is that the ESCA Law 2000 
did not require that rumours may likely influence the market value of securities 
which is important as rumours can influence investors‘ decisions. Hence, the 
legislature should amend this Article by making a prohibition that any rumour 
would likely effect financial markets or investors‘ decisions. 
 The ESCA law 2000 did not criminalise reckless action. So if a financial analyst 
fails to take proper care over the information or statement s/he provides, or s/he 
 319 
 
does not know to what extent that information or statement is true, s/he is not 
liable under ESCA Law 2000, because the law requires the intention (i.e. 
dishonesty) to induce investors. If there is no intention, he or she will not be 
guilty. However, the UAE legislature should prohibit any persons who ‗induce 
another person to deal in investments by  making or publishing a statement, 
promise or forecast if this person knows, or is reckless as to whether the 
statement is misleading, false or deceptive‘.856 
 The SCA has issued some decisions that may cover some practices of market 
abuse or fill any gap left by ESCA law 2000. All of these decisions though are 
powerless in comparison with legal decisions and will not reach the level and 
severity of punishments as the legal prohibitions would. For example, Article 
37/C of SCA Decision No. 3 of 2000 bans behaviour already prohibited by 
Article 39(2) of ESCA Law 2000. The reason for the SCA decision is not 
completely understandable. The repetition of the law‘s provisions is not entirely 
reasonable, and it has led to confusion for investors in the market. Therefore, the 
SCA needs to reconsider and readapt these decisions so as to eliminate this 
repetition.  
 
 
Chapter Five was an applied study in the UAE aimed at exploring the legal experts and 
investors‘ opinions regarding ESCA law 2000 and the markets‘ regulations as well as 
the markets operational problems. The researcher used the tool of social science 
research of quantitative and qualitative methods through the statistical results of the 
questionnaire and the analysis of interview findings. It revealed shortcomings that the 
ESCA law 2000 and the marketplace are suffering from. The shortcomings revealed by 
the applied study are as follows: 
                                                 
856
 Article 41(1) (a) of The DIFC law No. 12 of 2004. 
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 The prices of shares often do not reflect the real situation of the activities of 
companies.  It may indicate that something unusual is occurring such as a 
manipulative scheme or any illegal activities.  
 Leaking of inside information from its original source to another party, which 
makes one question the operational effectiveness of a financial market.   
 The ESCA law 2000 and regulation of financial markets have loopholes or gaps 
through which offenders of market abuse might escape. This supports the idea 
that there are deficiencies in the law and regulations.   
 Financial advisers, brokers or investment analysts are proficient to provide 
recommendations or suggest investment strategies. However, participants 
believe that those people often issue misleading recommendations or suggested 
investment strategies.   
 The market abuse behaviour interferes with the normal process of supply and 
demand in the local securities markets. This claim is supported by the majority 
of respondents who believe that market abuse behaviour ‗often‘ interferes with 
the supply and demand of securities markets in the UAE.  
 Spreading rumours in the markets often happens, which is the main way to 
manipulate the shares prices.  The result showed that highly significant 
percentages of the respondents believed that rumours ‗always‘ spread in the 
financial markets.  
 Lack of disclosing explanatory information from the listed companies against 
any rumours.   
 The SCA and the local financial markets rarely play their roles in preventing 
market abuse practices and there is a multiplicity and overlapping of jurisdiction 
between the SCA and local financial markets. 
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This study also raised some alternative solutions concerning criminal punishments and 
legal protection from market abuse practices. It suggested establishing a specialist court 
in the financial market and the concept of reconciliation under the UAE criminal system 
in the securities markets. Both propositions have been seen by participants as useful 
and as the right means to combat existing market abuse and achieve protection of 
investors.   
Regarding the punishments, it is suggested that to discourage market abuse in financial 
markets , the UAE legislature should permit the SCA to publish such statement of 
offenders‘ names, together with his/her punishment and the kind of offence which s/he 
has committed in the media. Another suggestion for an alternative punishment is the so-
called proportional fine. The majority of the participants agreed to both propositions.  
 
Finally, in light of what the thesis has discussed and presented, it has been shown that 
the regime of market abuse and other illegal conduct is entirely weak in the financial 
markets. There are some vague areas that the regime needs to remedy and reconsider 
and that the UAE legislation needs to reform. The legislator should pay attention to 
preventive measures by criminalising all forms of market abuse. It needs to define these 
illegal practices rather than leave them as vague and in general terms. It needs to cover 
in detail elements of insider dealing and market manipulation.  If this is achieved, 
reasonable protection for investors will be provided. The majority of local investors in 
the financial markets of the UAE are unfamiliar with investing in the securities market. 
They involve themselves in the securities market without knowledge or understanding 
of the processes of investments. They just want to maximise their return regardless of 
how they gain. Investors need real knowledge of sophisticated financial instruments and 
understanding of electronic commerce. It is the responsibility of the SCA to spread 
awareness and knowledge amongst investors.   
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Appendices  
Appendix 1: The questionnaire (English) 
 
 
Questionnaire  
 
Title: Investigation into Market Abuse in the UAE Financial Markets: A Comparative 
Legal Study (PhD Thesis). 
 
Researcher: Hamad Saif Alshamisi 
 
E-mail: ha222@exeter.ac.uk 
 
Supervisor: Prof. Tim Niblock 
 
University: University of Exeter, the United Kingdom. 
 
Introduction: 
The main aim of the current study is to investigate the market abuse practices in the 
UAE Financial Market. Initially, I would like to thank you for accepting to take part in 
this study. For research purpose, I would need your true and honest answers to this set 
of questions. This is an entirely voluntary study. You have the right to withdraw from 
the study at any time without giving any reasons. I would be grateful if you would 
answer this questionnaire fully. I will follow this up with some interviews. The 
questionnaire will be anonymous. All the information you provide will be confidential 
and for study purposes only.  
 
Thanks very much in advance for your help and collaboration. 
 
Note: ESCA= Emirates Securities and Commodities Authority   
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Section (I): Legal Protection of investors in financial markets: 
         Please put a tick (√) in the box that best suits your opinion. 
No. Statements Strongly 
agree 
Agree Unsure disagree Strongly 
disagree 
1 Specialising  criminal court 
is useful for financial 
markets   
 
     
2 Market abuse practices  
exist in UAE financial 
market 
 
     
3 The legal responsibility 
should be based on 
negligence in case of 
committing any mislead the 
investor in the financial 
market. 
     
4 The ESCA law 2000 or 
regulations of financial 
market should define 
market abuse or at least 
provide an example of such 
practices. 
     
5 The ESCA law 2000 should 
state that a rumour may 
likely influence the value of 
the securities and investor 
decisions 
     
6 The ESCA law 2000 should 
criminalise any action 
which creates a false and 
misleading impression. 
     
7 The regulator should 
prohibit insider dealing acts 
regardless of requirements 
for personal benefits. 
     
8 For market abuse practices 
to be adequately 
investigated on the SCA, 
legal experts should be 
appointed, who possess 
high financial, economic 
and legal skills and 
knowledge. 
 
     
9 The definition of insider 
should be restricted   to 
‗natural persons‘ as actors. 
     
10 Company insiders should 
be prevented from trading 
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until a reasonable 
dissemination period has 
passed. 
 
11 Illegal practices were the 
main reason behind the 
summer crisis in 1998 
which led to fake and 
misleading shares prices 
 
     
 
Do you have any other views in relation to the legal protection of investors? If so, 
please write them below. 
……………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
 
Section (II): The operational problems in the UAE financial market 
            Please put a tick (√) in the box that best suits your opinion. 
 
No. Statements Always Often Sometimes Rarely Never 
1 The share prices of listed 
companies reflect their real 
situation. 
     
2 There is leaking of inside 
information from its original 
source to other investors. 
 
     
3 There are loopholes or gaps in 
the ESCA law 2000 and 
regulation of financial market 
through which offenders of 
market abuse might escape. 
 
     
4 There are misleading 
recommendations or 
suggested investment 
strategies which are issued by 
financial advisers, brokers or 
investment analysts. 
 
     
5 Shares prices are manipulated 
in the UAE financial markets. 
     
6 The market abuse behaviour 
interferes with the normal 
process of supply and demand 
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in the local securities markets. 
 
7 Rumours are spread in the 
financial markets in the UAE. 
     
8 The available financial market 
legislations and rules are 
adequate to face such market 
abuse. 
 
     
9 The SCA and local financial 
markets play their supervisory 
role to prevent market abuse 
practices. 
 
     
10 A rumour is not usually about 
selling or buying securities, 
but it might refer to economic 
crisis or issuer‘s activities 
which impact financial market 
negatively. 
     
11 Listed companies always take 
action against a rumour which 
relates to their activities or 
securities by disclosing 
explanatory information. 
 
     
12 There is a multiplicity and 
overlapping of jurisdiction 
between the SCA and local 
financial markets. 
 
     
 
 
 
Section (III): Criminal punishments and another alternative solution instrument as 
a determent of market abuse activities 
 Please insert only one numbers from (1) to (5) opposite each of the following 
statements according to your agreement. Number (1) stands for the strongest agreement, 
Number (5) the weakest agreement.   
 
No. statements Rating 
A The criminal punishments in the ESCA law 2000 are not sufficient for deterring 
market abuse activities in the UAE financial market. 
 
 
B To discourage market abuse from not taking place in financial market an offender 
name, his/her punishment and the kind of offence which he/she has committed 
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should be published in media 
C The estimated fine imposed on the offender should not be less than the expected 
profits to be obtained or the loss to be avoided. 
 
D Acknowledge the reconciliation scheme in the securities markets provided that it 
takes place prior to issuing a final decision in the case. 
 
 
 
 
 
If you are willing to be interviewed, please write name, your e-mail address and 
mobile number below.  
Name:……………………………………………………. 
E-mail:    ………………………………………………………………………………. 
Mobile No:……………………………………………………………………………….. 
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Appendix 2: open-ended question.  
I think it is appropriate now to think of establishing a specialized court for the financial 
markets... In addition, the legally responsible for the insider dealings should include any 
person and not necessarily the company employees. So, a new identification to the insider’s 
identity according to the laws and the legal regulations of financial markets in the country 
should be devised. 
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Appendix 9: open-ended question 
Investors should be protected [by the SCA and financial markets] from manipulators 
in the financial market whether from brokers, financial advisors or executive 
.managers‘. 
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Appendix 8: open-ended question. 
The investors should be protected from the manipulators’ abuse in the financial market 
whether from brokers, financial advisors or executive managers. 
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Appendix 7: open-ended question 
There should be a severe punishment for disclosing inside information and then 
disclosing them promptly or after a short period of raising their shares. 
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Appendix 10: open-ended question. 
Monitoring decision makers and their conversation on television as they mislead the investors. 
In addition, the decision makers are misleading more than anybody else. 
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Appendix 5: open-ended question.  
enlightenment sessions for the investors should be given even on their own expenses to 
support his/her comprehensive understanding to the right way of investment in the 
stock market. In addition, warning the investors from risk taking and non-speculation so that 
we can build positive investement system. If not, we will be exposed to unbalanced stock 
market because of the speculations.  Moreover, we should not protect the person who insists 
on speculations unconsciously even if he was tricked somehow. 
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Appendix 11: open-ended question.  
The SCA should punish the administrations of companies that issues statements or 
news which negatively or positively influences the value of a share and then deny 
this news or information.. 
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Appendix 3: open-ended question.  
 
It should have experts specialised in the financial market who specialise in detecting 
manipulators... 
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Appendix 12: Certificate of Ethical Approval 
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